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With the number of immigrant deportations setting new records,
attention has focused largely on states like Arizona and
Alabama, which seem to be competing to pass the harshest anti-
immigrant state law provisions. Yet laws like those at issue in
Arizona v. United States, seeking to augment or supplement
federal immigration enforcement efforts, represent only one side
of the state and local response to the issue. Recent years have also
witnessed a spate of jurisdictions opting out of immigration
enforcement by passing measures restricting local law
enforcement from honoring federal immigration detainers.
This Article assesses this wave of rendition resistance in the
context of the history of interstate rendition in the United States
of fugitive slaves and "fugitives from justice" (criminal fugitives).
This history is relevant because, like immigration rendition, slave
rendition and criminal rendition concern a paradigmatic
transaction-the claim, by a person or government, of a right to
have a second government deliver up the body of a person into
the custody of the claimant. The history explored here is one of
the legal mechanisms for delivering bodies back across borders.
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Our rendition history reveals a robust tradition of rendition resistance
stemming from a concern for civil rights. This history supplies a body
of precedent supporting those localities that have chosen to resist
immigration detainers. Across two centuries of our history, it was
widely accepted that the federal government could not compel local
officials to comply with rendition demands. During this period, a
historical practice of state and local authorities resisting demands for
rendition in the name of civil rights persisted. Immigration rendition
resistance follows this tradition.
Comparing immigrant rendition to fugitive slave rendition and
criminal rendition lays bare the nearly complete absence of procedural
protections afforded persons in immigration rendition proceedings.
Additionally, appreciating the connections between immigrant
rendition and slave and criminal rendition allows us to look beyond
legal formalism and perceive the underlying values being served by
immigration rendition. Against this historical context, immigration
rendition becomes visible as a legal system akin to slave and criminal
rendition, established to counter the free migration of laborers of color
by delivering them back across borders. The exercise of local authority
against rendition efforts, as it has been used in the slave and criminal
contexts, can be seen as an expression of disapproval of those
underlying values.
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INTRODUcTION
The United States deported record numbers of immigrants-
more than 800,000-in fiscal years 2011 and 2012 combined.' A little
more than half of those deported were so-called "criminal aliens" 2
noncitizens who had been convicted of some criminal offense.3 These
numbers also set record highs for a single year.4 Yet in this same
period of record deportations, some local governments started a wave
of resistance by refusing to enforce federal immigration detainers
aimed at bringing immigrants caught up in state criminal justice
systems into the federal immigration enforcement net.
The discussion of the states' role in immigration enforcement has
largely focused on the question of whether states like Arizona,
Alabama, and Georgia may "opt in" to immigration enforcement by
passing local measures to supplement the federal government's
enforcement mechanisms.' The Supreme Court's decision in Arizona
v. United States6 may have put a damper on local efforts to augment
or supplement the federal immigration enforcement regime.' But the
1. Elise Foley, Deportation Hits Another Record Under Obama Administration,
HUFFINGTON POST (Dec. 21, 2012) (citing FY 2012: ICE Announces Year-End Removal
Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities and Issues New National Detainer Guidance
to Further Focus Resources, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Dec. 21, 2012)
http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1212/121221washingtondc2.htm [hereinafter ICE FY
2012 Report]), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/21/immigration-deportationn
2348090.html (noting 409,849 deportations in FY 2012 and 396,906 in FY 2011).
2. ICE FY 2012 Report, supra note 1 (noting 225,390 "criminal alien" deportations);
FY 2011: ICE Announces Year-End Removal Numbers, Highlights Focus on Key Priorities
Including Threats to Public Safety and National Security, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT (Oct. 18, 2011), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/1110/111018
washingtondc.htm [hereinafter ICE FY 2011 Report] (noting 216,698 "criminal alien"
deportations).
3. The number includes those convicted of minor traffic offenses. ICE FY 2011
Report, supra note 2.
4. Removal Statistics, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov
/removal-statistics/ (last visited Aug. 30, 2013) (click on "Criminal Aliens" drop-down
tab).
5. See generally Gabriel J. Chin & Marc L. Miller, The Unconstitutionality of State
Regulation of Immigration Through Criminal Law, 61 DUKE L.J. 251 (2011) (arguing state
legislation like Arizona's S.B. 1070 and copycat measures are preempted).
6. 132 S. Ct. 2492 (2012).
7. Id. at 2507. 1 have discussed some specific implications the Arizona decision
carries for immigration detainer practices in two prior articles. See generally Christopher
N. Lasch, Federal Immigration Detainers After Arizona v. United States, 46 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 629 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Detainers After Arizona] (arguing that federal use of
immigration detainers raises substantial constitutional questions, and that the logic of the
Arizona decision-holding Arizona's statutory scheme to be preempted because of
conflicts with the comprehensive immigration enforcement regime established by
Congress-can be applied with equal force to the executive branch's detainer regulation,
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recent wave of resistance to immigration detainers raises an equally
important question: May state and local governments "opt out" of
immigration enforcement? This Article answers that question by
examining local resistance to immigration rendition in its legal and
historical context.
Part I of this Article describes the surge of local resistance to
immigration enforcement that began in 2010. It discusses in detail the
immigration enforcement program, named "Secure Communities,"
that drove the number of deportations to record highs and the federal
government's use of immigration detainers in support of that
program. It then reviews the events leading to the decision of one
local government-Santa Clara County, California-to "opt out" of
immigration enforcement. Santa Clara's story is emblematic of the
resistance found in Chicago, the District of Columbia, New York, San
Francisco, and other jurisdictions that chose to opt out.
Part II explores the history of interstate rendition' in the United
States. It traces the history of the rendition of fugitives from justice
and fugitive slaves pursuant to the Extradition and Fugitive Slave
Clauses of the Constitution and implementing legislation and follows
the rise of uniform state legislation governing extradition and the
development of an interstate compact governing the use of detainers
for rendition of prisoners.
This history is relevant precedent to be considered in assessing
the legality of actions taken with respect to immigration detainers.
For this history concerns one paradigmatic transaction-the claim, by
a person or government, of a right to have a second government
which similarly conflicts with Congress's statutory scheme); Christopher N. Lasch,
Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement Under Arizona v. United States, 3 WAKE
FOREST J. L. & POL'Y 281 (2013) [hereinafter Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer
Enforcement] (arguing that even if some residual state authority to enforce federal
immigration laws exists after Arizona, it is nonetheless preempted, at least with respect to
state officials prolonging detention pursuant to immigration detainers). But see Kevin R.
Johnson, The Debate Over Immigration Reform Is Not Over Until It's Over,
SCOTUSBLOG (June 25, 2012, 8:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/online-
symposium-the-debate-over-immigration-reform-is-not-over-until-its-over/ ("States are
likely to test the boundaries of Arizona v. United States with new, if not improved,
immigration enforcement legislation.").
8. In his seminal treatise on extradition and rendition, John Bassett Moore
distinguished between "extradition," the delivering up of fugitives between independent
nations, and "rendition," the delivering up of fugitives domestically, within the United
States. 2 JOHN BASSETT MOORE, A TREATISE ON EXTRADITION AND INTERSTATE
RENDITION § 516 (Boston, The Boston Book Company 1891). "Extradition" between
nations is governed by international law, while "rendition" is governed by domestic law.
Id. Because domestic law applies to the three forms of delivering up discussed here, I
adhere to the term "rendition."
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deliver up the body of a person into the custody of the claimant. This
is our country's history of legal mechanisms for delivering bodies
back across borders.
Part III of this Article addresses how the law of immigration
detainers and the decision of local governments to dishonor them
should be understood in light of precedent-the history of rendition
reviewed in Part II. Understood in this context, the decision of Santa
Clara County and other localities to opt out of immigration detainer
enforcement is not only legally justifiable, but it is also consistent with
a historical tradition spanning nearly two centuries of state and local
authorities resisting federal demands for rendition in the name of civil
rights.
Part IV considers the broader implications of evaluating current
immigration practices against the historical backdrop reviewed in Part
II. After analogizing current immigration rendition to the rendition of
fugitive slaves or fugitives from justice, the Article concludes that a
common historical thread emerges: Rendition has been used as a
weapon to counter the free migration of laborers of color, by
delivering them back across borders, and the exercise of local
discretion has, with equal consistency, been used to meet it.
I. SANTA CLARA COUNTY AND THE RISE OF LOCAL RESISTANCE
TO IMMIGRATION RENDITION
A. Secure Communities
In March 2008, the federal government launched an immigration
enforcement program called "Secure Communities."9 The stated
purpose of the program was to focus on the deportation of
immigrants who committed serious crimes.10 The program targeted
9. ICE Unveils Sweeping New Plan to Target Criminal Aliens in Jails Nationwide:
Initiative Aims to Identify and Remove Criminal Aliens from All U.S. Jails and Prisons,
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT (Mar. 28, 2013), http://www.ice.gov
/news/releases/0803/080328washington.htm [hereinafter ICE, Sweeping New Plan].
10. Id. The list of "Level-1 crimes" included murder, kidnapping, and sexual assault,
as well as some arguably significantly less serious crimes, such as "threats," "resisting an
officer," and drug crimes with a sentence of greater than one year. U.S. IMMIGRATION &
CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES STANDARD OPERATING
PROCEDURES 9, available at http://epic.org/privacy/secure-communities/secure
communitiesops93009.pdf. That drug crimes were included in the list of "Level-1 crimes"
is not surprising given the nexus policymakers have argued exists between immigration
enforcement and the "war on drugs." See Kevin R. Johnson, It's the Economy, Stupid: The
Hijacking of the Debate over Immigration Reform by Monsters, Ghosts, and Goblins (Or
the War on Drugs, War on Terror, Narcoterrorists, Etc.), 13 CHAP. L. REV. 583, 588-600
[Vol. 92154
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prisoners who were awaiting trial or serving sentences for local, state,
or federal crimes."
The "cornerstone" of the Secure Communities program is
"interoperability"-the linking of federal crime, immigration, and
fingerprint databases. 12 Routinely, local law enforcement officials
submit booking fingerprints to the FBI for criminal background
checks.13 The FBI transmits these fingerprints to the Department of
Homeland Security ("DHS"),14 which then determines which
prisoners to target for immigration enforcement.
Immigration detainers are the central enforcement tool for the
Secure Communities program'" because they are the principal
mechanism for federal immigration officials to obtain custody over
suspected immigration violators in the custody of state or local law
enforcement officials. When federal officials learn that a suspected
immigration violator is in a state prison or local jail, they issue a
detainer, also known as a "Form I-247.""1 The form is a piece of paper
purporting to command 8 state or local officials to maintain in their
(2010) (exploring the rhetoric and the reality of links between the "war on drugs" and
immigration enforcement).
11. ICE, Sweeping New Plan, supra note 9. Because this Article focuses on state and
local resistance to the federal government's enforcement program, I consider only the use
of immigration detainers to obtain custody over state and local prisoners and do not
address any of the legal issues pertaining to the use of detainers to obtain custody over
federal prisoners. See Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 Nw. U. L. REV. 1281,
1302-08 (2010) (discussing the intersection of civil immigration detainers and criminal
prosecutions of immigrants); LENA GRABER & AMY SCHNITZER, NAT'L IMMIGRATION
PROJECT OF THE NAT'L LAWYERS GUILD, THE BAIL REFORM ACT AND RELEASE FROM
CRIMINAL AND IMMIGRATION CUSTODY FOR FEDERAL CRIMINAL DEFENDANTS (June
2013), available at http://www.nationalimmigrationproject.org/legalresources/practice
advisories/pa Federal BailAdvisory.pdf.
12. See, e.g., Buncombe, Henderson, and Gaston Sheriffs' Offices in North Carolina
Receive Full Interoperability Technology to Help Identify Criminal Aliens: Departments of
Homeland Security and Justice Providing More Identity Information to Local Officers
About Non-U.S. Citizen Criminal Arrests, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT
(Nov. 18,2008), http://www.ice.gov/news/releases/0811/081118charlotte.htm.
13. David J. Venturella, Secure Communities: Identifying and Removing Criminal




16. ICE Detainers: Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT, http://www.ice.gov/newsflibrary/factsheets/detainer-faqs.htm (last visited
Aug. 31, 2013) ("Detainers are critical for ICE to be able to identify and ultimately
remove criminal aliens who are currently in federal, state or local custody.").
17. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdflimmigration-detainer-form.pdf.
18. A thorough discussion of the immigration detainer form, including an analysis of
whether the immigration detainer is a request or a command, is presented in Part III.
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custody a person who otherwise would be released to freedom19 and
to deliver that person to federal immigration officials.
Secure Communities increased ten-fold the use of immigration
detainers as an enforcement tool.20 The United States now issues
approximately 250,000 immigration detainers each year.21 With this
increased use of detainers, the number of deportations has spiked.22
B. Santa Clara County and Resistance to Secure Communities
But Secure Communities was not without its detractors. Since its
inception in March 2008, opponents have denounced Secure
Communities, charging that it encourages racial profiling, diverts
local resources from crime control, and makes communities less safe
by discouraging immigrants from reporting crimes or cooperating
with police.23
19. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 17 ("IT IS REQUESTED THAT
YOU: Maintain custody of the subject ... beyond the time when the subject would have
otherwise been released from your custody to allow [the Department of Homeland
Security] to take custody of the subject.").
20. Immigration and Customs Enforcement ("ICE") placed 14,803 immigration
detainers in fiscal year 2006 and 20,339 in fiscal year 2007. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2008, at 36, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2008.pdf; U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND
SEC., BUDGET-IN-BRIEF: FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 35, available at
http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2009.pdf. In fiscal years 2009 and 2010,
ICE issued 234,939 and 239,523 detainers respectively, or approximately 20,000 per month.
U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2011: BUDGET IN BRIEF 63 [hereinafter FY 2011
BUDGET], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assetsfbudget bib-fy2011.pdf; U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FY 2012: BUDGET IN BRIEF 79 [hereinafter FY 2012
BUDGET], available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf.
21. 347,691 detainers were issued during the sixteen-month period from October 1,
2011 through January 31, 2013. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS
CLEARINGHOUSE, FEW ICE DETAINERS TARGET SERIOUS CRIMINALS (Sept. 17, 2013),
available at http://trac.syr.edu/immigration/reports/330; see also Complaint for Injunctive
and Declaratory Relief and Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus at [ 28, Moreno v.
Napolitano, No. 1:11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 11, 2011) (alleging 270,988 detainers were
issued in fiscal year 2009).
22. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, SECURE COMMUNITIES:
IDENT/IAFIS INTEROPERABILITY MONTHLY STATISTICS THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30,
2011 at 1-2 (2011), available at http://www.ice.gov/doclib/foia/sc-stats/nationwide
_interoperability-stats-fy2011-to-date.pdf. In fiscal year 2011, "interoperability" was
deployed in 937 new jurisdictions, resulting in an increase of over 100,000 "matches" and
nearly 30,000 additional deportations. Id. As of August 22, 2012, ICE had activated Secure
Communities in ninety-seven percent of jurisdictions nationwide. U.S. IMMIGRATION
CUSTOMS & ENFORCEMENT, ACTIVE JURISDICTIONS 1 (2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdf/sc-activated2.pdf.
23. Violeta R. Chapin, iSilencio! Undocumented Immigrant Witnesses and the Right to
Silence, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 119, 152-54 (2011); NAT'L IMMIGRATION FORUM, Secure
Communities, available at http://www.immigrationforum.org/images/uploads/Secure
_Communities.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2013); NAT'L IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., MORE
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Echoing these criticisms, in June 2010, the Board of Supervisors
of Santa Clara County passed a resolution urging the disentanglement
of local law enforcement from federal immigration enforcement.24
The resolution indicated a clear concern for the civil rights of
immigrants in Santa Clara County.25 Its opening paragraph described
the county as "home to a diverse and vibrant community of people
representing many races, ethnicities, and nationalities, including
immigrants from all over the world." 26 The resolution also expressed
the belief of the Board of Supervisors that "laws like Arizona's SB
1070 ... subject individuals to racial profiling" and affirmed the
county's commitment to protect all of its residents from
"discrimination, abuse, violence, and exploitation."" The Board of
Supervisors identified the Tenth Amendment as a legal basis for
separating local law enforcement from the federal immigration
enforcement effort.26
Following the resolution, United States Representative Zoe
Lofgren wrote to DHS Secretary Janet Napolitano and United States
Attorney General Eric Holder, asking for clarification on how
localities could "opt out" of the Secure Communities program. 29
Counsel for Santa Clara County sought similar clarification, invoking
Tenth Amendment concerns by asking whether the county was
QUESTIONS THAN ANSWERS ABOUT SECURE COMMUNITIES 3-4 (March 2009), available
at http://v2011.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/secure-communities-2009-03-23.pdf.






28. Id.; see also U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States
respectively or to the people."). The Tenth Amendment prohibits federal commandeering
of local officials, see Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 935 (1997), as well as "unfunded
mandates," see Edward A. Zelinsky, Unfunded Mandates, Hidden Taxation, and the Tenth
Amendment: On Public Choice, Public Interest, and Public Services, 46 VAND. L. REV.
1355, 1411 (1993). Zelinsky observes:
A mandate is a requirement imposed on a subordinate level of government to
provide a public service that otherwise would not be furnished or to provide a
public service in a more costly fashion. A mandate is unfunded if the higher tier of
government fails to reimburse fully the lower level for the costs imposed on it.
Id. at 1366.
29. Letter from U.S. Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcomm. on Immigration,
Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int'l Law, Comm. on the Judiciary, to Janet
Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., and Eric H. Holder, Attorney Gen. (July 27,
2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/1-ZL-Secure-Communities-Opt-
Out-Letter-%287-27-10%29.pdf.
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"required or merely requested" to honor detainers, and whether the
county would receive reimbursement for any expenses incurred. 0
Federal authorities initially indicated the county could opt out by
giving notice to DHS and the relevant state identification bureau,"
and in September 2010 the Board of Supervisors voted to withdraw
Santa Clara County from Secure Communities.32 Santa Clara gave the
requisite written notices, but the Director of Secure Communities
told Santa Clara County in a November 2010 meeting the county
would not be permitted to withdraw.33
The issues that had been percolating in Santa Clara made
national news in April 2011 after advocates released reams of
documents obtained through Freedom of Information Act requests
concerning the Secure Communities program.34 The released
documents confirmed that Santa Clara's experience was not unique.35
In addition to vividly demonstrating DHS's failure to adhere to the
enforcement priorities it claimed, the documents revealed significant
confusion about whether local participation in Secure Communities
was mandatory or optional. 6 The released documents "reveal[ed]
30. Letter from Miguel Mdrquez, Cnty. Counsel, to David Venturella, Exec. Dir. of
Secure Cmtys., at 2 (Aug. 16, 2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/1-
County-Counsel-8-16-10.pdf (emphasis in original).
31. Letter from Janet Napolitano, Sec'y, Dep't of Homeland Sec., to U.S. Rep. Zoe
Lofgren, Chairwoman, Subcommittee on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec.
and Int'l Law, Comm. on the Judiciary (Sept. 7, 2010), available at
http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/2-USDOJ-and-DHS-ResponsestoZL.09.08.2010.pdf;
Letter from Ronald Weich, Assistant Attorney Gen., to Rep. Zoe Lofgren, Chairwoman,
Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Sec. and Int'l Law, Comm. on
the Judiciary (Sept. 8, 2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/2-USDOJ-
and-DHS-ResponsestoZL.09.08.2010.pdf; Letter from David J. Venturella, Assistant Dir.
of Secure Cmtys., to Miguel M~rquez, Cnty. Counsel (undated), available at
http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/4-ICE-response-to-SCC.pdf.
32. Memorandum from Miguel Marquez, Cnty. Counsel, to George Shirakawa,
Chairperson, and Donald F. Gage, Vice Chair, Pub. Safety & Justice Comm., at 2 (Dec. 2,
2010), available at http://media.sjbeez.org/files/2011/10/9-PSJC-memo-12-2-10.PDF.
33. See id. at 5 ("The Director of Secure Communities claimed that a local opt-out
had never been a possibility, refusing to acknowledge that this was a clear departure from
his earlier written communications with the County.").
34. See Lee Romney & Paloma Esquivel, Noncriminals Swept up in Federal
Deportation Program, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 25, 2011, http://articles.latimes.com/2011/apr/25
/local/la-me-secure-communities-20110425.
35. NAT'L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., BRIEFING GUIDE TO "SECURE
COMMUNITIES"-ICE's CONTROVERSIAL IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT PROGRAM:
NEW STATISTICS AND INFORMATION REVEAL DISTURBING TRENDS AND LEAVE
CRUCIAL QUESTIONS UNANSWERED 1-4, available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/Secure
%20Communities%2OFact%20Sheet%20Briefing%20guide%208-2-2010%20Production
.pdf
36. Id. at 3.
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that ICE officials had long known that the program was not
voluntary."3  Outraged, Representative Lofgren called for an
investigation of DHS, charging the agency with "essentially lying to
local government and to members of Congress."38 Representative
Lofgren detailed the trail of inconsistent statements and suggested
DHS had adopted an internal definition of the term "opt out" in
order to give the department "plausible deniability" while all the
while knowing the Secure Communities program was not optional."
The backlash was swift and strong. The Congressional Hispanic
Caucus urged the President to "freeze" Secure Communities effective
immediately, noting the evidence revealed a "striking dissonance"
between its stated purpose and actual effect and suggesting the
program may "endanger the public, particularly among communities
of color."40 Illinois and New York notified DHS of their immediate
withdrawal from Secure Communities,41 and Massachusetts Governor
Deval Patrick announced his state would withdraw.42
With the news that the federal government had unwittingly co-
opted state and local governments into a system of mandatory
immigration enforcement, legal scholars quickly noted the Tenth
Amendment implications. Professor Bill Ong Hing observed: "The
central teaching of the Tenth Amendment cases is that 'even where
Congress has the authority under the Constitution to pass laws
requiring or prohibiting certain acts, it lacks the power directly to
37. Haraz Ghanbari, Congresswoman Calls for Investigation of Enforcement Program




39. Letter from U.S. Rep. Zoe Lofgren, to Charles K. Edwards, Acting Inspector
Gen., and Timothy Moynihan, Assistant Dir., Office of Prof'1 Responsibility, U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (Apr. 28, 2011), available at
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/04/28/lofgren-calls-for-dhs-investigation n 855138
.html. The documents also suggested that DHS may have "shifted away from agreements
with local police to signing top-down state level agreements without local input," which
"seems to have limited the right of localities to choose not to participate in the program."
NAT'L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., supra note 35, at 3 & nn.15-16.
40. Letter from U.S. Rep. Charles A. Gonzalez, Chairman, Cong. Hispanic Caucus, to
President Barack Obama (May 5, 2011), available at http://ndlon.org/pdfl2011-
05chcletter.pdf.
41. Letter from Mylan Denerstein, Counsel to the Governor of N.Y., to John
Sandweg, Counselor to the Sec'y, U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (June 1, 2011), available at
http://www.governor.ny.gov/assets/Secure%20Communities.pdf; Letter from Pat Quinn,
Governor of Ill., to Marc Rapp, Acting Assistant Dir., Secure Cmtys. (May 4, 2011),
available at http://epic.org/privacy/secure-communities/sc-ill.pdf.
42. See Editorial, Resistance Grows, N.Y. TIMES, June 7, 2011, http://www.nytimes
.com/2011/06/08/opinion/08wedl.html.
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compel the States to require or prohibit those acts.' "43 And from
Boalt Hall, Aarti Kohli noted Secure Communities caused costs to
state and local governments, thus indirectly referencing a Tenth
Amendment "unfunded mandate" concern."
Stymied in its efforts to opt out of Secure Communities, Santa
Clara decided to cut its ties to federal immigration enforcement by
taking away the federal government's key tool for obtaining its
targets-the immigration detainer. On October 18, 2011, the Board of
Supervisors declared independence from federal immigration
enforcement by announcing the county would no longer routinely
honor federal immigration detainers.4 5 Santa Clara resolved not to
honor any immigration detainer unless the federal government
agreed to pay the costs of detention, and then only if the prisoner
were convicted of a serious crime.46 The county declared absolute its
refusal to honor immigration detainers for juvenile prisoners.4 7
Santa Clara is but one example in a wave of jurisdictions opting
out in the wake of the documents released in April 2011.48 In
Alameda County (California),49 Champaign County (Illinois),"o Cook
43. Media Advisory, Chief Justice Earl Warren Inst. on Law and Soc. Policy, Univ. of
Cal.-Berkeley, Sch. of Law, Legal Scholars Weigh in on Immigration Enforcement
Controversy in California and the ICE's "Secure Communities" Program 2 (May 10, 2011)
(quoting New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 166 (1992)), available at
http://www.law.berkeley.edu/img/FinalMedia AdvisorySComm.pdf. Prof. Hiroshi
Motomura observed that Secure Communities "may overstep the constitutional authority
of the federal government to tell local governments how to run [their] police
departments." Id.
44. Id. at 3 ("Because of ICE [detainers], local jurisdictions use their own limited
resources to feed, detain, and manage low-level offenders who would ordinarily not
remain in custody. All of this occurs before the person is even taken into custody by ICE.
Secure Communities has resulted in-a dramatic rise in ICE [detainers] issued to local jails,
thereby overburdening local law enforcement with the detention of those arrested on minor
offenses who would not normally be held for extended periods.").
45. SANTA CLARA CNTY. BD. OF SUPERVISORS, SUMMARY OF PROCEEDINGS /
MINUTES OF OCTOBER 18, 2011, item 11(a)(2), available at http://sccgov.iqm2.com




48. BD. OF SUPERVISORS OF THE CNTY. OF SANTA CLARA, CAL., BD. OF
SUPERVISORS' POLICY MANUAL § 3.54, Civil Immigration Detainer Requests (2013),
available at http://www.sccgov.org/sites/bos/legislation/bos-policy-manual/documents
/bospolicychap3.pdf.
49. See Letter from Richard Valle, Supervisor, District 2, to Bd. Supervisors,
Alameda Cnty. (Apr. 17, 2010), available at http://www.acgov.org/board
/boscalendar/documents/DocsAgendaReg_04_23_13/BOARDS%20COMMISSION/Set
%20Matter%20Calendar/BOS_Approve a-resolution-regarding_ICE-CivilDetainer_-R
equests.pdf (including resolution text). Local commentators have described the resolution
as symbolic and non-binding on the sheriff. See Steven Tavares, Alameda County
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County (Illinois)," Milwaukee County (Wisconsin),5 2 Multnomah
County (Oregon),53 the towns and cities of Amherst,54 Berkeley,"
Chicago,6 Los Angeles, Newark," New Orleans,59 New York,' and
San Francisco, 61 and the District of Columbia,62 measures have been
Supervisors Discourage Sheriff From Detaining Undocumented Residents,
EBCITIZEN.COM (Apr. 23, 2013), http://www.ebcitizen.com/2013/04/alameda-county-
supervisors-discourage.html. In adjacent Contra Costa County, the sheriff is reported to
be finalizing a policy that would limit detainer compliance. Malaika Fraley, Contra Costa
County Softening Policies on Immigrant Deportations, CONTRA COSTA TIMES, May 24,
2013, http://www.contracostatimes.com/contra-costa-times/ci 23313741/contra-costa-
county-softening-policies-immigrant-deportations.
50. See Letter from Dan Walsh, Champaign Cnty. Sheriff, to U.S. Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (March 8, 2012), available at http://d3n8a8pro7vhmx.cloudfront.net
/progressivemajorityaction/pages/92/attachments/original/1369418919/ChampaignILPol
icyLetter.pdf?1369418919.
51. COOK COUNTY, ILL., ORDINANCE § 46-37(a) (Supp. 2012), available at
http://cookcountygov.com/ll1lib-pub-cook/cook ordinance.aspx?WindowArgs=1501
("The Sheriff of Cook County shall decline ICE detainer requests unless there is a written
agreement with the federal government by which all costs incurred by Cook County in
complying with the ICE detainer shall be reimbursed.").
52. Res. File No. 12-135, 2012 Milwaukee Cnty. Bd. of Supervisors (Wis. 2012),
available at http://milwaukeecounty.legistar.com/LegislationDetail.aspx?ID=1124069
&GUID=3D583485-4F01-4B43-B892-D6FFE5D327BF.
53. Res. 2013-032, 2013 Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs for Multnomah Cnty. (Or. 2013),
available at http://web.multco.us/sites/default/files/2013-032.pdf.
54. Yoojin Cho, Amherst to Opt out of Secure Communities-Resolution to Opt out of
Immigration Law Passed, 22WWLP.COM (May 22, 2012), available at
http://www.wwlp.com/news/local/hampshire/amherst-lst-town-to-opt-out-of-secure-comm
unities-law.
55. Annotated Agenda, Berkeley City Council Meeting (Oct. 30, 2012), available at
http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/City-Council/2012/lOOct/Documents/10-30_Regular
MeetingAnnotatedAgenda.aspx; see also Letter from Christine Daniel, City Manager
of Berkeley, Cal., to Mayor and Members of the City Council on Consideration of
Revisions to Policy Regarding Immigration Detainers in the Berkeley Jail (Oct. 30, 2012),
available at http://www.ci.berkeley.ca.us/Clerk/CityCouncil/2012/lOOct/Documents/2012-
10-30_Item_19_Consideration-ofRevisions.aspx.
56. CHI., ILL., CODE §§ 2-173-005, 2-173-042 (2013).
57. Editorial, Baca's Sensible Shift On Immigration-Illegal Immigrants Won't Be
Detained for Minor Offenses, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 6, 2012), http://articles.latimes.com
/2012/dec/06/opinionla-ed-adv-detainers-20121206.
58. James Queally, Newark Police First in N.J. to Refuse to Detain Undocumented
Immigrants Accused of Minor Crimes, NJ.COM (Aug. 15, 2013), http://www.nj.comlessex
/index.ssf/2013/08/newark-police first in-njto.refuse to detain illegal-immigrantsaccu
sedofminor crimes.html.
59. See Campbell Robertson, New Orleans and U.S. in Standoff on Detentions, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 13, 2013, at A10 (detailing New Orleans' policy limiting detainer compliance
that "came about for a variety of reasons, including a lawsuit filed in federal court in 2011
by two men who had spent months in Orleans Parish Prison on expired detention
requests").
60. N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 9-131 (Supp. 2013).
61. Brent Begin, San Francisco County Jail Won't Hold Inmates for ICE, S.F.
EXAMINER (May 6, 2011), http://www.sfexaminer.com/sanfrancisco/san-francisco-county-
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passed or policies enacted seeking to end routine compliance with
detainers. State-level resistance has occurred in California 63 and
Connecticut," and has been proposed in Florida,65 Massachusetts,6 6
and Washington.67
The central motivating features of the Santa Clara withdrawal
from Secure Communities-and the withdrawal of other localities as
well-have been the following: First, concern with the civil rights
implications of the Secure Communities enforcement program, and
particularly concerns of racial profiling;68 second, disillusionment with
jail-wont-hold-inmates-for-ice/Content?oid=2174504 (describing policy adopted by San
Francisco Sheriff Michael Hennessey).
62. Immigration Detainer Compliance Amendment Act of 2012, D.C. Act 19-442, 59
D.C. Reg. 10153, 10153-55 (Aug. 24, 2012).
63. The California "TRUST (Transparency and Responsibility Using State Tools)
Act," aimed at limiting the state's compliance with federal immigration detainers, was
signed into law by the Governor of California on October 5, 2013. See Assemb. B. 4, 2013-
2014 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2013), available at http://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces
/billNavClient.xhtml?billid=201320140AB4 (bill history) and http://www.leginfo.ca.gov
/pub/13-14/bill/asm/ab_0001-0050/ab_4_bill_20130624_amendedsen-v97.pdf (text of bill).
64. Perhaps responding to litigation, see Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Brizuela
v. Feliciano, No. 3:12-cv-00226-JBA (D. Conn. Feb. 13, 2012), the Connecticut
Department of Correction limited its compliance with detainers to instances in which the
Department determines the prisoner's release would pose an "unacceptable risk to public
safety." CONN. DEP'T OF CORR., ADMIN. DIRECTIVE 9.3: INMATE ADMISSIONS,
TRANSFERS AND DISCHARGES 9-10 (2012), available at
http://www.ct.gov/doc/LIB/doc/PDF/AD/ad0903.pdf. In June 2013, the Connecticut
General Assembly passed and the Governor signed into law a bill that will expand the
limitations on detainer compliance beyond the Department of Correction to other state
and local law enforcement agencies. Act of June 25, 2013, 2013 Conn. Acts 13-155,
available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2013/act/palpdfl2013PA-00155-ROOHB-06659-PA.pdf
(concerning civil immigration detainers).
65. S.B. 730, 2012-2013, Reg. Sess. (Fla. 2013). The bill, which would have limited
detainer compliance to cases involving specified "serious offense[s]," id. at 4, died in
committee in May 2013. See S 730, OPEN STATES, http://openstates.org/fl/bills/2013/S730/
(last visited Sept. 2, 2013).
66. H.B. 1613, 188th Gen. Ct., Reg. Sess. (Mass. 2013). The bill was titled "An Act
relative to restore community trust in Massachusetts law enforcement," and would
severely restrict state participation in immigration enforcement. Id. For example, the act
would preclude Massachusetts judges from denying bail based solely on an immigration
detainer, prevent law enforcement from sharing booking lists or release dates for state
prisoners, and prevent law enforcement from making state prisoners available for ICE
interviews without providing the inmate the opportunity to have counsel present. Id.
§ 40(b). The act would prevent the honoring of immigration detainers except for adults
sentenced to a prison term of five years or longer, and even then only when ICE has (1) a
prior order of removal or has filed a notice to appear with the immigration court and (2)
entered into an agreement for reimbursement of any costs of prolonged state
incarceration. Id.
67. H.B. 1874, 63rd Leg. Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013), available at http://apps.leg.wa.gov
/documents/billdocs/2013-14/PdflBills/House%2Bills/1874.pdf.
68. See supra notes 23-27 and accompanying text.
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the failure of the federal government to honor its stated enforcement
priorities;69 and third, legal reliance on the Tenth Amendment, and
the argument that the federal government-particularly in the
absence of compensation-cannot compel enforcement of federal law
by state and local officials.70
The concerns motivating Santa Clara's resistance to immigration
rendition are not new. Indeed, each of these features has been
implicated at some point in the struggles and controversies over
interstate rendition that have persisted across the span of United
States history. Understanding that history is essential to
understanding the legitimacy of local resistance to immigration
detainers.
II. THE HISTORY OF RENDITION AND RESISTANCE IN THE UNITED
STATES
A. From Colonial Times to Emancipation
Two rendition systems were in operation during the first half of
American history-a criminal rendition system for delivering up
"fugitives from justice" and a slave rendition system for delivering up
escaped slaves." Rendition controversies abounded in the antebellum
period, with rendition disputes-whether in cases involving fugitives
from justice or fugitives from slavery-arising largely in the context of
the broader sectional dispute over slavery.72 These controversies were
persistent in part because of the lack of any enforcement mechanism
to bring states into compliance with the formal legal rules governing
rendition.7 3 The federal government, throughout this period, was
69. See supra notes 34-40 and accompanying text.
70. See supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text. In December 2012, for example,
California's Attorney General Kamala D. Harris issued guidance encouraging California
law enforcement agencies to adopt their own policies on detainer compliance. Attorney
General Harris opined: "If .. . detainers were mandatory, forced compliance would
constitute the type of commandeering of state resources forbidden by the Tenth
Amendment." KAMALA D. HARRIS, INFO. BULLETIN 2012-DLE-01: RESPONSIBILITIES
OF LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES UNDER SECURE COMMUNITIES 2 (2012)
(citing Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 925 (1997); New York v. United States, 505
U.S. 144, 161 (1992)), available at http://www.aclunc.org/docs/immigration/
aginfo bulletin.pdf; see also Resistance Grows, supra note 42 ("The idea that the federal
government can commandeer states' resources for its enforcement schemes seems ripe for
legal challenge.").
71. See discussion infra Part II.A.1.
72. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-5.
73. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-5.
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believed to lack any power to compel the compliance of state officials
with federal rendition law.74
This situation-with states able to effectively opt out of the
rendition process-pertained in both the realms of criminal rendition
and slave rendition." State discretion to opt out of criminal rendition
would persist into the twentieth century. 6 With respect to slave
rendition, the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 represented an attempt to
solve the problem of persistent state rendition controversy by placing
enforcement of rendition exclusively in the control of federal
officials."
1. The Constitutional Provisions for Interstate Rendition
The history of interstate rendition in the United States has been
driven by two clauses in the Constitution requiring fugitives to "be
delivered up"-the Extradition Clause" and the Fugitive Slave
Clause.79 The coupling of these clauses in the Constitution (the
Fugitive Slave Clause immediately following the Extradition Clause)
reflected a linking of fugitive slaves and fugitives from justice that was
more than a century old. Indeed, the first formal compact among
colonies-the New England Confederation of 1643 between
Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Haven, and New Plymouth-
provided in a single article for the return of both fugitive slaves and
fugitives from justice.so The Articles of Confederation of the United
Colonies in 1672 did the same."' As a general matter, neither fugitive
74. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-5.
75. See discussion infra Part II.A.2-5.
76. See discussion infra Part II.B.1.
77. See discussion infra Part II.A.4.
78. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A Person charged in any State with Treason,
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
79. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No Person held to service or Labour in one State,
under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or
Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up
on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.").
80. Frank Kopelman, Extradition and Rendition: History-Law-Recommendations,
14 B.U. L. REV. 591, 625-26 (1934).
81. ARTICLES OF CONFEADERATION BETWEEN THE PLANTATIONS UNDER THE
GOUERMENT OF THE MASSACHUSETTS THE PLANTATIONS VNDER THE GOUERNMENT
OF NEW PLYMOUTH; AND THE PLANTATIONS VNDER THE GOUERMENT OF
CONECTICOTr of 1672, art. VII, reprinted in THE COMPACT WITH THE CHARTER AND
LAWS OF THE COLONY OF NEW PLYMOUTH: TOGETHER WITH THE CHARTER OF THE
COUNCIL AT PLYMOUTH, AND AN APPENDIX, CONTAINING THE ARTICLES OF
CONFEDERATION OF THE UNITED COLONIES OF NEW ENGLAND AND OTHER
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slaves nor fugitives from justice found quarter in escaping from one
English colony to another during the pre-revolutionary period.82
The eighteenth century and the American Revolution put an end
to the unanimity of the colonies on the question of slavery. The
concept of slavery, as a metaphor, dominated eighteenth century
political discourse, culminating in Americans viewing themselves on
the eve of the Revolution as "the most abject sort of slaves" to the
British." The premise behind the metaphor was that slavery was
abhorrent to the natural rights of man.' Inevitably, in an age in which
the colonists increasingly employed the slavery metaphor in their
efforts to throw off the yoke of English oppression, antislavery
sentiment waxed concurrently with this logic: "The identification
between the cause of the colonies and the cause of the Negroes bound
in chattel slavery-an identification built into the very language of
politics-became inescapable."" While those in the southern states
were reluctant to embrace the identification of the two causes, such
rhetoric was commonplace in the northern and middle colonies by
1774.86 This contributed to the rising anti-slavery feeling." The
VALUABLE DOCUMENTS 314, 317 (William Brigham ed., Boston, Dutton & Wentworth
1836).
82. ALMON WHEELER LAUBER, INDIAN SLAVERY IN COLONIAL TIMES WITHIN
THE PRESENT LIMITS OF THE UNITED STATES 217-25 (1913) (detailing measures taken
for the return of fugitive slaves in the colonies); MARION GLEASON MCDOUGALL,
FUGITIVE SLAVES (1619-1865), at 89-103 (Boston, Ginn & Co. 1891) (detailing colonial
legislation for fugitive slave rendition); I.T. Hoague, Extradition Between States: Executive
Discretion, 13 AM. L. REV. 181, 188-89 (1879) (describing "intimate" relationship of the
colonies with regard to criminal justice); Kopelman, supra note 80, at 624-25 (noting that
fugitives from justice "usually" could not obtain asylum); Michael Edmund O'Neill,
Article III and the Process Due a Connecticut Yankee Before King Arthur's Court, 76
MARQ. L. REV. 1, 62 (1992) (describing how fugitives from justice could be transported to
England from the colonies for trial in an English court). But see C.W.A. David, The
Fugitive Slave Law of 1793 and its Antecedents, 9 J. NEGRO HIST. 18, 18 (1924) ("In New
England a provision obtained for the temporary protection of runaway servants who had
fled on account of tyranny of their masters.").
83. BERNARD BAILYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN
REVOLUTION 232-33 (1967).
84. Slavery "meant the inability to maintain one's just property in material things and
abstract rights, rights and things which a proper constitution guaranteed a free people." Id.
at 233. It was an "absolute political evil," a "symptom and consequence of disease in the
body politic." Id. at 232-33.
85. Id. at 235. See generally id. at 232-46 (acknowledging conflicts between slavery
and principles of freedom based in the American Revolution as noted by Revolutionary
figures); ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL
PROCESS 19-22 (1975) (identifying numerous Revolutionary era figures who wrote in
opposition to slavery because of its conflict with the principles of freedom and liberty);
David, supra note 82, at 20 (noting the resistance to the slave trade in the Continental
Congress leading up to the Revolutionary War).
86. BAILYN,supra note 83, at 236-39.
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sectional divide thus engendered would spur rendition controversies
implicating slavery until the Civil War ended them.
The conviction that slavery was inimical to natural law had long
been discussed, but it also flowed easily from Lord Mansfield's
decision in Somerset's Case" in 1772, condemning slavery as "so
odious, that nothing can be suffered to support it, but positive law."89
Somerset's Case "became a cloud over the legitimacy of slavery in
America."90 It resonated with revolutionary ideology and fueled the
antislavery movement in America. Slaves in Massachusetts
successfully sued for their freedom on the ground that no positive law
in Massachusetts supported their enslavement. 91 Abolitionists
declared the entire ground of the American colonies to be free soil,
since slavery had been held in Somerset's Case to be inconsistent with
the English Constitution, and the colonies were forbidden from
establishing laws inconsistent with England's.' Rising antislavery
sentiment fueled significant accomplishments before and during the
Revolution, including the abolition of slavery (either immediate or
gradual) in several of the northern states.93 The sectional divide over
slavery deepened.
With respect to rendition, the states after the Revolution were no
longer bound together as colonies of the Crown94 but were instead
87. David, supra note 82, at 20; James Oakes, "The Compromising Expedient":
Justifying a Proslavery Constitution, 17 CARDOzO L. REV. 2023,2027-30 (1996).
88. Somerset v. Stewart, (1772) 98 Eng. Rep. 499, 509-10 (K.B.).
89. COVER, supra note 85, at 17 (quoting Somerset's Case, 98 Eng. Rep. at 510).
Scholars have debated the true content and meaning of Somerset's Case. See Jerome
Nadelhaft, The Somerset Case and Slavery: Myth, Reality, and Repercussions, 51 J. NEGRO
HiST. 193, 200-01 (1966) (casting doubt on that portion of the reported decision that
Cover quotes here); William M. Wiecek, Lord Mansfield and the Legitimacy of Slavery in
the Anglo-American World, 42 U. CHI. L. REV. 86, 141-46 (1974) (summarizing variants of
the Somerset decision). What is important here, however, is Somerset's reception in
America, and it is clear that Lord Mansfield's condemnation of slavery as "odious"
reached the American audience. See Wiecek, supra.
90. Wiecek, supra note 89, at 88. The author notes this "result ... would have
surprised and annoyed [Lord] Mansfield." Id.
91. Id. at 115.
92. Id. at 116-17.
93. David, supra note 82, at 20; Oakes, supra note 87, at 2027-30.
94. Before the Revolution, the colonies regularly delivered up fugitives from justice
from one colony to another, in part because they were "under a common sovereign" and
the "common good of the whole sovereign" was implicated. Kopelman, supra note 80, at
624-25; see Commonwealth v. Deacon, 10 Sergeant & Rawle 125, 129, 1823 WL 2218 (Pa.
1823) ("The common good of the whole, forbids an asylum, in one part, for crimes
committed in another. So, prior to the American revolution, a criminal who fled from one
colony, found no protection in another."). Justice Tilghman's opinion in Deacon was cited
by leading commentators. See, e.g., ROLLIN CARLOS HuRD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT
OF PERSONAL LIBERTY, AND ON THE WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE
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independent nations with no duty to deliver up fugitives to each
other.95 Since Somerset's Case "supported the conclusion that a slave
became free upon setting foot in a free jurisdiction,"9 6 the rendition of
fugitive slaves between free and slaveholding states now became an
open question."
The Articles of Confederation, drafted in 1776 and 1777, and
ratified in 1781, contained a provision for the return of fugitives from
justice 9 -but none for fugitive slaves.99 Rendition of fugitive slaves
was governed only by comity: "The state to which a slave fled was
free to emancipate her or to return her, as it saw fit."'"0 Fugitive slaves
CONNECTED WITH IT: WITH A VIEW OF THE LAW OF EXTRADITION OF FUGITIVES 592
(Albany, W.C. Little & Co. 1858); 2 MOORE, supra note 8, at 980; JOSEPH STORY,
COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS, FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, IN REGARD TO
CONTRACTS, RIGHTS, AND REMEDIES, AND ESPECIALLY IN REGARD TO MARRIAGES,
DIVORCES, WILLS, SUCCESSIONS, AND JUDGMENTS 522 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co.
1834).
95. See O'Neill, supra note 82, at 63. Cf Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and
Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1446 (1987) ("[F]ederation by mutual treaty was exactly
what the Revolutionaries had in mind when they created the Articles. The document was
not styled as a 'constitution' (as were the new charters within each state) but as a
'confederacy,' a 'firm league of friendship' entered into by 'different states,' each of which
would 'retain[] its sovereignty, freedom, and independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction
and right, which is not by this confederation expressly delegated to the United States, in
Congress assembled.' ")
96. COVER, supra note 85, at 87.
97. See David, supra note 82, at 20 (noting that the Revolution "divided [the country]
into slave and non-slave-holding sections, a condition which made the return of fugitives a
sectional question").
98. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1. At least Connecticut and
Virginia passed legislation purporting to implement this provision. ACTS AND LAWS OF
THE STATE OF CONNECTICUT, IN AMERICA 110 (Timothy Green, ed., New London 1784);
MOORE, supra note 8, at 824 (citing 10 HENNING'S STAT. AT LARGE 130). Additionally, a
custom predating the Articles of Confederation, by which surrender of a fugitive was
made upon receipt of a writ signed by the chief justice of the demanding state and
endorsed by the chief justice of the asylum state, appears to have prevailed in some
jurisdictions during the period of the Articles of Confederation. Hoague, supra note 82, at
189-91.
99. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. IV, para. 1.
100. Robert J. Kaczorowski, Fidelity Through History and to It: An Impossible Dream?,
65 FORDHAM L. REV. 1663, 1674 n.56 (1997) (citing, inter alia, THOMAS D. MORRIS,
FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE NORTH 1780-1861, at 15-16
(1974), and WILLIAM M. WIECEK, THE SOURCES OF ANTISLAVERY
CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 1760-1848, at 78-79 (1977)). Kaczorowski further
explains:
As Northern states abolished slavery while Southern states retained it, two
conflicting legal systems emerged in the United States. This troubled slaveholders.
The legal effect of any state's law did not go beyond its territorial jurisdiction. A
state that did not recognize slavery was under no obligation to give effect to the
master's right in his slave, should either or both come within the state's
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reaching Massachusetts, for example, were likely to be declared free
on the basis of Somerset's Case.101
But this decoupling, in the Articles of Confederation, 02 of the
issues of fugitive slave rendition and the rendition of fugitives from
justice, would prove short-lived. Less than a decade later, in the
Northwest Ordinance of 1787, the rendition of fugitives from justice
and fugitive slaves would be rejoined.o3 While the Northwest
jurisdiction. Nor were nonslaveholding states under any legal obligation to return
runaway slaves to their owners in another state.
Id.
101. THOMAS D. MORRIS, FREE MEN ALL: THE PERSONAL LIBERTY LAWS OF THE
NORTH 1780-1861, at 15 (1974). One author suggests the omission from the Articles of
Confederation of a provision for fugitive slave rendition was inconsequential. See
MCDOUGALL, supra note 82, at § 14 at 13 ("Since all the thirteen colonies recognized
slavery, the Revolution made no difference in any previous intercolonial practice as to the
delivery of slaves: in framing the Articles of Confederation no clause on the subject was
thought necessary."). This conclusion underestimates, in my opinion, the confluence of
three factors, already discussed, that would quite logically have led representatives of the
southern states to demand something more than comity-the significant confluence of
revolutionary and antislavery ideology, particularly in the northern and middle colonies,
which presaged sectional conflict over slavery; Somerset's Case and its perceived holding
that slavery exists by positive law only; and the prevailing notion of the states as
independent nations entering into a confederation. See supra notes 88-95 and
accompanying text. Additionally, similar logic would suggest a provision for fugitives from
justice-which was included in the Articles of Confederation-would have been "thought
unnecessary" as well.
102. Interestingly, a proposal for colonial confederacy, William Penn's 1697 "Plan for a
Union of the Colonies in America," also decoupled the two rendition issues, referencing
fugitive debtors and fugitives from justice but omitting mention of fugitive slaves. MR.
PENN'S PLAN FOR A UNION OF THE COLONIES IN AMERICA, reprinted in HOWARD W.
PRESTON, DOCUMENTS ILLUSTRATIVE OF AMERICAN HISTORY 1606-1863, at 147 (3d
ed., New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons 1893). Penn's plan listed points of concern in calling
for a congress that would
hear and adjust all matters of Complaint or difference between Province and
Province. As, 1st, where persons quit their own Province and goe to another, that
they may avoid their just debts, tho they be able to pay them, 2nd, where offenders
fly Justice, or Justice cannot well be had upon such offenders in the Provinces that
entertaine them ....
Id. The omission of any mention of fugitive slaves as a "matter[] of Complaint" is possibly
grammatical rather than ideological, as Penn's list was illustrative, not exhaustive. Penn
himself owned slaves. See Edward Raymond Turner, The Abolition of Slavery in
Pennsylvania, 36 PENN. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 129, 132 (1912). Antislavery sentiment
in Pennsylvania would not rise until the second half of the eighteenth century. See
generally id. (describing the early abolitionist movement in Pennsylvania).
103. AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED
STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO of 1787, reprinted in PRESTON, supra note 102,
at 241, 241-50. Article IV of the Northwest Ordinance incorporated the Articles of
Confederation, and consequently the provision for rendition of fugitives from justice. Id.
at 248. Article VI provided that in the case of "any person escaping into the [Northwest
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Ordinance purported to ban slavery from the Northwest
Territories," the Ordinance contained a compromise: The slavery
ban was coupled with a provision for rendition of any fugitive slave
who might escape from the states to the territories. 05 Thus, "the first
and last antislavery achievement of the central government in the
period" 06 was also the first legislation of the national government
respecting fugitive slave renditionl07 and "an important victory for
slavery.""'
The Northwest Ordinance was passed in July 1787;109 in August,
South Carolina's delegation to the Constitutional Convention
attained a similar gain for slavery with little opposition or debate"'-
the inclusion of the Fugitive Slave Clause in the Constitution."' The
territories], from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in any one of the original
States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to the person claiming his or
her labor or service as aforesaid." Id. at 250.
104. Id. But see Paul Finkelman, Slavery and the Northwest Ordinance: A Study in
Ambiguity, 6 J. EARLY REPUBLIC 343, 344-46 (1986) (concluding the Ordinance's actual
impact on slavery in the territories was negligible).
105. See AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE
UNITED STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO of 1787, art. IV, supra note 103, at
248.
106. ULRICH B. PHILLIPS, AMERICAN NEGRO SLAVERY 128 (1918).
107. C.W.A. David describes the ordinance as "set[ting] the precedent that Congress
alone had the right to regulate the extension of slavery." David, supra note 82, at 21. The
Ordinance ought not be considered as precedent for federal regulation of fugitive slave
rendition, however, as it only demonstrated the national government's dominance over
the territories-not the States.
108. Finkelman, supra note 104, at 345. Finkelman argues that the presence of the
fugitive slave provision in the Northwest Ordinance might have contributed to a southern
perception of the Ordinance as "proslavery, or at least as protective of slavery." Id. at 345
n.; see also David, supra note 82, at 21 (describing the fugitive slave provision of the
Ordinance as having been "passed to appease the southern members of Congress").
109. 32 JOURNALS OF THE CONTINENTAL CONGRESS 1774-1779, at 334 (Roscoe R.
Hill ed.,1936).
110. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES
145-52 (1913); Earl M. Maltz, The Idea of the Proslavery Constitution, 17 J. EARLY
REPUBLIC 37, 58 (1997) ("[C]riticism of the fugitive slave clause was virtually
nonexistent."). Maltz has suggested this was because the Fugitive Slave Clause was a
compromise-while the Clause required the return of fugitive slaves, it was silent on the
issue of whether northern states could free slaves voluntarily brought onto free soil by
their masters. Id. at 56-59.
111. PAUL FINKELMAN, AN IMPERFECT UNION: SLAVERY, FEDERALISM, AND
COMITY 26-27 (1981). There are suggestions that the fugitive slave provisions in the
Northwest Ordinance and the Constitution were part of a single compromise on slavery.
James Madison reportedly described a "compromise by which the northern or anti-slavery
portion of the country agreed to incorporate, into the Ordinance and Constitution, the
provision to restore fugitive slaves." EDWARD COLES, HISTORY OF THE ORDINANCE OF
1787, at 28-29 (1856), quoted in Staughton Lynd, The Compromise of 1787, 81 POL. SCI. Q.
225, 228 (1966).
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text of the Fugitive Slave Clause, which was nearly identical to that of
the fugitive slave provision in the Northwest Ordinance,112
immediately followed the Extradition Clause,' which was drawn
nearly verbatim from an analogous clause in the Articles of
Confederation." 4 The inclusion of a provision for the rendition of
fugitive slaves was seen as both a significant departure from current
practice and as a significant gain for the southern slaveholding
states."' James Madison, arguing at the Virginia ratifying convention,
summarized the advantages under the proposed Constitution to a
slaveholding state: "This is a better security than now exists.... [A]t
present, if any slave elopes in any of those states where slaves are
free, he becomes emancipated by their laws; for the laws of the States
are uncharitable to one another in this respect. . . .""6
The Constitution appeared to replace the relationship of comity
between the states that had prevailed under the Articles of
112. Compare U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 3 ("No person held to Service or Labour in
one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any
Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be
delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due."), with
AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES
NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO of 1787, art. VI, supra note 103, at 250 ("[Any person
escaping in the [Northwest territories], from whom labor or service is lawfully claimed in
any one of the original States, such fugitive may be lawfully reclaimed, and conveyed to
the person claiming his or her labor or service as aforesaid.").
113. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2 ("A person charged in any State with Treason,
Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on
Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be
removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.").
114. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION OF 1781, art. IV, para. 2 ("If any Person guilty of,
or charged with treason, felony or other high misdemeanor in any state, shall flee from
Justice, and be found in any of the united states, he shall upon demand of the Governor or
executive power, of the state from which he fled, be delivered up and removed to the state
having jurisdiction of his offence.").
115. See, e.g., FINKELMAN,supra note 111, at 27-28 ("The delegates returning to North
Carolina ... told their governor that '[t]he Southern States have also a much better
Security for the Return of Slaves who might endeavor to Escape than they had under the
original Confederation. Charles Cotesworth Pickney was the most optimistic, telling the
South Carolina House of Representatives, 'We have obtained a right to recover our slaves
in whatever part of America they may take refuge, which is a right we had not before.' "
(quoting 3 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 254-55 (Max Farrand
ed., Yale University Press rev. ed. 1937) (1911))).
116. FINKELMAN, supra note 111, at 27 (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL
STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION AS
RECOMMENDED BY THE GENERAL CONVENTION AT PHILADELPHIA, IN 1787, at 453
(Jonathan Elliot ed., Philadelphia, J.B. Lippincott Co. 2d ed. 1896)). "During the critical
decade of the 1780's," Robert Cover writes, "it was almost axiomatic that the operation of
normal 'international' reciprocity would not lead to the recognition by one state of the
slave property of another." COVER, supra note 85, at 88.
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Confederation with a relationship of compulsion. Whether that
change would prove true in practice, however, depended on the
ability of the federal government to enforce the Fugitive Slave
Clause.
2. Congressional Action: The Extradition and Fugitive Slave Acts of
1793
The Extradition Clause and Fugitive Slave Clause of the
Constitution provided explicit endorsement of interstate rendition;
Congress first asserted its power to legislate in this field in 1793.17
The events leading to the legislation comprising the Extradition and
Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 suggested a rendition system governed
only by comity between the states would be made difficult by the
states' widening division on the subject of slavery.
On March 9, 1791, a group of Virginians under the command of
Francis McGuire killed four Delaware Indians at Big Beaver Creek in
Pennsylvania."' The killings were in retaliation for alleged acts
committed in late February by a band of Delaware Indians against
Virginians."' A group of aggrieved Indian chiefs composed a letter to
President Washington, and in turn Washington's Secretary of War
suggested Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania seek extradition from
Virginia of McGuire and his men, to be tried for the murders in
Pennsylvania.120 This was done, and Governor Randolph of Virginia
immediately offered a reward to anyone who would turn the fugitives
over to Pennsylvania.12'
117. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302 (1793). Fugitives from justice and fugitive
slaves were the subject of a single act of Congress. Following common usage, I will refer to
the first two sections, §§ 1-2, 1 Stat. at 302, dealing with fugitives from justice, as the
"Extradition Act of 1793," and the remaining sections, §§ 3-4, 1 Stat. at 302-05, dealing
with fugitive slaves, as the "Fugitive Slave Act of 1793."
118. William R. Leslie, A Study in the Origins of Interstate Rendition: The Big Beaver
Creek Murders, 57 AM. HIST. REV. 63, 64 (1951).
119. Id.
120. Id. at 64-65.
121. Id. at 64-66. The requisition was made in April 1791. Id. at 64-65. The Governor
of Pennsylvania, "having received information upon oath that four freindly [sic] Indians
were murdered on the Ninth of March last by a body of armed men, under the Command
of Samuel Brady and Francis McGuire," wrote the Governor of Virginia "and required
that the above named two persons should be delivered up . Executive Minutes of
Governor Thomas Mifflin 1790-1792 (Apr. 23, 1791), in 1 PENNSYLVANIA ARCHIVES,
9TH SER. 3, 89 (Gertrude MacKinney, ed., 1931). The history of Indian nations'
sovereignty and the relationships between Indian nations, the states, and the federal
government is not explored in this Article, though I suspect much could be learned
through an examination of the history of rendition among those governments. For such an
examination, see generally Kerstin G. LeMaire & Mark D. Tallan, Issues Involving
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Ten days later, after favorably observing the swift and certain
response of Governor Randolph to the requisition of the Big Beaver
Creek murderers, the Pennsylvania Society for Promoting the
Abolition of Slavery asked Governor Mifflin to issue a requisition for
a second group of Virginians.122 These men had been indicted for
kidnapping after they abducted an African American named John,
claiming him to be a fugitive slave. 123 Among those named in the
indictments was Francis McGuire-one of the Big Beaver Creek
murderers.124
In June 1791, Governor Mifflin of Pennsylvania again wrote
Governor Randolph of Virginia, demanding the surrender of the
kidnappers.125 In marked contrast to Governor Randolph's swift
acquiescence to the requisition of the Big Beaver Creek murderers,
the second requisition aroused the deep divide between Pennsylvania
and Virginia over slavery and generated fierce resistance.126 Governor
Randolph refused the extradition request, citing various technical
reasons explaining why the requisition was not in compliance with the
requirements of the Extradition Clause of the Constitution, arguing
that the Extradition Clause had been supplied with no enforcement
mechanism and implicitly asserting that rendition was purely a matter
of executive prerogative. 127 The divide deepened, and Governor
Randolph ultimately recalled his reward for the Big Beaver Creek
murderers in addition to refusing the extradition of the indicted
kidnappers.128 "Co-operation, at first vigorous, then stumbling, had
finally stopped completely."129 Congressional action was ultimately
seen as the only remedy for the impasse.3 o
Extradition and fugitive slave rendition were addressed together
in the legislation of 1793. The Extradition Act of 1793 imposed a duty
Extradition and Their Impact on Tribal Sovereignty, 76 U. DET. MERCY L. REV. 803
(1999).
122. Leslie, supra note 118, at 66-67.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 67.
125.. Executive Minutes of Governor Thomas Mifflin 1790-1729, supra note 121, at 124
("A Letter was written ... demanding that Balwin Parsons[,] Francis McGuire[,] and
Absalom Wells who have been indicted in the County of Washington in this State for
having illegally and forcibly carried off from the said County a certain free Negroe named
John with an intention to sell him as a slave in another State, may be delivered up to this
State....").
126. See Leslie, supra note 118, at 68-70.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id. at 71.
130. Id. at 71-73.
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on state governors to surrender a fugitive from justice upon demand
of another state governor; the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 similarly
imposed a duty on state agencies, permitting the person recapturing a
fugitive slave to take him or her before a state judge or magistrate
and declaring it the duty of the judge or magistrate to issue a
certificate after summary procedures to establish ownership and
fugitivity.13'
What is perhaps most noteworthy about the 1793 Acts is that it
was the division over slavery that fueled the need for national
legislation. So long as the issue of rendition was unconnected to
slavery-the extradition of Virginians for the murder of the Delaware
in Pennsylvania-comity between the states appeared more than
sufficient to accomplish that end.132 But when slavery touched the
issue, the states' differences rose to the fore. Rendition of fugitives
from justice, ordinarily a noncontroversial issue, would generate legal
battles across the antebellum period when tied to the slavery issue, as
in Francis McGuire's case.133
But far from resolving the differences between the states, the
1793 Acts instead raised key questions about the relationship
between the state and federal governments. Most importantly, did
Congress have the authority to compel state action? The 1793 Acts
clearly imposed duties on state officials.134 But could any federal
authority provide a remedy if state officials failed to discharge these
duties?135
131. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793).
132. See Leslie, supra note 118, at 66 ("Up to this point there was not even a ripple of
discord between Pennsylvania and Virginia."). While Leslie discusses Governor
Randolph's subsequent disillusionment with the account received from Governor Mifflin,
upon which Randolph had relied in quickly issuing the reward for surrendering the
fugitives, id., it was the dispute over slavery that ultimately sharpened the divide and led to
the 1793 Acts. Id. at 72-73.
133. See infra Part II.A.5.
134. The Extradition Act of 1793 prescribed the duties of a state governor. § 1, 1 Stat.
at 302 ("[I]t shall be the duty of the executive authority of the state or territory to which
such person shall have fled, to cause him or her to be arrested and secured, and notice of
the arrest to be given .. . and to cause the fugitive to be delivered .... "). Similarly, the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 prescribed the duties of state magistrates. § 3, 1 Stat. at 302-05
(authorizing the owner of a fugitive slave (or his agent) to seek a certificate from a
magistrate judge and declaring "it shall be the duty of such ... magistrate [receiving
satisfactory proof] to give a certificate . . . which shall be sufficient warrant for removing
the said fugitive from labour, to the state or territory from which he or she fled").
135. Another question that has arisen with regularity concerning the legality of
rendition is: What limitations, if any, does the Fourth Amendment impose on rendition?
See, e.g., Michigan v. Doran, 439 U.S. 282, 285 n.3 (1978) (assuming without deciding that
the Fourth Amendment applies to extradition proceedings); id. at 293 n.3 (Blackmun, J.,
concurring) (observing the Court's assumption that the Fourth Amendment applies to
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In 1818, a bill was proposed which would have strengthened the
Fugitive Slave Act, in part by making it a federal crime for state
officials to refuse assistance in enforcing the Fugitive Slave Act.136
Representative Whitman from Massachusetts objected to the bill
because "he did not believe Congress had the right to compel the
State officers to perform this duty-they could only authorize it."1 37
Senator Morril of New Hampshire likewise offered impassioned
argument against the bill because he did not believe Congress had the
right to compel state officers to perform this duty.'38
Another question left open by the 1793 Acts was whether the
states, notwithstanding federal legislation on rendition, had authority
to pass legislation touching on the rendition process. The states took
the view that they exercised at least concurrent legislative power.
Both before and after the 1793 legislation, states passed anti-
kidnapping and "personal liberty" laws designed to offer some
minimum procedural protections, such as the right to present
evidence and the right to testify, to alleged fugitive slaves.139 In 1820,
Pennsylvania enacted legislation increasing the penalty for
kidnapping and prohibiting state officials from enforcing the Fugitive
Slave Act.140 This prompted some efforts in Congress to strengthen
the Fugitive Slave Act, but no legislation was passed.14'
3. 1842: Prigg v. Pennsylvania
Federal and state legislation continued for some time in an
uneasy coexistence. This ended with Prigg v. Pennsylvania,142 which
Extradition Clause cases). While I believe the same methodology I employ here would be
useful in discussing the question, I leave it for another day, as I believe it deserves separate
treatment.
136. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 839 (1818); MCDOUGALL, supra note 82, § 20, at 22.
137. 31 ANNALS OF CONG. 839. Whitman's argument was unavailing-the bill passed
the House. Id. at 840.
138. Id. at 254; see also id. at 245 ("[Y]ou call upon a State officer, under the State
government, to perform a judicial act authorized by a law of the United States. Upon the
services of this officer you have no claim; to demand them you have no power."). The bill
ultimately failed. MCDOUGALL, supra note 82, § 20, at 22-23 (noting the bill failed for
non-concurrence between the House and Senate versions).
139. Scott J. Basinger, Regulating Slavery: Deck-Stacking and Credible Commitment in
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, 19 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 307, 316-18 (2003); see also Sandra L.
Rierson, The Thirteenth Amendment as a Model for Revolution, 35 VT. L. REV. 765, 809-
10 (2011) (discussing personal liberty laws).
140. See An Act to Prevent Kidnapping, ch. 73, in Acts of the General Assembly of the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania 104, 104-05 (Harrisburg, 1820); see Basinger, supra note
139, at 316.
141. MCDOUGALL, supra note 82, § 21, at 23-24.
142. 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539 (1842).
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arose from conflict between Pennsylvania's personal liberty law of
1826143 and the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793.'"
In 1837, Edward Prigg, Nathan Bemis, Jacob Forward, and
Stephen Lewis, four slave-catchers from Maryland, made a demand
to Pennsylvania officialsl45 and thereupon secured the arrest of
Margaret Morgan (whom they claimed to be a fugitive slave), her
husband Jerry Morgan (indisputably a free person), and their
children.46 Unable to persuade Pennsylvania officials to issue a
certificate of removal, the slave-catchers abducted Margaret Morgan
and her children and took them to Maryland. 4 7 After indictments
were obtained against the slave-catchers for the kidnapping, the
Pennsylvania Governor demanded of the Maryland Governor that
Prigg be delivered up to Pennsylvania for trial.'48 This demand was
initially refused.149 Only after the two states brokered a compromise,
intended to bring the matter quickly to the Supreme Court to resolve
the constitutionality of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 and
Pennsylvania's personal liberty law, did Maryland surrender Prigg for
trial.' Prigg was tried and convicted, and after an expedited appeal
resulted in affirmance by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, the case
reached the United States Supreme Court.'
Although the case arose from the criminal rendition of Prigg, the
legal issues before the Court centered on the preemptive effect of the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1793: Was it constitutional, and if so, could
Pennsylvania enact litigation that would impose additional burdens
143. Act of Mar. 25, 1826, ch. L, 1826 Pa. Laws 150.
144. Act of Feb. 12, 1793, ch. VII, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302-05 (1793).
145. The demand was in compliance with provisions of Pennsylvania's law that
imposed pre-seizure procedural protections against slave rendition. See Basinger, supra
note 139, at 317-18.
146. Paul Finkelman, When International Law Was a Domestic Problem, 44 VAL. U. L.
REV. 779, 793 (2010) ("A local constable then accompanied the four Marylanders to the
Morgan home, arrested the family, and brought them back to Justice of the Peace
Henderson."); Barbara Holden-Smith, Lords of Lash, Loom, and Law: Justice Story,
Slavery, and Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 78 CORNELL L. REV. 1086, 1122-23 (1993).
147. Paul Finkelman, Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Northern State Courts: An Anti-Slavery
Use of a Pro-Slavery Opinion, 25 CIV. WAR HIST. 5, 7-8 (1979); See Holden-Smith, supra
note 146, at 1122-23; Ronald S. Sullivan Jr., Classical Racialism, Justice Story, and
Margaret Morgan's Journey from Freedom to Slavery: The Story of Prigg v. Pennsylvania,
in RACE LAW STORIES 59, 61-63 (Rachel F. Moran & Devon W. Carbado eds., 2008).
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on the slave rendition process?'52 The Court, in an opinion by Justice
Story,' held that Congress was authorized to legislate in this area
and that Congress's power in that regard was exclusive.'54 Prigg's
conviction for violating Pennsylvania's personal liberty laws was
reversed.'
Since the Court was broadly considering the constitutionality of
the Fugitive Slave Act, the Justices had occasion to opine on the
matter of whether the federal government could compel state officials
to implement federal law. Nearly all of the Justices believed the
federal government held no such power of compulsion.' 6
Even Justice Story-whose opinion exalted Congress as the sole
body capable of and empowered with implementing through
legislation both the Extradition Clause and the Fugitive Slave
Clause"'-acknowledged it was doubtful that an act of Congress
could compel state action.' After concluding that the Fugitive Slave
Clause required implementing legislation and that Congress would be
the body to enact such legislation, Justice Story noted that "it might
well be deemed an unconstitutional exercise of the power of
interpretation, to insist that the states are bound to provide means to
carry into effect the duties of the national government, nowhere
delegated or intrusted to them by the Constitution.""' Thus, while
152. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 609-10 (1842).
153. Whether and to what extent Justice Story was opposed to slavery is hotly
contested. Compare GRANT GILMORE, THE AGES OF AMERICAN LAW 38 (1977)
(describing Justice Story as "among the notable judicial figures of the period who are
known to have been convinced antislavery men"), and Neal Kumar Katyal, Judges as
Advicegivers, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1709, 1749 & n.195 (1998) (describing Justice Story's
"outrage against slavery"), with Alfred L. Brophy, Thomas Ruffin: Of Moral Philosophy
and Monuments, 87 N.C. L. REV. 799, 844 (2009) (finding "little reason to think Story was
antislavery") and Holden-Smith, supra note 146, at 1091 (arguing that "Story's antislavery
reputation is seriously overblown" and that "Story cared far more about the protection of
property rights and the expansion of federal power than he did about the injustices being
done to black people by the fugitive slave law").
154. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 622; see Finkelman, supra note 148, at 608-09
(summarizing the opinions of the Justices).
155. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 673-74.
156. Finkelman, supra note 148, at 646-47 (summarizing Justice Story's view that the
federal government could not compel state officials to act). Finkelman also notes the
existence of some disagreement on the part of Justices Taney and Daniel regarding
compelling state officials to act. Id. at 656-57.
157. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625. Paul Finkelman asserts Justice Story's "primary
goal in Prigg was to enhance the power in the national government." Paul Finkelman,
Story Telling on the Supreme Court: Prigg v. Pennsylvania and Justice Joseph Story's
Judicial Nationalism, 1994 SuP. CT. REV. 247, 249.
158. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 615-16.
159. Id. at 616.
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Justice Story declared Congress's Fugitive Slave Act of 1793 "to be
clearly constitutional in all its leading provisions," he equivocated
with respect to "that part which confers authority upon state
magistrates."160 He noted that "a difference of opinion has existed,
and may exist still on the point, in different states, whether state
magistrates are bound to act" under the Fugitive Slave Act. 61
However, Justice Story held no doubt that state magistrates might
choose to comply with the law if not otherwise precluded by state
law.162
Thus, the prevailing view in Prigg was that even if Congress
could legislate on the subject, it could not compel the performance of
a duty by state officials. 163
Justice McLean took a different view. While taking "as a
conceded point ... that Congress had no power to impose duties on
state officers,"1" he would have held that "although, as a general
principle, Congress cannot impose duties on state officers," the text of
the Extradition and Fugitive Slave Clauses specifically imposed such
duties.165 He recognized, though, that these duties were as a practical
matter unenforceable: "This power may be resisted by a state, and
there is no means of coercing it."166 This remark foreshadowed the
outcome in Kentucky v. Dennison.67
160. Id. at 622.
161. Id.
162. Id. ("[S]tate magistrates may, if they choose, exercise that authority, unless
prohibited by state legislation.").
163. See id. at 630 (Taney, C.J., concurring) ("The state officers mentioned in the law
are not bound to execute the duties imposed upon them by Congress, unless they choose
to do so, or are required to do so by a law of the state; and the state legislature has the
power, if it thinks proper, to prohibit them. The act of 1793, therefore, must depend
altogether for its execution upon the officers of the United States named in it."). Professor
Finkelman credits Justice Story's opinion in Prigg with originating the concept of
unfunded mandates. Paul Finkelman, The Roots of Printz: Proslavery Constitutionalism,
National Law Enforcement, Federalism, and Local Cooperation, 69 BROOK. L. REV. 1399,
1407-10 (2004).
164. Prigg, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) at 664 (McClean, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 665.
166. Id. at 666.
167. 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 109-10 (1860) (per curiam) (holding that "there is no power
delegated to the General Government, either through the Judicial Department or any
other department, to use any coercive means to compel" a state governor to return a
fugitive to the jurisdiction in which he was charged), overruled by Puerto Rico v. Branstad,
483 U.S. 219 (1987).
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4. From Prigg to the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850
While proclaiming Congress's exclusive legislative power, Prigg
nonetheless encouraged further concurrent state legislation in two
ways. First, Justice Story emphasized the states had not surrendered
their inherent police powers, which would justify legislation in the
field but for Congress's exclusive power. 6 8  States might pass
legislation not antagonistic to the federal enactment.6"
Second, and more critically, Justice Story's conclusion that state
officers could not be compelled to carry out Congress's rendition plan
encouraged the northern states to continue their resistance. 70 Their
response to Prigg was to reenact a more robust form of the personal
liberty laws that had been at the heart of the Prigg controversy."' The
new personal liberty laws prohibited northern judges and law
enforcement officers from giving force to the Fugitive Slave Act.172 In
Massachusetts, for example, citizens petitioned for a law that would
prohibit state officers from participating in fugitive recapture and
would also prohibit the use of state facilities for detaining fugitives.'73
Rendition controversies continued unabated, and since many states
had only one or two federal judges who could enforce the Fugitive
Slave Act, Prigg rendered the Act largely unenforceable.'74
168. Prigg, 41. U.S. (16 Pet.) at 625.
169. See id. at 622.
170. See generally Finkelman, supra note 147 (explaining the northern states' response
to the Prigg decision).
171. Id.
172. Basinger, supra note 139, at 320-21; Paul Finkelman, Legal Ethics and Fugitive
Slaves: The Anthony Burns Case, Judge Loring, and Abolitionist Attorneys, 17 CARDOZO
L. REV. 1793, 1799-1800 (1996); Finkelman, supra note 147, at 21-22; Rierson, supra note
139, at 812-13.
173. Rierson, supra note 139, at 812 n.207. Such laws are reminiscent of today's
"sanctuary" legislation in the immigration realm. See generally Cristina M. Rodriguez, The
Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 600- 05(2008)
(discussing the tensions caused by and motivations of local sanctuary laws). An Oregon
statute, for example, provides:
No law enforcement agency of the State of Oregon or of any political subdivision
of the state shall use agency moneys, equipment or personnel for the purpose of
detecting or apprehending persons whose only violation of law is that they are
persons of foreign citizenship present in the United States in violation of federal
immigration laws.
OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1) (2007). A separate provision of the same law permits local
officials to arrest a suspected immigration violator only where a federal magistrate has
issued an arrest warrant for a criminal immigration violation. Id. § 181.850(3).
174. Leslie Friedman Goldstein, A "Triumph of Freedom" After All? Prigg v.
Pennsylvania Re-examined, 29 LAw & HIST. REV. 763, 764 (2011).
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As part of a broader compromise over slavery-"the famous
'Compromise of 1850' ""'-a strengthened fugitive slave act was
passed.' The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 combined the self-help
provisions of the Act of 1793 with sharply curtailed procedures,
prohibiting the testimony of the alleged fugitive and eliminating both
the possibility of trial by jury and the availability of habeas corpus."7
The Act doubled the civil penalty for violating its provisions and for
the first time criminalized non-compliance with slave rendition with a
potential sentence of up to six months' imprisonment."
But the centerpiece of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 was a
provision authorizing federal judges to appoint commissioners to hear
fugitive slave cases, creating a potentially vast federal enforcement
machine and making the Act of 1850 "an even more remarkable
exercise of national authority" than its predecessor.7 9 The 1850 Act
was passed against a background in which it was acknowledged that
Congress could not compel state officials to participate in fugitive
recapture.o8 0  Rather than continue reliance on the voluntary
participation of state courts and officials, the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 put control squarely in the hands of federal officials."'
Enforcement was accomplished not only by the federal
commissioners whose jobs were created by the Act, but also in some
cases by federal troops.182
175. Robert J. Kaczorowski, The Tragic Irony of American Federalism: National
Sovereignty Versus State Sovereignty in Slavery and in Freedom, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1015,
1038 (1997).
176. See generally id. at 1035-38 (describing the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and its
connection to the Compromise of 1850).
177. Id. at 1036, 1038.
178. Id. at 1037.
179. See id. at 1035-36.
180. See supra notes 157-62 and accompanying text (describing Justice Story's
conclusion in Prigg that the federal government could not compel state officers to enforce
the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793).
181. While northern resistance to slave rendition continued, see Kaczorowski, supra
note 175, at 1039-40, there is some evidence that the Act of 1850 was enforced with some
regularity, see Gerald G. Eggert, The Impact of the Fugitive Slave Law on Harrisburg: A
Case Study, 109 PA. MAG. HIST. & BIOGRAPHY 537, 537-38 (1985). See generally
STANLEY W. CAMPBELL, THE SLAVE CATCHERS: ENFORCEMENT OF THE FUGITIVE
.SLAVE LAW, 1850-1860 (1968) (asserting that the Fugitive Slave Law was enforced more
often than most southerners in the 1850s believed).
182. See Rierson, supra note 139, at 819 ("[T]he federal government threw its military
weight behind enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 in a series of well-publicized
incidents that shocked the conscience of many who were previously neutral on the
subject."); id at 819-22 (describing such incidents).
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5. 1860: Rendition of Fugitives From Justice in Dennison v. Kentucky
With regard to the Extradition Act of 1793 and the rendition of
fugitives from justice, a situation obtained that was in many ways
similar to that regarding fugitive slaves. We have seen that despite a
clear command in the Constitution, an initial lack of legislation
produced a fairly quick breakdown in the comity of the states.183 This
led to passage of the Extradition Act of 1793, which set forth rules for
implementing the provision of the Constitution.184 Yet, just as the
1793 legislation was not seen as a bar to independent state action on
the fugitive slave issue, neither did the states passively obey the
commands of the Extradition Act.
Rendition controversies regarding fugitives from justice were
more rare than slave rendition controversies, but contests did arise,
exacerbated by the sectional divide on slavery.' 5 Southern states
refused extradition to the north of slave-catchers accused of
kidnapping free African Americans, while northern states refused
extradition to the south of those accused of aiding and abetting
fugitive slaves.186 An example of the former was Virginia's refusal to
extradite Francis McGuire to Pennsylvania-which spurred passage
of the Extradition Act of 1793.187 An example of the latter88 was
183. See supra Part II.A.2.
184. See supra Part II.A.2.
185. FINKELMAN, supra note 111, at 7 ("[R]efusals of northern and southern governors
to surrender fugitives from justice indicate slavery's potential for disrupting comity and
interstate relations.").
186. Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 1468, 1508 & n.158 (2007) (citing, inter alia, DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION
IN CONGRESS: DESCENT INTO THE MAELSTROM, 1829-1861, at 183-94 (2005) and
FINKELMAN, supra note 111, at 6-8 (1981)). The pattern in rendition controversies, for
state authority to be selectively employed in the service of one side or the other in the
slavery debate, mirrored the larger tendency in the antebellum period, for states' rights
arguments to be so employed: "When states' rights suited the needs of slaveholders, they
argued states' rights. When states' rights interfered with the slaveholder agenda, appeals
to states' rights were abandoned." Michael Kent Curtis, John A. Bingham and the Story of
American Liberty: The Lost Cause Meets the "Lost Clause", 36 AKRON L. REV. 617, 619
(2003) (citing Paul Finkelman, States' Rights North and South in Antebellum America, in
AN UNCERTAIN TRADITION: CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE HISTORY OF THE SOUTH
125 (Kermit L. Hall & James W. Ely, Jr., eds., 1989)).
187. See supra notes 118-33 and accompanying text. Another example is the case of
Ohio v. Forbes and Armitage. See FINKELMAN, supra note 111, at 7 & n.9. Forbes and
Armitage were indicted in Ohio for kidnapping Jerry Phinney, an African American. State
of Ohio v. Forbes, 3 W. L.J. 370, 370 (Ky. Cir. Ct. 1846). The Kentucky court found that
Forbes and Armitage were "within the protecting clause" of a Kentucky act providing that
persons indicted for removing fugitive slaves from other jurisdictions would not be subject
to extradition if acting pursuant to authority of the slaveowner. Id. at 377-78, 380.
188. For other examples, see FINKELMAN, supra note 111, at 6-7.
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Ohio's refusal to honor the demand of the Governor of Kentucky for
the rendition of Willis Lago, a "free man of color" who had been
indicted in Woodford County, Kentucky, for having "seduce[d] and
entice[d] Charlotte, a slave, the property of C. W. Nuckols, to leave
her owner and possessor."189 Two successive Ohio governors rebuffed
Governor Magoffin's demand, and the case made its way to the
United States Supreme Court in 1860 as Kentucky v. Dennison.90
Ohio's arguments as to the propriety of its Governor's refusal of
extradition were based, in part, on that portion of Prigg declaring the
federal government's inability to compel state action:
The [Governor] against whom the writ is prayed is not subject,
in any form or degree, to the jurisdiction of this court. ... The
proceeding ... is aimed at the supreme Executive of the State
of Ohio, to "coerce" the exercise of one of its imagined
functions. But no power has been confided to any Department
of the Federal Government to impose a duty upon any
functionaries of a State, or to constrain the discharge of their
official concerns.191
The Supreme Court, argued Ohio, lacked any power to issue the
requested relief-a writ of mandamus compelling Ohio's Governor to
take action. 192 And just as the Court in Prigg had trumpeted the
legislative power of Congress yet admitted its weakness to compel
enforcement of its laws by state officials, so did Chief Justice Taney's
opinion in Dennison."'
Writing for the Court, Justice Taney held that even though
Congress imposed in the Extradition Act of 1793 a "duty" on state
governors to act and framed its legislation in such terms, that duty
was unenforceable.1 94 The Court went on to reject, in the most ringing
of terms, the idea that Congress could direct the actions of state
officials: "[W]e think it clear, that the Federal Government, under the
Constitution, has no power to impose on a State officer, as such, any
duty whatever, and compel him to perform it . . .."5
189. Kentucky v. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66, 67 (1860), overruled by Puerto Rico
v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
190. Paul Finkelman, Kentucky v. Dennison, in THE OXFORD GUIDE TO UNITED
STATES SUPREME COURT DECISIONS 149 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1999).
191. Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) at 92-93.
192. Id. at 92 (arguing that the "official personage" of Ohio's Governor was not subject
"in any form or degree" to the Court's jurisdiction).
193. Id. at 107.
194. Id. (holding that "the words 'it shall be the duty' were not used as mandatory and
compulsory, but as declaratory of the moral duty which this compact created").
195. Id.
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As in Prigg, the prevailing view was that Congress might
authorize a state officer to act, but it could never compel action.
6. Conclusion
The antebellum history of rendition demonstrates three salient
features. First, slave rendition and criminal rendition are linked, and
controversies over rendition were tied to the sectional divide over
slavery throughout the period.196 Northern resistance to slavery
manifested itself in efforts to undermine slave rendition and in
northern governors' refusals to comply with criminal rendition
requests that implicated slavery, like the requisition for Willis Lago in
the Dennison case for charges of aiding and abetting a fugitive
slave.197
Second, it was an accepted fact that the federal government
could not compel state officials' compliance with either slave or
criminal rendition.'98 This was evident in the congressional remarks
concerning proposed legislation in 1818;199 and it was abundantly clear
in the Prigg and Dennison decisions of the Court.200
Third, the attempted solution to the problem of rendition
controversies was to remove the states' control of the rendition
process and place it exclusively in the control of the federal
government. The Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, with its vast federal
enforcement mechanisms, would be the only effort at a federally
dominated rendition scheme.20 1 And with the Civil War's arrival, it
would prove to be short-lived.
B. Post-Civil War Rendition Resistance: From Fugitive Slaves to
Fugitives from Justice
Although slave rendition was no longer an issue after the Civil
War, rendition controversies continued in the realm of criminal
rendition. There, the federal control over slave rendition
accomplished by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 had no parallel.
Instead, state discretion in criminal rendition continued
unchecked.202 While slavery was gone, the south quickly transformed
itself to maintain a command economy with African Americans
196. See supra Part II.A.5.
197. See supra Part II.A.5.
198. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
199. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
200. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
201. See supra Part II.A.4.
202. See infra Part II.B.2.
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supplying an essentially captive labor system.203  Rendition
controversies continued, therefore, to arise based on sectional friction
and differing visions of the civil rights of African Americans.
As occurred in the antebellum period, the irregularity of the
rendition system (owing largely to differing regional attitudes toward
civil rights) led to calls for reform.2 04 In contrast to the antebellum
effort to reform the rendition system by consolidating power in the
federal government, the postbellum period ultimately saw the
regularization of rendition attained through the passage of uniform
state legislation (the Uniform Criminal Extradition Act) and an
interstate compact (the Interstate Agreement on Detainers).205
1. The Continued Exercise of States' Rights in Criminal Rendition
Matters, in Support of Civil Rights
State governors and state courts could and did play an essential
role in vindicating civil rights throughout the century following the
Civil War. The "failure" of national extradition law during this period
can be seen as a triumphant assertion of local power to differentiate
between fugitives from justice and fugitives to justice.206
Emancipation dealt a formal death blow to the Fugitive Slave
Clause and the Fugitive Slave Act,207 but it did not put an end to
disputes over the migration of African American laborers from the
south. Emancipation did ensure that such disputes would be framed
by the laws governing fugitives from justice-the Extradition Clause
and Extradition Act of 1793-rather than those governing fugitive
slaves. African Americans might no longer have been fugitives from
slavery, but they continued to migrate from the south as fugitives
from convict leasing, lynching, Jim Crow justice, chain gangs, and
deplorable prison conditions.2 08
203. See infra Part IIB..1.
204. See infra Part II.B.2.
205. See infra Parts II.B.3, II.B.4.
206. John J. Murphy, Revising Domestic Extradition Law, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1063,
1074 (1983) ("One of the fascinating historical aspects of extradition law was its function
as a guardian of civil rights. For many years, the extradition process protected persons
from discriminatory application of the trial process, threatened civil rights violations-
including the ultimate violation of lynching-and poor prison conditions.").
207. The end to the Fugitive Slave Act's practical authority came earlier. See Ashutosh
Bhagwat, Cooper v. Aaron and the Faces of Federalism, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1087, 1112
(2012) (noting that the Fugitive Slave Act was only enforced "until 1861, when secession,
then civil war, then emancipation mooted the issue").
208. See infra notes 215-42 and accompanying text. The first chapter of Michelle
Alexander's indictment of mass incarceration provides a useful general account of
slavery's "preservation through transformation" throughout American history. MICHELLE
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Following the Civil War, the slave labor system immediately
transformed itself into a forced labor system, initially driven in large
part by convict leasing.209 The so-called "Black Codes"-legislative
"plans for getting things back as near to slavery as possible" 210
essentially criminalized the idea of any African American existence
inconsistent with the perpetuation of a plantation economy supported
by a subjugated labor force. The Codes required African Americans
to maintain proof of employment, subjected them to harsh physical
punishment for breaking labor contracts, subjected their families to
work under their labor contracts, and subjected their children to
"apprenticeship" without any requirement of parental consent.211
Perhaps most importantly, vagrancy laws proliferated throughout
the former Confederate states. The criminal justice system, which
before Emancipation had no concern for slaves (who were disciplined
by their masters), now focused its eye on the freedman.212 Even
vagrancy laws that made no reference to race were aimed at one
target-"the vagrant contemplated was the plantation negro." 213 Once
ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF
COLORBLINDNESS 20-57 (2010).
209. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 208, at 26-35 (discussing the transition
from slavery to a racial caste system supported by convict leasing and Jim Crow laws);
ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863-1877, at
198-205 (1988) (explaining the various legal means that were used to limit the freedom of
African Americans); DAVID M. OSHINSKY, "WORSE THAN SLAVERY": PARCHMAN
FARM AND THE ORDEAL OF JIM CROW JUSTICE 31-53 (1996) (detailing convict leasing in
Mississippi); William Cohen, Negro Involuntary Servitude in the South, 1865-1940: A
Preliminary Analysis, 42 J.S. HIST. 31, 33 (1976) (describing a "system of involuntary
servitude that emerged after the Civil War [and] was a fluid, flexible affair which
alternated between free and forced labor in time to the rhythm of the southern labor
market").
210. FONER, supra note 209, at 199 (citation omitted).
211. Id. at 199-201. For a summary in graphic form of laws aimed at controlling labor
in the postbellum south, see WILLIAM COHEN, AT FREEDOM'S EDGE: BLACK MOBILITY
AND THE SOUTHERN WHITE QUEST FOR RACIAL CONTROL 1861-1915, at 240-41 (1991).
212. See Andrea C. Armstrong, Slavery Revisited in Penal Plantation Labor, 35
SEATTLE U. L. REV. 869, 901 (2012) ("Most African-Americans, as slaves, faced
'plantation justice' instead of the state criminal justice system."); Anthony C. Thompson,
Unlocking Democracy: Examining the Collateral Consequences of Mass Incarceration on
Black Political Power, 54 HOW. L.J. 587, 614-17 (2011) (concluding that "[i]nstead of
subjecting slaves to the penitentiary, slaves were largely subjected to the discipline of their
owners and as such were largely outside the reach of the criminal justice system").
213. FONER, supra note 209, at 201 (citation omitted); see also Cohen, supra note 209,
at 33 ("Broadly drawn vagrancy statutes enabled police to round up idle blacks in times of
labor scarcity and also gave employers a coercive tool that might be used to keep workers
on the job."). Cohen points out that vagrancy laws and convict leasing existed in the north,
but he notes a difference in "the spirit in which these measures were enforced. Most of the
laws discussed here made no mention of race, but southerners knew that they were
intended to maintain white control of the labor system, and local enforcement authorities
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an African American was charged with a crime, he could essentially
be enslaved:
If employers could no longer subject blacks to corporal
punishment, courts could mandate whipping as a punishment
for vagrancy or petty theft. If individual whites could no longer
hold blacks in involuntary servitude, courts could sentence
freedmen to long prison terms ... [and] bind them out to white
employers who would pay their fines.214
Escape rates from the convict lease system were
"astronomical,"21 5 and it is reasonable to believe escapees were
among those attempting to migrate from the south.216 While
impediments to African American migration certainly were in
place,217 the corrupt justice system and convict leasing were "push"
factors supporting northward and westward movement.218
The 1879 mass exodus of African Americans ("exodusters")
from southern states to Kansas and Indiana,21 9 which prompted a
Congressional investigation into its causes, was perhaps emblematic
of this migration movement. One witness testified to the prevailing
sentiment behind the migration: "We felt we had almost as well be
slaves under these men." 220 In support of their "fear that they would
implemented them with this in mind." Id. at 34; see also id. at 49-52 (describing
enforcement of the vagrancy laws).
214. FONER, supra note 209, at 205.
215. MATTHEW J. MANCINI, ONE DIES, GET ANOTHER: CONVICT LEASING IN THE
AMERICAN SOUTH, 1866-1928, at 75 (1996); id. at 37 ("[M]any convict camps were virtual
sieves. Perhaps the only statistic in excess of mortality rate would be escape rate.");
OSHINSKY, supra note 209, at 50-51, 67-68 (describing annual escape rate "often
reach[ing] 25 percent" in the Arkansas convict leasing system and "at least 10 percent" in
the Mississippi system); GEORGE WASHINGTON CABLE, The Convict Lease System in the
Southern States (1883), reprinted in THE SILENT SOUTH 115, 132-33 (1996) (reporting 257
escapes from an average convict population of less than 600 in two years in Tennessee).
216. One author reports that "[r]ecords show that literally thousands of escaped
convicts must have inhabited the late-nineteenth-century Southern landscape." MANCINI,
supra note 215, at 68. This of course assumes escaped convicts remained in the south.
217. See Cohen, supra note 209, at 38-42 (discussing "emigrant-agent laws" passed in
"those states which felt themselves most threatened by Negro out-migration").
218. Cohen documents migration in the late nineteenth century as largely from
southeast to southwest. COHEN, supra note 211, at 248-73.
219. See generally NELL IRVIN PAINTER, EXODUSTERS: BLACK MIGRATION TO
KANSAS AFTER RECONSTRUCTION 185-201 (1976) (detailing the mass movement of
previously enslaved Americans to Kansas).
220. SELECT COMM., 46TH CONG., S. REP. ON MIGRATION OF NEGROES (1879-80),
reprinted in 4 J. NEGRO HIST. 58, 69 (1919); see also Nell Irvin Painter, Millenarian Aspects
of the Exodus to Kansas of 1879, 9 J. SOC. HIST. 331, 331 (1976) ("The movement was as
much a fleeing from reenslavement as a flocking to freedom.").
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be eventually reduced to a system of peonage even worse than slavery
itself," 221 witnesses cited the criminal and convict leasing laws:
Under these laws they allege that a colored man may be fined
$500 for some trifling misdemeanor, and be compelled to work
five or six years to pay the fine; and that it is not uncommon for
colored men thus hired out to be worked in a chain gang upon
the plantations under overseers, with whip in hand, precisely as
in the days of slavery.222
The convict lease system would effectively hold many African
Americans in slavery into the early twentieth century.223 But prison
farms and chain gangs, ultimately no less punitive than leasing,
persisted even longer.224 Inhumane treatment of prisoners in the south
continued to be cause for flight, as evidenced by extradition battles
fought by escapees from southern chain gangs seeking refuge in the
north as recently as 1970.225 Abominable prison conditions remained a
cause for denying southern extradition requests into the 1970s.226
221. S. REP. ON MIGRATION OF NEGROES, reprinted in 4 J. NEGRO HIST. at 87.
222. Id. Witnesses related that in Texas "a colored man had been arrested for carrying
a 'six-shooter' and fined $65, including costs, and ... had been at work nearly three years
to pay it." Id. So-called "county convicts" could be leased "at any price the county judge
may determine"-one African American woman was leased for one-fourth of a cent per
day. Id.
223. As late as 1912, the convict lease system was assailed as equivalent to slavery. E.
Stagg Whitin, Prison Labor, 2 PROC. ACAD. POL. SCI. N.Y.C. 633, 633 (1912) ("[B]ehind
the dark bastilles we call our prisons, penitentiaries, reformatories, workhouses and
refuges there still hides the enemy of our social progress, the economically vicious slave
system."). The same author described the following exchange, occurring in May 1911:
"Will you buy me, Sah?" asked a boy convict in an Alabama convict camp, when
approached by the writer. "Won't you buy me out, Sah?" he reiterated to the
rejoinder, "I'm not buying niggers." "It'll only cost you $20, Sah, an' I'll work fer
you as long as you say. I'se fined $1.00, Sah, and got $75 costs. I'se worked off all
but $20. Do buy me out, Sah, please do."
E. STAGG WHITIN, PENAL SERVITUDE 1 (1912). For a collection of authorities on the end
of convict leasing, see Stephen Garton, Managing Mercy: African Americans, Parole and
Paternalism in the Georgia Prison System 1919-1945, 36 J. Soc. HIST. 675, 678 n.20 (2003).
See generally Jane Zimmerman, The Convict Lease System in Arkansas and the Fight for
Abolition, 8 ARK. HIST. Q. 171 (1949) (describing the gradual demise of convict leasing in
Arkansas over four decades).
224. See generally OSHINSKY supra note 209 (describing the history of prison farms);
Consuelo Alden Vasquez, Note, Prometheus Rebound by the Devolving Standards of
Decency: The Resurrection of the Chain Gang, 11 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 221,
227-35 (1995) (recounting a brief history of chain gangs).
225. Vasquez, supra note 224, at 232 ("The barbaric and inhumane conditions endured
by chain gang convicts caused prisoners to seek refuge in other states."); Garton, supra
note 223, at 696 n.50 ("[E]scape was a regular occurrence and quite a number succeeded,
many never to be recaptured."); see also Vasquez, supra note 224, at 232 n.60 (citing cases,
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Migrating African Americans cited as a cause of their exodus not
only the south's laws, but also its lawlessness. Unfair courts and
unrestrained violence against African Americans prevailed.227 The
rise of the Ku Klux Klan after the Civil War was a leading indicator of
widespread violence, with its whippings, rapes, and murders of the
recently freed population.228 One estimate for the years 1868-71 puts
the number of Klan lynchings at over 400.229 The violence was so
ranging in year from 1949 to 1970, arising from extradition proceedings to reinstate
fugitives from the chain gang). Georgia's chain gang system, "like its predecessor the
convict lease system, [was] condemned as a harsh, barbaric and brutal form of oppression,
with little thought given to rehabilitation." Garton, supra note 223, at 675. One magazine
urged that "no [fugitive] ought to be delivered to Georgia as long as it persists in its
inhuman and barbarous chain-gang system." Editorial Paragraph, 136 THE NATION 1, 2
(Jan. 4, 1933). In 1949, a panel of the Third Circuit held a fugitive from Georgia's chain
gang was entitled to a writ of habeas corpus, finding "the State of Georgia has failed
signally in its duty as one of the sovereign States of the United States to treat a convict
with decency and humanity." Johnson v. Dye, 175 F.2d 250, 256 (3d Cir. 1949), rev'd sub
nom., Dye v. Johnson, 338 U.S. 864 (1949). The court declined to describe with
particularity the "revolting barbarities which Johnson and his witnesses state were
habitually perpetrated as standard chain gang practice." Id. at 256 n.12.
226. See, e.g., Koch v. O'Brien, 131 A.2d 63, 64 (N.H. 1957) (noting a fugitive fought
extradition on the grounds of his mistreatment at the South Carolina State Penitentiary,
where the petitioner alleged he had been held in solitary confinement for four and one-
half years "on reduced rations under filthy conditions"); Stewart v. State, 475 P.2d 600, 601
(Or. Ct. App. 1970) (documenting that fugitive fought extradition on grounds he would be
subjected to "cruel and inhuman treatment" in the Mississippi State Penitentiary). In 1967,
an Oregon court granted habeas relief to a fugitive sought for extradition to Arkansas.
Recent Case, 84 HARV. L. REV. 456, 456 (1970) (describing the unreported Oregon case).
The court described the Arkansas penitentiaries as a "system of barbarity, cruelty, torture,
bestiality, corruption, terror, and animal viciousness that reeks of Dachau and Auschwitz,"
and as "institutions of terror, horror, and despicable evil." Id.; see also A Way for Lester,
TIME, July 12, 1971, at 53 (reporting on same fugitive case); Let Me Stay up North, JET,
Apr. 2, 1971, at 43 (reporting on same fugitive case); Michigan Governor Rejects
Extradition of Arkansas Negro, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 1971, at 27 (reporting case in which a
fugitive "feared for his safety if returned" to Arkansas). In 1952 the Supreme Court held a
fugitive seeking habeas corpus relief from extradition would first be required to exhaust
all remedies in the demanding state. Sweeney v. Woodall, 344 U.S. 86, 89-90 (1952). The
case was brought by an African American man who sought to block his extradition from
Ohio to Alabama, where he alleged he had been beaten with a "nine-pound strap with five
metal prongs" to the point of unconsciousness, had been "stripped to his waist and forced
to work in the broiling sun all day long without a rest period," and had been "forced to
serve as a 'gal-boy' or female for the homosexuals among the prisoners." Id. at 92
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
227. See Christopher Waldrep, Substituting Law for the Lash: Emancipation and Legal
Formalism in a Mississippi County Court, 82 J. AM. HIST. 1425, 1450-51 (1996) (describing
the postbellum attempt to "use law to resume a domination previously sustained outside
the law"-slavery-as a "failed experiment" that ultimately resulted in Mississippians
turning to extralegal violence against freedmen).
228. See PHILIP DRAY, AT THE HANDS OF PERSONS UNKNOWN: THE LYNCHING OF
BLACK AMERICA 39-49 (2002).
229. Id. at 49.
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severe as to spur passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act of 1871, making it
a federal crime to "go in disguise upon the public highway ... [to]
depriv[e] any person or any class of persons of the equal protection of
the laws." 230 The Ku Klux Klan Act was the high water mark of
federal intervention in the postbellum south and indicated how dire.
the situation was.231 Yet what little gains were accomplished by the
indictments and convictions under the Klan Act-which were "not
significant in terms of numbers" 232 -turned out to be fleeting. The
Klan provided violent support to the democratic efforts to "redeem"
the south,233 culminating in the withdrawal of federal troops from civil
rights enforcement 234 and the end of Reconstruction.
Henry Adams, an organizer of the 1879 "exoduster" migration,
testified before a Senate committee to the names of 683 African
American men who had been "whipped, maimed or murdered within
the ... eight years" leading up to the exodus.23 5 Louisiana in 1879 was
described as exhibiting "[c]rime and lawlessness existing to an extent
that laughs at all restraint . . . . The fiat to go forth is irresistible. . . . It
is flight from present sufferings and from wrongs to come." 236
The use of criminal law in the south as a mechanism for
implementing "neoslavery" continued well into the 1940s. 237 Debt
peonage was common throughout the deep south, with vagrancy
charges leading to unpaid fines which in turn led to forced labor.238
Workers who attempted to escape this system were rounded up as
vagrants, given additional fines, and returned to work.239
The most horrific violence from which African Americans sought
escape during this period was, of course, mob violence and
lynching.240 African Americans accused of assaulting white women, in
230. Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13, 13.
231. See DRAY, supra note 228, at 47; FONER, supra note 209, at 454-59.
232. DRAY, supra note 228, at 47; see also FONER, supra note 209, at 458 ("Judged by
the percentage of Klansmen actually indicted and convicted, the fruits of 'enforcement'
seem small indeed, a few hundred men among thousands guilty of heinous crimes.").
233. ALEXANDER, supra note 208, at 30-31.
234. See FONER, supra note 209, at 581-82 (describing the "Bargain of 1877" and the
triumph of "Redemption").
235. SELECT COMM., 46TH CONG., S. REP. ON MIGRATION OF NEGROES (1879-80),
reprinted in 4 J. NEGRO HIST. 58, 85 (1919).
236. Id. at 86.
237. See ISABEL WILKERSON, THE WARMTH OF OTHER SUNS 152 (2010).
238. Id. (citing Jerrell H. Shofner, The Legacy of Racial Slavery: Free Enterprise and
Forced Labor in Florida in the 1940s, 47 J. S. HIST. 411, 414-16 (1981)).
239. Jerrell H. Shofner, The Legacy of Racial Slavery: Free Enterprise and Forced
Labor in Florida in the 1940s, 47 J. S. HIST. 411, 415-16 (1981).
240. George Swanson Starling was one African American who was forced to migrate
north in order to escape death threats as opposed to debt peonage. WILKERSON, supra
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particular, faced a choice between flight and mob "justice"-trials
were relatively infrequent given the tolerance of mob rule.241 Fear of
lynching was frequently cited, in cases spanning the postbellum
century, as a reason why a northern governor or court should not
grant extradition of a fugitive back to the south.242 The NAACP,
note 237, at 127-39, 150-57. Starling, a Floridian fruit picker in the 1940s, had attempted
to organize workers for a better wage and was forced to escape Florida to avoid being
lynched. Id. "Leaving was his only option." Id. at 157.
241. See OSHINSKY,supra note 209, at 104-06.
242. See, e.g., Commonwealth ex rel. Mattox v. Superintendent of Cnty. Prison, 31 A.2d
576, 577 (Pa. Super. 1943) (discussed in A.R.H., Recent Cases, 17 TEMP. L. Q. 469, 469-72
(1943) and Raymond Pace Alexander, The Thomas Mattox Extradition Case, 2 NAT'L B.J.
1, 5 (1944) (describing how habeas was sought to prevent extradition of a 16-year-old
African American boy to Georgia, where "he would be in very grave danger of being
lynched")); VANN R. NEWKIRK, LYNCHING IN NORTH CAROLINA, A HISTORY, 1865-
1941, at 67-69 (2009) (chronicling attempt to prevent extradition of Munroe Rogers from
Massachusetts to North Carolina on grounds that he would be lynched there); Lyda
Gordon Shivers, Note, Interstate Rendition-Was it Meant to be Obligatory?, 2 MiSS. L.J.
240, 240 (1929) (discussing a 1928 case in which Ohio's Governor refused to grant
extradition to Mississippi because of the "bad lynching record of the state"); see also
Extradition-Refusing Requisition of Fugitive Because of Fear that He Will be Lynched, 55
CENT. L.J. 341, 341-42 (1902) (discussing the Rogers case); Florence Murray, The Negro
and Civil Liberties During World War II, 24 Soc. FORCES 211, 213-14 (1945)
(documenting cases where northern governors and courts refused to return African
Americans to the south on the grounds "that the Negroes would not receive fair trials in
the southern courts, or that they had already served enough time for the crimes they were
alleged to have committed"); Russell J. Cowans, Fight to Save Sheriffs Slayer from South,
CHI. DEFENDER, Nov 21, 1931, at 13 (describing a case in which the lawyer for the fugitive
introduced a map marking lynchings in the Alabama county to which extradition was
sought); Georgia Sheriff Foiled in Attempt to "Kidnap", CHI. DEFENDER, Nov. 3, 1923, at
22 (reporting a case in which a New Jersey governor refused extradition to Georgia);
Lawyers in Legal Fight to Save Man from Georgia Mob, CHI. DEFENDER, Feb. 5, 1921, at
1 (detailing a case of a black man accused of killing a white sheriff in Georgia, who
allegedly "had broken into his home and endeavored to place a rope about his neck");
Lynching Threat Stops Extradition, THE N.Y. AMSTERDAM NEWS, Mar. 14, 1928, at 17
(reporting that "extradition of Will Brown ... from Columbus, 0., to Missouri, where it
was feared he would be lynched on charge of a murder committed 14 years ago, has been
defeated"); Lynching Threats Prevent Extradition to Missouri, PHILA. TRIBUNE, Mar. 15,
1928, at 3 (describing same case in which Ohio refused Missouri's extradition requests for
a black man who Missouri officials could not clearly identify or connect to the murder with
which he was charged); Negro Prisoner's Plea: He Successfully Fights an Extradition Case
with Arkansas Authorities, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 3, 1895, at 8 (documenting a case
where a Tennessee prisoner obtained habeas corpus when he alleged that authorities in
Arkansas sought his extradition for charges on which he had been acquitted, and claimed
"the officers of this county sought to bring him back here for the purpose of having him
mobbed"); Not a Good Reputation, CHI. DEFENDER, Jul 22, 1922, at 12 (detailing a case in
which the Ohio Governor refused extradition of an African American man to Georgia
because of danger of lynching); Officials' Lives Hostage in Extradition Case: Iowa Gov.
Demands Fair Trial, PITTSBURGH COURIER, Feb. 6, 1932, at 3 (describing a case in which
the Iowa Governor agreed to the extradition of an African American to Missouri.only
after county sheriff guaranteed to protect the accused's life with his own); Refuse
Extradition on Hill to Arkansas, CHI. DEFENDER, Mar. 20, 1920, at 1 (reporting the
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founded in 1909, pursued efforts on behalf of numerous fugitives to
block extradition from northern states to southern lynch mobs.243 in
George Crawford's case in 1933, for example, the NAACP feared a
lynching either before or after trial in the event the African American
was extradited to Virginia for the murders of two white women.244
One reporter saw in a Massachusetts federal judge's refusal to
extradite Crawford "New England [going] about its old business of
refusing to extradite fugitive 'slaves' to Virginia."245
A case arising in the late nineteenth century exemplified the anti-
lynching rationale for refusing extradition and indicated the
persistence of the sectional conflict at the heart of the Dennison
case. 246 The Reverend A.S. Hampton, an African American, was
arrested in Ohio for extradition to Kentucky on charges of shooting
with intent to kill.247 The Governor of Ohio approved the requisition,
but Hampton had received letters warning him his life was not safe.248
"A colored man and a colored boy had been lynched there [in
Kentucky], one for murder and the other for criminal assault, and he
would be strung up by a mob if taken back."249 Upon receiving this
information, a Cincinnati judge refused to honor the requisition
without the personal guarantees of the Kentucky Governor and local
authorities that Hampton would be protected from lynching.250 The
Ohio judge, Judge Buchwalter, said the last man he surrendered to
Kentucky "had been lynched in twenty-four hours. "251
Kansas Governor's refusal to extradite African American unionizer to Arkansas because
of "the failure of the Arkansas officials to guarantee a fair trial to Hill").
243. James Weldon Johnson & Herbert J. Seligmann, Legal Aspects of the Negro
Problem, 140 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 90, 96 (1928). See generally ROBERT
L. ZANGRANDO, THE NAACP CRUSADE AGAINST LYNCHING, 1909-1950 (1980)
(chronicling the NAACP's efforts to prevent the extradition of black fugitives to the
south).
244. Boston Fights for George Crawford, AFRO-AMERICAN, Feb. 4, 1933, at 21.
245. Echoes of the Fugitive Slave, AFRO-AMERICAN, May 6, 1933, at 6.
246. Afraid of Southern Justice: A Cincinnati Judge Refuses to Surrender a Colored
Prisoner, DAILY INTER OCEAN, Jan. 1, 1895, at 5.
247. Id.; Brown Is Indignant: He Criticizes Judge Buchwalter for the Demands of the
Safety of Hampton, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, Jan. 2, 1895, at 5.
248. Afraid of Southern Justice, supra note 246.
249. Id.
250. Exacts a Pledge Not to Lynch: Judge Will Surrender No Prisoners Without
Governor's Promise of Protection, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 1, 1895, at 1.
251. Id.; see also This Week in Review, CONGREGATIONALIST, Jan. 10, 1895, at 48
("[A] judge of an Ohio court has virtually said to the State of Kentucky, 'Not until you
give your pledge as a commonwealth that lynchings shall cease within your bounds will I
honor your writs of extradition ..... ).
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"I have sent two colored men back lately," said Judge
Buchwalter. "One to Georgia and one to Kentucky, although
the offense of the latter was only shooting at somebody. He was
taken by a mob out of the Burlington jail and hanged to a tree.
I determined then I would never send another prisoner South,
unless I had assurance he would be protected from a mob and
be given a fair trial."2 52
The Governor of Kentucky, John Young Brown, retorted that
his "self-respect and his regard for the dignity of the state of
Kentucky forbid that he should ever give any such humiliating
guarantee."253 On January 4, 1895, before a courtroom so densely
packed "that one attorney became ill and had to retire," Kentucky's
agent presented a corrected copy of the requisition and indictment
but "no letter from Gov. Brown promising protection as required by
the court."2 54 The next day, Judge Buchwald discharged Hampton
from custody, citing the previously mentioned instance of a fugitive
surrendered by the court to a Kentucky lynching as one of nineteen
such lynchings "within a comparatively short time." 5
An interesting postscript to the Hampton case occurred three
years later. While Kentucky's Governor, a Democrat, had in 1895
proclaimed concerns of lynch law unfounded while seeking
Hampton's extradition,256 the reins of government soon passed to
Republican hands. In 1898, Kentucky's Republican Governor
William O'Bradley refused to issue requisition papers for an African
American indicted for rape who had fled Kentucky to Illinois.2 57
Governor O'Bradley based his refusal "on the wholesale slaughter of
negroes by mobs in [Graves County, Kentucky] and on the failure to
punish their murderers. "258
252. Afraid of Southern Justice, supra note 246.
253. John Brown's Kick: The Governor of Kentucky Gives Judge Buchwalter Fits-
Constitutional Question at Issue, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 3, 1895, at 5. Governor
Brown also questioned Judge Buchwalter's failure "to rebuke the violence of the mob that
on Sunday night attempted to rescue Hampton from the officers when they arrested him."
Pledge Against Lynching: Governor Brown, of Kentucky, Refuses to Give One to an Ohio
Judge, BALT. SUN, Jan. 3, 1895, at 7.
254. No Assurances from Kentucky: Judge Buchwalter Holds the Hampton Extradition
Case Under Advisement, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, Jan. 5, 1895, at 3.
255. He Discharges Prisoner Hampton, CHI. DAILY TRIB., Jan. 6, 1895, at 12; see also
Ohio and Kentucky Clash Over a Negro Criminal, 10 THE LITERARY DIG. 336-37 (1895)
(chronicling several newspapers' reactions to Judge Buchwalter's decision).
256. Pledge Against Lynching, supra note 253 ("Hampton is in no danger of mob
violence and never was in any danger of it.").




NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
2. Calls for "Reform" of the Criminal Rendition System
State action to block extradition in the name of civil rights was
hardly met with uniform approval.259 Indeed, a competing narrative of
the postbellum period depicted the lawlessness of extradition
proceedings and the tendency for any expectation of regularity to be
frustrated. 260 A diversity of state legislation, coupled with the effective
reduction (by the Dennison decision) of the relationship between the
states to one of comity, created conditions of uncertainty that called
for nearly continuous litigation of the issues surrounding interstate
rendition.261 Repeatedly, particularly notorious extradition disputes
spurred calls for "reform" of the extradition process.262
Mahon v. Justice,263 arising out of the infamous and bloody feud
between the Hatfields of West Virginia and the McCoys of Kentucky
in the late 1880s,264 inspired such calls. After the West Virginia
Governor refused to extradite several people indicted for murder in
Kentucky, a band of men crossed over into West Virginia and
abducted them. 265 After the Supreme Court held West Virginia could
not reclaim them by means of habeas corpus,2 66 a New York Times
editorial claimed Mahon "illustrate[d] the need of a more effective
law for the regulation of inter-State extradition."267 The writer noted
with dismay that despite the Constitution's command that fugitives
from justice "shall be delivered up," "Congress has left the matter in
259. See, e.g., Extradition-Refusing Requisition of Fugitive Because of Fear That He
Will Be Lynched, supra note 242, at 341 (1902) ("We cannot too strongly express our
disapproval .... What right has the Governor of Massachusetts to 'arraign' the
administration of justice in North Carolina, or what right has the Governor of Indiana to
say that one charged with crime in Kentucky cannot obtain a fair trial in the latter
state?"); see also Note, Interstate Rendition: Executive Practices and the Effects of
Discretion, 66 YALE L.J. 97, 110-11 & n.74 (1956) (citing criticism arising in cases in which
extradition was blocked).
260. See infra notes 263-87 and accompanying text (describing several chaotic
controversies in which governors refused to extradite men wanted for crimes in other
states).
261. See infra notes 263-87 and accompanying text (noting that two of the
aforementioned controversies resulted in cases being heard before the Supreme Court).
262. See infra notes 263-87 and accompanying text (giving examples of newspaper
writers and politicians calling for congressional intervention into extradition
controversies).
263. 127 U.S. 700 (1888).
264. Hatfield-M'Coy Vendetta: Official Report of the Governor of West Virginia in
Regard to a Remarkable Family Feud, PHILA. INQUIRER, Feb. 1, 1888, at 1 ("The
Hatfields were in the Confederate army, and the McCoys in the Union army.").
265. Mahon, 127 U.S. at 700-01.
266. Id. at 715.
267. Editorial, N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 1888, at 4.
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such shape that it still depends on the discretion of the Governor of
the State in which the criminal is found." 268
Similar calls for national legislation followed an extradition
battle arising from political turmoil in Kentucky at the turn of the
century. The 1900 gubernatorial election followed a "campaign of
unexampled bitterness" between the Democratic candidate for
governor, William Goebel, and the Republican candidate, William
Taylor.269 After Taylor was declared the winner,270 Goebel initiated a
challenge to the election results. 27 1 While the challenge was pending,
Goebel was assassinated by a shot fired from the executive
mansion.2 Before his death, Goebel was declared governor.273 Taylor
was indicted and fled to Indiana, and Goebel's successor initiated
extradition proceedings.274 When the Republican Governor of
Indiana, Winfield Durbin, refused to accede to the requisition, critics
called for congressional legislation "as the most effective solution of
these unhappy and serious clashes of authority between the governors
of sister commonwealths over the extradition of fugitives from
justice." 275
Congress took up the matter. In December 1901, James
Robinson, a Congressman from Indiana and a Democrat, proposed
legislation that would have added a federal enforcement tool to the
Extradition Act.276 Robinson's bill would have permitted a state
governor, upon having an extradition attempt rebuffed by another
268. Id.
269. Wiliam Cullen Dennis, Jury Trial and the Federal Constitution, 6 COLUM. L. REV.
423,438 n.2 (1906). Both candidates attempted to court the crucial African American vote,
but Goebel ultimately embraced segregated train cars, while Taylor "reluctantly admitted
that he opposed segregated cars." HAMBLETON TAPP & JAMES C. KLOTTER, KENTUCKY:
DECADES OF DISCORD, 1865-1900, at 433-35 (1977); see also JAMES C. KLOTTER,
WILLIAM GOEBEL: THE POLITICS OF WRATH 74-75 (1977) (discussing Goebel's attempt
to court the African American vote); GEORGE C. WRIGHT, 2 A HISTORY OF BLACKS IN
KENTUCKY: IN PURSUIT OF EQUALITY, 1890-1980, at 92-94 (1992) (same).
270. GEORGE C. WRIGHT, LIFE BEHIND A VEIL: BLACKS IN LOUISVILLE,
KENTUCKY, 1865-1930, at 186 (1985) ("Black leaders rejected Goebel's position and
remained with their party. Their vote proved crucial.").
271. Dennis, supra note 269, at 438 n.2.
272. Id.; Michael C. Heintz, A Refuge for American Criminals, 18 J. AM. INST. CRIM. L.
& CRIMINOLOGY 331, 332 (1927).
273. Dennis, supra note 269, at 438 n.2.
274. See KLOTTER, supra note 269, at 112-14; TAPP & KLOTTER, supra note 269, at
453; Dennis, supra note 269, at 438 n.2; Heintz, supra note 272, at 332.
275. 53 CENT. L.J. 421, 422 (1901). Taylor remained in Indiana until he was pardoned in
1909. Governor Pardons Taylor and Finley; Willson of Kentucky Dismisses Cases Against
Six Men Accused of Goebel Murder; Youtsey Alone Punished; Taylor and Finley, Long
Exiles in Indiana, Hope to Return to Kentucky to Live, N.Y. TIMES, April 24, 1909, at 1.
276. 54 CENT. L.J. 1, 1 (1902).
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governor, to enlist federal marshals to arrest the fugitive.277 This
legislation would have effectively paralleled the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850 by putting enforcement of the rendition process in the hands of
federal officials. The bill failed, to the chagrin of those who felt
reform was needed.278
Less than a decade later, the failure of extradition law again
aroused calls for congressional action. The Supreme Court in 1906
considered the legality of the rendition from Colorado to Idaho of
"Big Bill" Haywood, President of the United Mine Workers
Association, and his compatriots, on charges of conspiracy to murder
the ex-Governor of Idaho.279 Despite colorable claims by Haywood
and his comrades that they had been abducted at night and extradited
before they could avail themselves of the Colorado courts,280 the
Court was steadfast, as it had been in Mahon, in denying a remedy.281
Once again the only question the Court would consider was whether
the present detention of the petitioners-as opposed to how that
detention came about-was lawful.282
Justice McKenna, dissenting on the ground that the allegations of
misconduct on the part of the states themselves set this case apart
from Mahon, viewed the decision as bringing the Court "perilously
near" the destruction of both the right to personal liberty and the
means to enforce it. 283 The Haywood case, once again affirming the
absolute discretion of state governors given the Dennison decision,
vividly demonstrated to one commentator "the present state of the
law [as] an inducement to kidnaping and lawlessness" and prompted a
call for congressional legislation.28
277. Id.
278. Extradition-Refusing Requisition of Fugitive Because of the Fear That He Will Be
Lynched, supra note 242, at 341-42 (1902) (lamenting "its enactment would have avoided
many of the unhappy and serious clashes of authority between the governors").
279. Pettibone v. Nichols, 203 U.S. 192, 194, 200 (1906). Haywood was represented by
Clarence Darrow, who argued the case before the Supreme Court. Id. at 196. The
University of Minnesota law library has an excellent web page devoted to the case, with
primary materials in abundance. The Clarence Darrow Digital Collection: The Bill
Haywood Trial, U. MINN. L. LIBR., http://darrow.law.umn.edu/trials.php?tid=3 (last visited
Nov. 16,2013).
280. Pettibone, 203 U.S. at 219-20 (McKenna, J., dissenting) (describing the claims of
Haywood and his colleagues).
281. See id. at 215-16 (majority opinion).
282. Id. at 216 (1906) ("[Tlhe vital fact remains that Pettibone is held by Idaho in
actual custody for trial under an indictment charging him with crime against its
laws . . . .").
283. Id. at 218-19 (McKenna, J., dissenting).
284. Note, Inter-State Rendition, 5 MICH. L. REV. 269,269-70 (1907).
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From the Civil War to the early twentieth century, then, two
themes played out. On the one hand, the inability of the federal
government to enforce the dictates of the Extradition Clause and the
Extradition Act gave rise to a leitmotif of state officials refusing
extradition in the name of civil rights. Alongside this theme, a
counterpoint was rising to a crescendo, calling for reform in the name
of uniformity.285 The dissonance between these themes was a reprise
of an antebellum conflict explored by Robert Cover-the clash of
morality and the demands of formal law.286 Just as antislavery judges
surrendered their private morality to the service of legal formalism,
calls for subservience to "the general" 287 ultimately prevailed in the
early twentieth century.
Reform did not come in the form of federal dominance, however,
but rather in the form of state legislation.
3. Uniform State Legislation: The Uniform Criminal Extradition Act
Given the precedents of Prigg, establishing the exclusivity of
federal legislation implementing the Fugitive Slave Clause, and
Dennison, establishing Congress's power (presumptively exclusive
per Prigg) to implement the Extradition Clause, one might have
expected state legislation governing criminal rendition to subside. To
the contrary, the leading nineteenth-century treatise on interstate
rendition, listing seven reasons why it should be so, concluded: "State
legislation is not necessarily excluded from the inter-State extradition
of fugitive criminals. There is an opportunity for it." 288 And in 1916, in
285. See, e.g., Extradition-The Law and the Procedure, 92 CENT. L.J. 297, 297 (1921)
("It is the conduct of political Governors that gives concern," and referencing "the danger,
if not the threat, of the influence of politics, racial prejudices or sectional animosities,
destroying the uniformity of operation of extradition laws....").
286. See generally COVER, supra note 85, at 197-256 (discussing the conflict between
"the moral values served by antislavery" and "the interests and values served by fidelity to
the formal system").
287. See Roscoe Pound, Cooperation in Enforcement of Law, 17 A.B.A. J. 9, 13 (1931)
(lamenting the prevalence in state-to-state relations of the "old attitude of non-co-
operation and indifference to the general," and citing interstate rendition as a
"conspicuous example").
288. SAMUEL T. SPEAR, THE LAW OF EXTRADITION, INTERNATIONAL AND INTER-
STATE 311 (Albany, Weed, Parsons & Co. 3d ed. 1885); see also 1 THOMAS M. COOLEY,
GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
192 (Boston, Little, Brown & Co. 1880) ("The extradition of fugitives as between the
States has commonly been made under state legislation, and the States in passing laws on
the subject appear to have assumed that the duty imposed by the Constitution was a state
duty .... "). Spear shared the widely held belief that the states' inherent police power
authorized the passage of legislation concerning rendition:
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the face of persistent views that state legislatures could enact laws
concerning criminal rendition (at least to fill the gaps left by
Congress 28 9), the Court formally ended what had for years been a
fiction, that Congress possessed exclusive legislative authority in the
field.29
Mr. Bishop, in his Criminal Law, vol. 1, p. 133, says that "statutes have been
enacted, in most or all of the States, authorizing the arrest of persons on the
charge of being fugitives from the justice of other States, on warrant issued by a
magistrate, in advance of the executive demand." This, as he says, has been done
in aid of the "legislation of Congress and for purposes of domestic police." Mr.
Hurd, in his work on Habeas Corpus, p. 636, suggests that "such legislation by the
States, when in no sense opposed to the law of Congress, may be rested upon the
general police power of the States . . . ."
Samuel Spear, Inter-State Extradition and State Authority, 18 ALB. L.J. 166, 167 (1878).
Spear examined New York's "act to authorize the arrest and detention of fugitives from
justice from other States and Territories of the United States" and concluded that it was
"abundantly justified" not only because it was in aid of and not in conflict with Congress's
Extradition Act, but also by virtue of the "domestic police [power] and general comity
among the States." Id.
Long after Prigg and Dennison, state courts characterized the Extradition Clause
as being "in the nature of a treaty stipulation between the States of the Union," Hibler v.
Texas, 43 Tex. 197, 203 (1875), or "purely a matter of compact or agreement between the
States, ... confer[ring] no powers upon Congress over its subject matter," In re Romaine,
23 Cal. 585, 591 (1863). The constitutionality of federal legislation was challenged and
ruled upon as though Prigg and Dennison had not been decided. Id. ("If this was a new
question, free from the political excitements which have grown out of the discussion of the
subject of slavery, and the enforcement of the succeeding clause relating to fugitives from
service, few would have disputed that this clause confers no power upon Congress over the
subject, and that all Congressional legislation founded thereon is void.").
289. See, e.g., JAMES ALEXANDER Scorr, THE LAW OF INTERSTATE RENDITION,
ERRONEOUSLY REFERRED TO AS INTERSTATE EXTRADITION § 36, at 44-45 (1917) ("The
States themselves have regarded interstate rendition as a concurrent field of legislation,
and therefore, they have not hesitated to enact laws covering the phases omitted by
Congress, as well as other laws auxiliary to the Constitution and laws of the United States
on this subject."); Charles P. McCarthy, A Constitutional Question Suggested by the Trial
of William D. Haywood, 19 GREEN BAG 636, 636-44 (1907) (urging the adoption of State
laws to circumvent the holding of Hyatt v. New York, 188 U.S. 691 (1903), eliminating
constructive presence and constructive flight as a basis for extradition).
290. While acknowledging that Dennison and subsequent decisions of the Court had
recognized "the exclusive character" of federal legislation, the Court in Innes v. Tobin, 240
U.S. 127 (1915), held that "those cases when rightly considered go no further than to
establish the exclusion by the statute of all state action from the matters for which the
statute expressly or by necessary implication provided," id. at 134. In a somewhat
unsatisfying opinion, citing no authority for its reasoning, the Court held that
the reasonable assumption is that by the omission to extend the statute to the full
limits of constitutional power [the statute] must have been intended to leave the
subjects unprovided for not beyond the pale of all law, but subject to the power
which then controlled them-state authority until it was deemed essential by
further legislation to govern them exclusively by national authority.
2013] RENDITION RESISTANCE 197
The belief in state power to legislate concerning criminal
rendition would ultimately lead to a legislative "solution" to the
perceived "failure" of rendition law occasioned by the persistence of
rendition controversies after the Civil War. The unpredictability of
extradition proceedings, given the unbridled discretion of state
governors, diversity in state legislation,2 91 and gaps in the Extradition
Act led to calls for uniform state legislation.2 92 In 1926, the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and
recommended the Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons
Charged with Crime.2 93
Twenty-six states adopted the Act by 1939, and twelve more did
so by 1951.294 By 1983 all states but two had adopted it, and the
Uniform Criminal Extradition Act ("UCEA"), as it had come to be
known, was described as "occup[ying] a core position in the law of
Id. at 134-35. The very next sentence, however, revealed the Court's true reasoning was
from necessity: "[S]uch conclusion is essential to give effect to the act of Congress, since to
hold to the contrary would render inefficacious the regulations provided concerning the
subjects with which it dealt." Id. at 135. One commentator described the Court's reasoning
as based "upon a failure, more by inadvertence than by intention in Congress, to make a
statute as broad as it should have been made." Extradition-Requisition for Fugitive in
State to Which He Had Been Removed by Extradition, 82 CENT. L.J. 261, 261 (1916). The
remedy was not to permit the state to legislate but to leave the matter to Congress: "It
would seem, at all events, that the constitution intended, that the subject was to be cared
for by federal legislation and if it was not exhaustive, it ought to have been." Id.
291. The Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws noted "quite
diversified legislation . . . in the various States." See Supplemental Report of the Standing
Committee on Uniform State Laws, 49 ANN. REP. A.B.A. 530,568 (1926).
292. See, e.g., Judge A.H. Reid, Interstate Extradition for Extra-Territorial Crimes, 43
ANN. REP. A.B.A. 432, 432-40 (1920) (calling upon States to pass uniform legislation).
293. Supplemental Report of the Standing Committee on Uniform State Laws, supra
note 291, at 530; id. at 562-68 (text of proposed Uniform Act for the Extradition of
Persons Charged with Crime); see also Proceedings of the Twenty-Sixth Annual Meeting of
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 39 ANN. REP. A.B.A.
852, 856 (1916) (Uniform Act for the Extradition of Persons of Unsound Mind). The
drafters of the Uniform Act believed the States had concurrent legislative power with
Congress:
[I]t has come to be recognized that the several states may provide machinery for
applying the law of extradition in respect to matters not covered by the Act of
Congress. Thus the states can legislate upon the method of applying for the writ of
habeas corpus, upon the method of arrest and detention of the fugitive before
extradition is demanded, upon the mode of preliminary trial, upon the manner of
applying for a requisition, upon the extent of asylum allowed a prisoner when
brought back to the state from which he has fled, and upon his exemption from
civil process; not to mention other points less important which have always been
regulated by local law.
Supplemental Report of the Standing Committee on Uniform State Laws, supra note 291, at
568.
294. 11 U.L.A. CRIM. LAW & PROC. 51 (master ed. 1974).
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interstate transfer of not only fugitives but also other persons
indispensable to state criminal justice." 29 5
4. An Interstate Compact: The Interstate Agreement on Detainers
State legislation also promised a solution to problems plaguing a
subset of extradition cases-those in which the fugitive from justice
was serving a sentence in another state. In such a case, states would
use a "detainer"-"a request, usually in the form of a warrant or hold
order, to detain a fugitive from justice wanted by the demanding
state. "296
A 1945 article by the Director of the Federal Bureau of Prisons
documented the corrosive effect of detainers on prisoners'
rehabilitative efforts, as well as noting the class of detainers lodged
"[w]ith [n]o [f]oundation," and called for the formation of an
interstate compact. 297 The negative effects of detainers on prisoner
295. Murphy, supra note 206, at 1090-91.
296. Note, The Detainer: A Problem in Interstate Criminal Administration, 48 COLUM.
L. REV. 1190, 1190-91 (1948) (footnotes omitted).
297. James V. Bennett, The Correctional Administrator Views Detainers, 9 FED.
PROBATION 8, 9-10 (1945); see also Note, supra note 296, at 1191-94 (documenting
problems with detainers). Because the Interstate Agreement on Detainers ("IAD"),
unlike the UCEA, is an interstate compact, it required congressional consent. See Cuyler
v. Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438-42 (1981). Congress passed the Interstate Crime Control
Consent Act in June 1934, and in December 1934, the President convened a "National
Crime Conference," at which "one of the main topics discussed was the feasibility of
obtaining more efficient control of crime through such interstate and federal cooperation
to simplify arrest and extradition." Richard Hartshorne, Inter-Governmental Cooperation-
The Way Out, 2 N.J. L. REV. 5, 16-17 (1936). In 1935 the Interstate Commission on Crime
was founded; among its immediate concerns were "loopholes" and the " 'no-man's land' of
crime control," such as that presented by interstate rendition. See Frank Bane, Foreword,
in COUNCIL OF STATE GOv'TS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL (rev.
ed. Sept. 1949). The Interstate Commission on Crime's work was taken over by the
Council of State Governments, id., which ultimately drafted and recommended the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers, COUNCIL OF STATE GoV'TS, SUGGESTED STATE
LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR 1957 at 3-4, 74-76, 78-85 (1956). Thus, the IAD was never
seen as purely state legislation. However, the need for congressional consent was not by
virtue of its subject matter-rendition-as the UCEA demonstrates, but rather by virtue
of its being an agreement among states. It seems noncontroversial to suggest that both the
UCEA and IAD, to the extent they govern the process by which a state obtains custody
over fugitives, are simple extensions of the process for prosecuting crime and therefore fall
within the core of the states' police powers. Those parts of the UCEA and IAD which
govern the process by which a state relinquishes custody over fugitives, by contrast, would
seem to be in need of an argument similar to that made in Commonwealth v. Tracy, 46
Mass. (1 Met.) 536 (1843), that fugitives are "a class of persons dangerous to the security
and peace of ... [the] community." Id. at 549. At any rate, there does not appear to have
been any argument raised against this process being within the states' police powers.
Congress's authority to enter into the field of intergovernmental rendition has been held
to be located in both the Extradition and Commerce Clauses. Adams, 449 U.S. at 442 n.10.
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rehabilitation 298  drew the attention of the Council of State
Governments which assembled a "Joint Committee on Detainers"
that included three members from the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws. 299 By 1956, model legislation
had been drafted, and state legislatures recommended for adoption
what would become known as the Interstate Agreement on Detainers
("IAD"). 300
298. See Larry W. Yackle, Taking Stock of Detainer Statutes, 8 LoY. L.A. L. REV. 88,
91-93 (1975) (same); Note, Detainers and the Correctional Process, 1966 WASH. U. L.Q.
417, 418-23 (documenting detainer problems). These negative effects were later
summarized by the Supreme Court:
[T]he inmate is (1) deprived of an opportunity to obtain a sentence to run
concurrently with the sentence being served at the time the detainer is filed; (2)
classified as a maximum or close custody risk; (3) ineligible for initial assignments
to less than maximum security prisons (i.e., honor farms or forestry camp work);
(4) ineligible for trustee [sic] status; (5) not allowed to live in preferred living
quarters such as dormitories; (6) ineligible for study-release programs or work-
release programs; (7) ineligible to be transferred to preferred medium or minimum
custody institutions within the correctional system, which includes the removal of
any possibility of transfer to an institution more appropriate for youthful
offenders; (8) not entitled to preferred prison jobs which carry higher wages and
entitle [him] to additional good time credits against [his] sentence; (9) inhibited by
the denial of possibility of parole or any commutation of his sentence; (10) caused
anxiety and thus hindered in the overall rehabilitation process since he cannot take
maximum advantage of his institutional opportunities.
Carchman v. Nash, 473 U.S. 716, 730 n.8 (1985) (alterations in original) (quoting Cooper v.
Lockhart, 489 F.2d 308, 314 n.10 (8th Cir. 1973)). Similar burdens are placed on a prisoner
with an immigration detainer:
Prisoners subject to immigration detainers are treated as higher security risks, and
are prohibited from serving their sentences in minimum security facilities or
community treatment centers. Non-citizens typically also find themselves ineligible
for halfway houses, early release programs, out-patient drug rehabilitation
programs, work release, literacy programs, or probation.
Brief of Nat'l Ass'n of Criminal Defense Lawyers, et al., as Amici Curiae in Support of
Petitioner, at 7-8, Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356 (2010) (No. 08-651) (citations
omitted).
299. The Joint Committee's report included a catalog of difficulties caused by
detainers, COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME
CONTROL, supra note 297, at 85-86. It also included a list of "guiding principles" for
reform, including that "[n]o prisoner should be penalized because of a detainer pending
against him unless a thorough investigation of the detainer has been made and it has been
found valid." Id. at 87-88.
300. COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'Ts, SUGGESTED STATE LEGISLATION PROGRAM FOR
1957, supra note 297, at 78-85. Article I of the proposed IAD gave recognition to the
problems with detainers that had occasioned the need for legislation, reciting that
unresolved detainers "produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner
treatment and rehabilitation." Id. at 81. By 1966, nine states had enacted the IAD; by 1970
that number had increased to twenty-five. See S. REP. NO. 91-1356 at 1 (1970); Note, supra
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As with the UCEA, the need for the IAD grew directly out of
the Dennison and Prigg opinions and the lack of any enforcement
mechanism external to the states for the Extradition Clause.30' Under
Dennison and Prigg, the states' relationships with one another
regarding fugitives from justice ultimately depended on comity.3 02 The
purpose of the IAD was to regularize the treatment of detainers by
converting criminal rendition from a scheme governed by comity to
one governed by compulsion.303
5. Conclusion
The postbellum period continued to be marked by the
"problem" of disuniformity in rendition occasioned by states'
differing civil rights norms. The Prigg and Dennison decisions, which
alleged the exclusive power of Congress to legislate regarding
rendition but acknowledged the impotence of the federal government
to compel compliance with such legislation, underscored the need for
a solution.3 04 But whereas the vision for an antebellum solution had
been in a consolidation of federal power in the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850,05 in the postbellum period state legislatures filled the void,
going some distance toward solving the disuniformity problem, by
promulgating the UCEA and the LAD.3 06
note 298, at 430 n.61; see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340, 349-51 (1978)
(recounting history of the development of the IAD).
301. See Bennett, supra note 297, at 8-9 (lamenting the lack of interjurisdictional
coordination and the "lack of definite boundaries to comity [and] understanding");
COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE HANDBOOK ON INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL, supra
note 297, at 88 (urging all jurisdictions to "observe the principles of interstate comity in
the settlement of detainers"); COUNCIL OF STATE Gov'TS, THE HANDBOOK ON
INTERSTATE CRIME CONTROL 91 (rev. ed. 1966) (noting that before the IAD, "the only
way a prosecuting official . . . could secure [a prisoner subject to a detainer] for trial was by
resort to a cumbersome special contract between the Governors of the two states
involved").
302. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
303. See Bennett, supra note 297, at 10.
304. See supra Parts II.A.3, II.A.5.
305. See supra Part II.A.4.
306. See supra Part II.B.3-4. Both the UCEA and IAD stem from the Extradition
Clause and require that extradition, or the placing of a detainer, be based on criminal
charges. By their terms, these statutory schemes are inapplicable to immigration detainers.
See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding
the IAD applies only to detainer related to pending criminal charges in another
jurisdiction, and not to immigration detainer).
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C. Postscript: Puerto Rico v. Branstad (1987)
The final chapter in this history is Justice Thurgood Marshall's
1987 opinion in Puerto Rico v. Branstad,307 overruling Dennison and
holding that the duties imposed by the Extradition Clause can be
enforced in federal court.30 s That Justice Marshall should write the
opinion overruling Dennison was fitting-Justice Marshall had
litigated many of the cases through which the Court had expanded
federal power in the name of civil rights enforcement.3 09 Chief Justice
Taney's decision in Dennison was the opposite-Taney "rediscovered
the viability of states' rights . . . in order to protect the slave states
from federal interference on the eve of the Civil War."3 10
The facts of Branstad were simple. Ronald Calder, a white man
and a native of Iowa, was charged with murder while living in Puerto
Rico for his work as an air traffic controller.3 1' Calder was alleged to
have struck and killed two people with his automobile in a parking lot
in Aguadilla and thereafter fled to Iowa, where he resisted
extradition efforts on the belief that "a white American man. . . could
not receive a fair trial in the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico."3 12
When the Iowa Governor refused to extradite Calder to Puerto Rico,
territorial authorities sought a writ of mandamus to compel the Iowa
Governor to perform his duty under the Extradition Clause and
Extradition Act.313
307. 483 U.S. 219 (1987).
308. Id. at 230.
309. See generally Anthony G. Amsterdam, Thurgood Marshall's Image of the Blue-
Eyed Child in Brown, 68 N.Y.U. L. REv. 226 (1993) (describing Marshall's oral arguments
and litigation strategy in Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)).
310. Paul Finkelman, The Taney Court, 1836-1864: The Jurisprudence of Slavery and
the Crisis of the Union, in THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT: THE PURSUIT OF
JUSTICE 95 (Christopher Tomlins ed., 2005); id. at 95-96 ("Sympathetic to the Southern
cause, Taney avoided writing an opinion that would have given the federal government
the legal authority to force state governors to act."). Taney, of course, wrote the infamous
decision in Dred Scott, in which he defended the power of the federal government. Scott v.
Sanford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). Finkelman concludes the apparent inconsistency
between Taney's states' rights and federalist opinions demonstrates
Taney's larger jurisprudential goal of protecting slavery and the South whenever
he could.... He could flit back and forth from states' rights to federal supremacy.
When it benefitted slavery ... Taney was happy to allow the states to determine
the status of people within their jurisdiction. When it did not, as in Dred Scott,
Taney denied states that capacity.
Finkleman, supra, at 96.
311. Branstad, 483 U.S. at 221-22.
312. Id.
313. Id. at 222-23.
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Dennison of course stood in the way of such relief.314 But Justice
Marshall dismissed Taney's Dennison'opinion, somewhat charitably,
as dictated by circumstance, with the "practical power of the Federal
Government" in 1861 "at its lowest ebb since the adoption of the
Constitution."315 Then, citing the Civil Rights Movement precedents
of Brown v. Board of Education316 and Cooper v. Aaron317-both of
which he had argued before the Court-Justice Marshall dealt
Dennison its death blow, declaring "[t]he fundamental premise of the
holding in Dennison-'that the States and the Federal Government in
all circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns-is not
representative of the law today.' "318
With regard to the Tenth Amendment, Branstad's holding that
the federal government can compel the states to perform their duties
under the Extradition Clause is a break in a long historical chain.319
Branstad did not indicate, however, that the ability of the federal
government to exercise compulsion over state officials would be
widespread.32 0 Indeed the holding of Branstad was narrowly confined
to the Extradition Clause, where "the duty is directly imposed upon
the States by the Constitution itself."3 21
Thus, Branstad left open the very question under inquiry here-
whether the Tenth Amendment prohibits the federal government
from compelling state compliance for the purpose of delivering up
suspected immigration violators.322
314. See id. at 223 (stating the district court dismissed the complaint because of
Dennison's holding).
315. Id. at 224-25.
316. 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
317. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
318. Branstad, 483 U.S. at 227-28 (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761
(1982)).
319. Id. at 227 ("If it seemed clear to the Court in 1861, facing the looming shadow of a
Civil War, that 'the Federal Government, under the Constitution, has no power to impose
on a State officer, as such, any duty whatever, and compel him to perform it,' basic
constitutional principles now point as clearly the other way.") (quoting Kentucky v.
Dennison, 65 U.S. (24 How.) 66,107 (1860), overruled by Branstad, 483 U.S. 219) (citation
omitted).
320. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 228.
321. Id.
322. Id. (stating that the Court had "no need to weigh the performance of the federal
obligation against the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth Amendment,"




III. HISTORY AS PRECEDENT FOR LOCAL RESISTANCE TO
IMMIGRATION RENDITION
The history of local resistance to slave and criminal rendition in
the United States provides compelling precedent for the resistance of
Santa Clara County and other jurisdictions to immigration rendition.
The greater span of history has validated local resistance to rendition
when it has been spurred by civil rights concerns and justified by
reference to the reserved powers of local governments. Branstad
ultimately broke this pattern, but for reasons that will be discussed
below, Branstad does not render localities powerless to resist federal
immigration rendition.
The history thus far reviewed is persuasive, not binding
precedent. While the Fugitive Slave and Extradition Clauses directly
governed slave and criminal rendition,323 they do not govern
immigration rendition, and there is no similar clause in the
Constitution pertaining to immigration rendition. The Extradition
Act,324 Fugitive Slave Acts,325 UCEA,326 and IAD327 by their terms do
not apply to immigration rendition.3 2 8 Before proceeding to a
discussion of how this non-binding but persuasive historical precedent
applies to the legal questions surrounding immigration detainers, it is
necessary to first examine the law directly governing immigration
detainers.
A. The Statutes and Regulation Governing Immigration Detainers
There are references to immigration detainers dating back at
least to 1950, and a form detainer was in existence as early as 1983.329
Yet, the only statutory reference to immigration detainers-section
287(d) of the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA")-was not
enacted until 1986.330 Shortly thereafter, the first federal regulation
323. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 2-3.
324. See supra Part II.A.2.
325. See supra Parts II.A.2, II.A.4.
326. See supra Part II.B.3.
327. See supra Part II.B.4.
328. See, e.g., United States v. Gonzalez-Mendoza, 985 F.2d 1014, 1016 (9th Cir. 1993)
(holding IAD does not apply to immigration detainer).
329. Christopher N. Lasch, Enforcing the Limits of the Executive's Authority to Issue
Immigration Detainers, 35 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 164, 182-85, 182 n.104, 183 n.105
(2008).
330. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207, 3207-
47 to 3207-48 (1986) (codified as amended at INA § 278(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2012)).
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detailing how immigration detainers could be issued and enforced
was enacted.331
The immigration detainer regulation was immediately challenged
332as ultra vires. The regulation is broad in scope, authorizing "[a]ny
authorized immigration officer" to issue "at any time" an immigration
detainer to "any other Federal, State, or local law enforcement
agency."333 Opponents of the regulation pointed to the fact that the
statutory authority-section 287(d) of the INA-was much narrower,
applying only in cases where a suspected immigration violator is
arrested for a controlled substance offense.334 This challenge was
rejected by the Immigration and Naturalization Service ("INS"),
which claimed that the statute did not limit the situations in which an
immigration detainer could be issued335 and that the regulation
331. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (1988); see also 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1 (2004) (referencing § 287.7 as
the governing regulation on detainers); 8 C.F.R. § 236.1 (2013) (same); 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1
(2013) (same). The history of 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 and its relationship to its purported
authority is discussed extensively in my first article on detainers. Lasch, supra note 329, at
182-85. Reference to "deportation" or "immigration" detainers can be found in federal
regulations predating 1986. See, e.g., Treatment and Instruction of Inmates, 47 Fed. Reg.
22,006, 22,007 (May 20, 1982) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 544) ("deportation
detainer"); Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners, 43 Fed. Reg. 22,747, 22,747 (May
26, 1978) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt.2) ("immigration detainer"); Parole, Release,
Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, and Juvenile Delinquents,
39 Fed. Reg. 45,223, 45,231 (Dec. 31, 1974) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 2)
("immigration detainer"); Parole, Release, Supervision and Recommitment of Prisoners,
Youth Offenders, and Juvenile Delinquents, 38 Fed. Reg. 26,652, 26,653 (Sept. 24, 1973)
(to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 2) ("immigration detainer"); Parole, Release, Supervision,
and Recommitment of Prisoners, Youth Offenders, and Juvenile Delinquents, 27 Fed.
Reg. 8,487, 8,488 (Aug. 24, 1962) (to be codified at 28 C.F.R. pt. 2) ("immigration
detainer"). But these regulations addressed the effect of immigration detainers on federal
prisoners' eligibility for programs or parole, and did not specify when a detainer could
issue or how it could be enforced. See, e.g., 39 Fed. Reg. at 45,231-32.
332. See Lasch, supra note 329, at 184-85 (describing federal immigration officials'
response to public comment challenging the detainer regulation as "overly broad because
the authority to issue detainers is limited by section 287(d) of the Act to persons arrested
for controlled substances offenses") (quoting Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of
Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. Reg. 42,406, 42,411 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8
C.F.R. pt. 242)).
333. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(a) (2011).
334. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2012) (codifying INA § 287(d)).
335. One federal district court has agreed with this interpretation. Comm. for
Immigrant Rights v. Cnty. of Sonoma, 644 F. Supp. 2d 1177 (N.D. Cal. 2009). In
Committee for Immigrant Rights, the plaintiffs argued, inter alia, that the detainer statute,
INA § 287(d), was a limit on the detainer authority of federal immigration officials,
permitting detainers to be issued only in cases involving controlled substance arrests. Id. at
1187. Because the federal detainer regulation does not limit the situations in which
detainers can be issued, the plaintiffs argued the regulation is ultra vires of the statute. Id.
at 1196; see also Lasch, supra note 329, at 186-93 (arguing the regulation is ultra vires
because it does not require the detainer process to be initiated by the arresting law
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merely codified the longstanding "general authority of the Service to
detain any individual subject to exclusion or deportation
proceedings. "336
Even accepting the notion that federal immigration authorities
have unbridled authority to detain suspected immigration violators,337
and a concomitantly broad "general detainer authority,"338 a key
question remains: What is an immigration detainer-is it nothing
more than a request for notification prior to a prisoner's release, or is
it a command that state or local officials continue the detention of a
suspected immigration violator who would otherwise be released?
The question is important because a federal command to state
officials to enforce immigration rendition provisions implicates the
history reviewed in Part II. That history of slave and criminal
rendition reveals a consistent rejection of the idea that the federal
government could compel state officials to participate in rendition of
prisoners until the Branstad decision in 1987.
B. Is an Immigration Detainer a Request or a Command?
There has been considerable uncertainty as to whether an
immigration detainer is a request or a command.33 9 From 1983 until
enforcement agency, and that the regulation is ultra vires for lack of limits as to situations
in which detainers can be issued).
The district court, however, concluded that the federal immigration detainer
regulation was not ultra vires of its enabling legislation. Comm. for Immigrant Rights, 644
F. Supp. 2d at 1198. The court first concluded that the detainer statute was not meant to
limit the situations in which the federal government might issue a detainer-rather, the
detainer statute was meant to impose additional requirements on the federal government
in controlled substance cases. Id.; see 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (requiring federal immigration
officials to "promptly determine whether or not to issue such a detainer" upon request in
such cases). Legislative history not cited by the court or the parties supports the court's
conclusion. 132 CONG. REC. 22981 (1986) (indicating the provision for detainers in INA
§ 287(d) was added in response to "local law enforcement complaints concerning the INS's
inability to issue a judgment on a suspect's citizenship status fast enough to allow the
authorities to continue to detain him," and was intended to mandate a faster response
from federal immigration authorities to requests initiated by local law enforcement).
336. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. Reg.
42,406, 42,411 (Aug. 17, 1994) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 242); see Lasch, supra note
329, at 184-85.
337. But see Arizona v. United States, 132 S.Ct. 2492, 2505-06 (2012) (recognizing the
authority of federal immigration officials to arrest suspected immigration violators is not
unlimited); see also Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement, supra note 7, at
295-97 (discussing Arizona's recognition of limited federal arrest authority).
338. Enhancing the Enforcement Authority of Immigration Officers, 59 Fed. Reg. at
42,411; see Lasch, supra note 329, at 185 (noting the federal government's contention that
it has "general detainer authority" regarding immigration detainers).
339. See KATE M. MANUEL, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42690, IMMIGRATION
DETAINERS: LEGAL ISSUES 11-14 (2012) (detailing authorities supporting the position
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June 2011, the immigration detainer form ("Form 1-247") used by the
federal. government contained language suggesting the detainer was
nothing more than a request for notice:
Please accept this notice as a detainer. This is for notification
purposes only and does not limit your discretion in any decision
affecting the offender's classification, work, and quarters
assignments, or other treatment which he or she would
otherwise receive.340
Additionally, the 1983 version of the detainer form did not
instruct local officials to maintain custody of the prisoner beyond his
or her release date. Instead, the form included a checkbox with the
following language: "IT IS REQUESTED THAT YOU ... Notify
this office of the time of release at least 30 days prior to release or as
much in advance as possible."341
Following the enactment of INA section 287(d) and the first
regulation on immigration detainers, the government added a
checkbox to the Form 1-247, accompanied by the following statement:
that the detainer is a request and authorities supporting the position that the detainer is a
command). Federal district courts have noted the mandatory language of 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(d). Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452, 2012 WL 5995820, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov.
30, 2012) (noting the absence of record evidence that the plaintiffs' "risk of future
confinement is 'conjectural' or 'hypothetical,' or that the mandatory language of 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7 is not followed in practice"); Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., No. 3-11-
1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of "shall" in 8
CFR § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state officials). The Third Circuit
appears poised to decide the question of whether immigration detainers can be mandatory
on state officials, in Galarza v. County of Lehigh. See Galarza v. Cnty. of Lehigh, No. 12-
3991 (3d Cir. Oct. 10, 2013). Oral arguments were heard on October 10, 2013; at the time
of publication, a decision had not been rendered. See id. The plaintiff in Galarza, a United
States citizen, brought an action for damages against the County of Lehigh, which honored
an immigration detainer lodged against him by federal officials, detaining Mr. Galarza
beyond when he would otherwise have been released. Galarza v. Szalczyk, No. 10-cv-
06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012). The district court held the
county could not be held liable because the county's policy of honoring all immigration
detainers was "consistent with" the federal regulation stating that a local law enforcement
agency "shall" prolong detention pursuant to a detainer. Id. at *18--19 (citing 8 CFR
§ 287.7(d)). I am counsel of record on an amicus brief which argues (consistent with my
arguments here) that despite the mandatory language of the federal regulation, as a matter
of law the federal government cannot require state and local officials to prolong the
detention of prisoners based on immigration detainers. Brief of Law Professors as Amici
Curiae in Support of Appellant & in Support of Reversal, Galarza v. Cnty. of Lehigh, No.
12-3991 (filed March 26, 2013), at 20-26 [hereinafter Galarza Amici Brief].
340. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Mar. 1983)
(emphasis added) (this version does not include the word "please"); U.S. IMMIGRATION
& NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Apr. 1997); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC.,
FORM 1-247 (Aug. 2010).
341. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Mar. 1983).
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Federal regulations (8 CFR 287.7) require that you detain the
alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays and Federal holidays) to provide adequate time for
INS to assume custody of the alien.342
The form now contained language indicating that the detainer was
"for notification purposes only" but also that federal regulations
"require" continued detention, confusing the issue of whether the
detainer is a request or a command.343
The government's official position on this point has been as
ambiguous as its detainer form. The County of Santa Clara noted the
ambiguity that existed by virtue of mixed messages in the Form 1-247,
the federal regulations, and DHS's published Secure Communities
"standard operating procedures."3 44 Santa Clara asked the director of
Secure Communities directly: "Is it [DHS]'s position that localities
are legally required to hold individuals pursuant to Form 1-247 or are
detainers merely requests with which a county could legally decline to
comply?"345 In September 2010, the director responded:
ICE views an immigration detainer as a request that a law
enforcement agency maintain custody of an alien who may
otherwise be released for up to 48 hours (excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays). This provides ICE time to assume
custody of the alien.346
342. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Apr. 1997)
(emphasis added).
343. Id.
344. The County noted that the Secure Communities "standard operating procedures"
described a detainer as a "request" but stated local law enforcement "will abide by the
conditions" stated in the detainer; 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 similarly describes a detainer as a
"request" but states local law enforcement "shall maintain custody" of prisoners who
would otherwise be released; and the Form 1-247 itself uses a combination of "request"
and "require" terminology. Memorandum from Miguel Marquez, Cnty. Counsel, Cnty. of
Santa Clara, to George Shirakawa, Chairperson of the Bd. of Supervisors' Pub. Safety &
Justice Comm. & Donald F. Gage, Vice Chair of the Bd. of Supervisors' Pub. Safety and
Justice Comm., at 13 (Sept. 1, 2010), available at http://altopolimigra.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/2010-09-01 SC-County-Counsel-Memo.pdf.
345. Letter from Miguel MArquez, Cnty. Counsel, Cnty. of Santa Clara, to David
Venturella, Exec. Dir., Office of Secure Cmtys., U.S. Dep't of Homeland Sec. (Aug. 16,
2010), available at http://ccrjustice.org/files/SCC%20County%20Counsel%201etter%20to
%20Venturella.pdf.
346. Letter from David Venturella, Exec. Dir., Office of Secure Cmtys., U.S. Dep't of
Homeland Sec., to Miguel Mdrquez, Cnty. Counsel, Cnty. of Santa Clara (Sept. 27, 2010)
(emphasis added), available at http://www.deportationnation.org/library/. The Council of
the City of New Orleans relied on this characterization of the detainer as a "request" in
enacting its recent policy limiting compliance with detainers. See Council of the City of
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An August 2010 revision of the detainer form retreated from
language indicating the regulation requires local law enforcement to
detain a person for DHS347 to language describing the detainer as a
request based on the regulation.348 This alteration suggested ICE's
position had solidified on this point. And in early 2011, DHS officials
reportedly stated privately that an immigration detainer is "merely a
request" and that "there is no federal law or mandate or court case
that requires local jurisdictions to honor [immigration] detainers."3 4 9
Yet in June 2011 the government changed course yet again, issuing
yet another revision of the Form 1-247 detainer, which eliminated the
"for notification purposes only" language and quoted the detainer
regulation as providing that "a law enforcement agency 'shall
maintain custody of an alien' once a detainer has been issued by
DHS."350 The most recent revision of the detainer form once again
describes itself as a "request" for prolonged custody and references
the detainer regulation but does not quote its mandatory language.351
Whether the federal government is claiming the authority to
command obedience from state officials remains unclear, given these
inconsistent pronouncements.352 The August 2010 detainer form had
New Orleans, Res. R-13-164 (May 16, 2013), available at http://nowcrj.org/wp-
content/uploads/2013/08/City-Council-Resolution-R-13-164.pdf.
347. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Apr. 1997).
348. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Aug. 2010).
349. Jason Winshell, San Francisco Poised to Revive 'Sanctuary City' After Feds Deport
More than 100 Non-Criminals, S.F. PUBLIC PRESS (Apr. 15, 2011),
http://sfpublicpress.org/news/2011-04/san-francisco-poised-to-revive-sanctuary-city-after-
feds-deport-more-than-100-non-crimi.
350. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (June 2011) (including in bold
language just below the document's caption, the command: "MAINTAIN CUSTODY OF
ALIEN FOR A PERIOD NOT TO EXCEED 48 HOURS").
351. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdflimmigration-detainer-form.pdf.
352. The federal government has recently taken the position, in litigation, that a
detainer is a "legally authorized request" that does not "impose[] a requirement upon a
[local enforcement agency] to detain the individual on ICE's behalf." Defendants' Answer
to Amended Complaint, at 11, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. May 13,
2013); see also Defendants' Memorandum in Support of Motion for Partial Judgment on
the Pleadings, at 9, Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11-cv-05452 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 2, 2013)
(arguing immigration detainers do not violate the Tenth Amendment by commandeering
state and local officials because "detainers issued pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 are
voluntary requests"). Relying in part on this litigation position, forty-nine members of
Congress recently requested that DHS clarify its position publicly. Describing "concern
over conflicting information the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) has
disseminated regarding the Secure Communities program," the members of Congress,
after expressing their belief that "[i]t is clear . .. that the 1-247 is a request and not a
requirement," asked DHS to "direct [them] to an easily accessible online resource that
clarifies that 1-247 detainers are requests, imposing no requirements on [local law
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seemed to signal a retreat from any such claim.353 The June 2011354
and later forms,355 making reference to the federal immigration
detainer regulation (which does purport to compel state officials to
detain prisoners at the federal government's insistence35 6) and the
suggestion by negative implication that state officials are "authorized
to hold the subject"357 for a limited time pursuant to the detainer,
signaled a return to the claim of federal compulsion.
C. The Legality of Immigration Detainers in Light of the Precedent
The legal question this raises is whether compulsion of state
officials by the federal government violates the Tenth Amendment's
reservation of powers to the states.358 Modern jurisprudence suggests
an affirmative answer. The Court has spoken with abundant clarity in
enforcement agencies]," or to post such information "in an easily accessible location
online." Letter from Mike Thompson, U.S. Rep., Zoe Lofgren, U.S. Rep., et al., to Rand
Beers, Acting Sec'y of Homeland Sec. (Oct. 17, 2013) (on file with the North Carolina
Law Review).
353. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Aug. 2010) (using the term
"request").
354. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (June 2011).
355. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Oct. 2011) (on file with the North
Carolina Law Review); U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2011); U.S.
DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2012), available at http://www.ice.gov
/doclib/secure-communities/pdflimmigration-detainer-form.pdf.
356. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (stating local law enforcement receiving a detainer "shall
maintain custody of the alien for a period not to exceed 48 hours, excluding Saturdays,
Sundays, and holidays in order to permit assumption of custody by the Department"
(emphasis added)); see also Ramirez-Mendoza v. Maury County, 2013 WL 298124, at *8
(M.D. Tenn. Jan. 25, 2013) (holding that 8 CFR § 287.7(d) "imposed a federal mandate"
on state officials); Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn., No. 3-11-1168, 2012 WL
3945354, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that the use of "shall" in 8 C.F.R.
§ 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state officials); Galarza v. Szalczyk, No.
10-cv-06815, 2012 WL 1080020, at *19 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 30, 2012) (holding that "although an
immigration detainer 'serves to advise another law enforcement agency that the
Department seeks custody' and 'is a request' to the federal, state, or local law enforcement
agency presently holding the individual named in the detainer that it 'advise the
Department, prior to release' of that individual, once the immigration detainer is issued,
the local, state, or federal agency then holding the individual 'shall' maintain custody"
(citation omitted) (quoting 8 C.F.R. §§ 287.7(a), 287.7(d))); cf Buquer v. City of
Indianapolis, 797 F.Supp. 2d 905, 911 (S.D. Ind. 2011) (describing an immigration detainer
as "not a criminal warrant, but rather a voluntary request" directed to state or local
officials).
357. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2012), available at
http://www.ice.gov/doclib/secure-communities/pdflimmigration-detainer-form.pdf ("[Y]ou
are not authorized to hold the subject beyond these 48 hours.").
358. U.S. CONST. amend. X ("The powers not delegated to the United States by the
Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or
to the people.").
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Printz v. United States," striking down in no uncertain terms a
federal statute requiring local law enforcement officers to submit
prospective handgun purchaser background check requests to the
federal government: "Today we hold that Congress cannot ...
conscript[] the States' officers directly.... [S]uch commands are
fundamentally incompatible with our constitutional system of dual
sovereignty."360
If, for example, Congress had written INA section 287(d) to
require (rather than to permit) local law enforcement officials to
report controlled substance arrestees suspected of being immigration
violators and to require (rather than to permit) those local officials to
request immigration officials to "promptly determine whether or not
to issue such a detainer,"361 the facts would be virtually
indistinguishable from Printz.362 But while Congress seems to have
carefully crafted the detainer statute to avoid Tenth Amendment
problems,363 the same cannot be said of the immigration detainer
regulation, which purports to compel state officials to enforce its
provisions. *
The history explored in Part II reveals that the question of
whether the federal government can compel state officials to
implement federal law is not at all a new question-in fact it has been
a recurring one with respect to rendition.3 65  Rendition history
provides deep support for the conclusion hastily drawn from modern
precedent-that the federal government has no authority to compel
state officials to detain prisoners for rendition.
The absence of federal authority to compel state compliance with
rendition was an unchallenged legal fact from the Articles of
359. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
360. Id. at 935.
361. 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2012).
362. Compare id., with Printz, 521 U.S. at 935.
363. Congress left control in the hands of local law enforcement officials to decide for
themselves when to bring a controlled substance arrestee to the attention of federal
immigration officials, ensuring INA § 287(d) avoided any Tenth Amendment unfunded
mandate problems. See Lasch, supra note 329, at 186-90 (discussing statutory language
allocating authority for initiating detainer process to law enforcement officials making the
criminal arrest).
364. 8 C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2013).
365. One legal historian traces the Printz decision back to Prigg. Professor Finkelman,
seizing upon Justice Scalia's mention of the Fugitive Slave Act in Printz, see 521 U.S. 898,
906 (1997), and noting the Justice's failure to mention that the portion of the Act which
required state judges to adjudicate claims was held unconstitutional by Justice Story in
Prigg, see supra notes 153-63 and accompanying text, has devoted an article to the matter.
See Finkelman, supra note 163, at 1400-01. In that article he treads some of the ground
that I also cover here.
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Confederation straight through to Puerto Rico v. Branstad.366 In fact,
there was every objective indication that the proposition was settled
law. In 1818, legislation that would have compelled state officials to
cooperate with fugitive slave rendition on pain of federal criminal
charges failed.367 And the Court's rejection of a federal compulsion
power in Prigg was near unanimous3 68 and abiding, as it was
reaffirmed in Dennison years later.369 Even Justice McLean, the lone
voice in favor of a federal compulsion power over rendition, rested
his argument narrowly upon the explicit duties governing state
officials in the text of the Fugitive Slave Clause of the Constitution.3 70
Against the backdrop of this history, the current immigration
detainer regulation suffers from the same defect shared by the
Fugitive Slave and Extradition Acts of 1793-each attempted to
impose by federal law a duty on state officials. The inability of the
federal government to compel performance of that duty leaves it
unenforceable; rendition controversies ensue. To the extent a solution
is needed, it will have to take a form akin to the Fugitive Slave Act of
185017'-federal, rather than state, officials will have to be charged
with enforcing the quarter million immigration detainers issued each
year. Alternatively, regularized cooperation with immigration
detainers could take the form of state legislation for the processing of
federal immigration detainers, akin to the state statutory enactments
of the UCEA or IAD.
But the long history of the anti-commandeering doctrine in
rendition proceedings ended with Branstad,372 leaving open the
possibility that Justice Marshall's Branstad opinion has opened the
door for federal compulsion of state officials in immigration rendition
matters. As applied to the federal regulation governing immigration
detainers, this argument is unpersuasive for four reasons.
First, the timing of the Branstad opinion makes using it to
support federal compulsion of state officials pursuant to the
regulation on immigration detainers problematic. The statute first
mentioning detainers, INA section 287(d), was passed in 1986373 a
year before Branstad was decided, and the interim regulation that
366. See supra Part II.
367. See supra notes 136-38 and accompanying text.
368. See supra Part II.A.3.
369. See supra Part II.A.5.
370. See Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 666 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting).
371. See supra Part II.A.4.
372. See supra Part II.C.
373. Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-570, § 1751(d), 100 Stat. 3207-47
(codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012)).
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first imposed a duty on state and local officials to continue holding
prisoners subject to immigration detainers was announced in May
1987 37 4-a month before Branstad was decided.
Not only did the statute and regulation predate the Branstad
decision, but the government's grounding of the detainer regulation
on its historic "general detainer authority,"375 eschewing INA section
287(d) as a positive source of statutory authority for issuing detainers,
invoked the long history of immigration detainers that predated
Branstad.376 Federal authority over immigration detainers throughout
that period was always understood in light of the anti-commandeering
doctrine embodied in Prigg and Dennison. Consistent with this
understanding, the detainer form in use during that historical period
merely "requested" state and local officials to notify federal
immigration officials of a prisoner's scheduled release date.377 The
interim regulation-passed before Branstad was decided-marked a
substantial expansion of the federal government's claimed power over
immigration rendition.3 78 Branstad is at best a post hoc justification
for the regulation.
Second, Branstad's holding is not capable of enlargement to
cover immigration rendition. While Justice Marshall in his Branstad
opinion did speak in sweeping terms about the changed relationship
between the states and federal government 79 and the incompatibility
374. Parole Judicial Recommendations Against Deportation Proceedings To
Determine Deportability of Aliens in the United States, 52 Fed. Reg. 16,370, 16,370-71
(May 5, 1987) (to be codified at 8 C.F.R. pt. 287).
375. See Lasch, supra note 329, at 185 & n.116; see Fed. Defendants' Notice of Motion
to Dismiss & Memorandum of Law in Support Thereof at 12-17, Comm. for Immigrant
Rights of Sonoma Cnty. v. Cnty. of Sonoma, No. 4:08-cv-04220, 2009 WL 3502742 (N.D.
Cal. Jan. 28, 2009) [hereinafter Fed. Defendants' Notice, Immigrant Rights].
376. See, e.g., Fed. Defendants' Notice, Immigrant Rights, supra note 375, at 12-17
(arguing that ICE has broad legal authority to detain and issue detainers for illegal aliens
and reviewing the different sources of law that support this proposition).
377. U.S. IMMIGRATION & NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Mar. 1983).
378. The word "detainer" as used in INA § 287(d) is best understood in light of this
history. History would not have envisioned federal officials commanding state officials to
detain suspected immigration violators on behalf of the federal government. "Detainer" as
used in INA § 287(d) should be construed as a detainer in the form of a request and not a
command. 8 U.S.C. § 1357 (2012) (codifying INA § 287); see U.S. IMMIGRATION &
NATURALIZATION SERV., FORM 1-247 (Mar. 1983). That part of the detainers regulation
which commands state officials to continue holding prisoners beyond their release date, 8
C.F.R. § 287.7(d) (2013), can draw support neither from INA § 287(d), nor from any
supposed historical "general detainer authority." See Lasch, supra note 329, at 185 &
n.116.
379. Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 483 U.S. 219, 228 (1987) ("The fundamental premise of
the holding in Dennison-'that the States and the Federal Government in all
circumstances must be viewed as coequal sovereigns-is not representative of the law
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of Dennison's reasoning with that changed relationship, 380 Branstad's
holding is nonetheless as narrowly expressed as was Justice McLean's
exception to the Court's unanimity on this point in Prigg.38 ' Both
Justice Marshall and Justice McLean found that federal compulsion
of state officers was permitted-not as a general matter, but only
because the text of the Constitution specifically imposed duties on
state officers. 82 This explicit textual command eliminated any need to
consider Tenth Amendment principles.383 But there is.no Fugitive
Slave Clause or Extradition Clause explicitly imposing duties on state
officers to comply with immigration rendition,384 and thus the Tenth
Amendment anti-commandeering concerns persist.385
Third, the post-Branstad decisions of New York v. United
StateS386 and Printz reaffirmed the anti-commandeering doctrine seen
throughout the nineteenth century and taken as a given in Prigg and
Dennison. In New York, the Court limited Branstad to the
proposition "only that federal law is enforceable in state courts and
that federal courts may in proper circumstances order state officials to
today.' ") (quoting FERC v. Mississippi, 456 U.S. 742, 761 (1982)); id. at 230 ("Kentucky v.
Dennison is the product of another time. The conception of the relation between the
States and the Federal Government there announced is fundamentally incompatible with
more than a century of constitutional development. Yet this decision has stood while the
world of which it was a part has passed away. We conclude that it may stand no longer.").
380. Id. at 230.
381. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. 539, 666 (1842) (McLean, J., dissenting) ("I go no
farther than to say, that where the Constitution imposes a positive duty on a state or its
officers to surrender fugitives, that Congress may prescribe the mode of proof, and the
duty of the state officers.").
382. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 228 ("Because the duty is directly imposed upon the
States by the Constitution itself, there can be no need to weigh the performance of the
federal obligation against the powers reserved to the States under the Tenth
Amendment."); Prigg, 41 U.S. at 666 (McLean, J. dissenting).
383. See Branstad, 483 U.S. at 228; Prigg, 41 U.S. at 666 (McLean, J., dissenting).
384. Indeed the Extradition Clause does not require states to render up fugitives to the
federal government-and hence it was believed necessary for the federal government to
join the IAD in order to obtain fugitives from the states for prosecution in the District of
Columbia. S. REP. No. 91-1356, at 4 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4864, 4868
("[U]nless the legislation is made applicable to the District, its prosecuting authorities
would not be able to have a prisoner in a party State made available for disposition of
local detainers. For these reasons the government of the District of Columbia
recommended amendments ... to make the legislation directly applicable to the
District.").
385. See Michael D. Hatcher, Printz Policy: Federalism Undermines Miranda, 88 GEO.
L.J. 177, 201-02 (1999) (arguing that while Branstad and similar cases "show that the
federal courts do have the power to order state executive officials to perform affirmative
duties when the State commits a constitutional violation[,] [i]t does not follow from these
cases that federal courts have the same power to issue[] orders requiring state officials to
perform affirmative duties absent a constitutional violation" (footnotes omitted)).
386. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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comply with federal law, propositions that by no means imply any
authority on the part of Congress to mandate state regulation."387
And when the federal government argued in Printz that the
Extradition Act of 1793 was an instance of Congress imposing duties
on state executive officials, the Printz majority pointed out that this
was direct implementation of the Extradition Clause.388 Thus,
Branstad has not been held to support a broad power of compulsion
in the federal government.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Branstad's reversal of
Dennison should be understood not as a simple expression of federal
dominance, but rather as a more nuanced expression of federal
dominance in a particular context-a United States after the Civil
Rights Movement and the Warren Court's criminal procedure
revolution.38 9 The decision must be read in light of those historical
developments.
Branstad must be understood as a post-Civil Rights Movement
decision. The significance of Justice Marshall's citations in Branstad
to Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka..o and Cooper v. Aaron391
is twofold. First, the decisions mark the clear difference in historical
context that Justice Marshall uses to support overruling Dennison, as
387. Id. at 179.
388. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 909 (1997). The majority proceeded to
discuss early anti-commandeering measures that directly support the argument that
federal immigration officials cannot require state jails to house federal prisoners:
On September 23, 1789-the day before its proposal of the Bill of Rights-the
First Congress enacted a law aimed at obtaining state assistance of the most
rudimentary and necessary sort for the enforcement of the new Government's
laws: the holding of federal prisoners in state jails at federal expense. Significantly,
the law issued not a command to the States' executive, but a recommendation to
their legislatures. Congress "recommended to the legislatures of the several States
to pass laws, making it expressly the duty of the keepers of their gaols, to receive
and safe keep therein all prisoners committed under the authority of the United
States," and offered to pay 50 cents per month for each prisoner. Moreover, when
Georgia refused to comply with the request, Congress's only reaction was a law
authorizing the marshal in any State that failed to comply with the
Recommendation of September 23, 1789, to rent a temporary jail until provision
for a permanent one could be made.
Id. at 909-10 (citations omitted).
389. See generally Robert Jerome Glennon, The Jurisdictional Legacy of the Civil
Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869 (1994) (connecting the Civil Rights Movement,
the Warren Court's "due process revolution" (characterized by a constitutionalization of
state criminal proceedings made possible by incorporating the protections of the Bill of
Rights via the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause) and an increase in the
federal courts' power and jurisdiction).
390. 344 U.S. 1 (1952).
391. 358 U.S. 1 (1958).
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these two decisions affirming the rights of African Americans are
juxtaposed against Justice Taney's decision intended "to protect the
slave states from federal interference on the eve of the Civil War.""
Second, Brown and Aaron relied upon the injunctive power of the
Supreme Court and thus illustrated the necessity of federal
compulsion to vindicate civil rights.
Branstad should also be understood in light of the Warren
Court's due process revolution. It would have been anomalous, after
years of combatting local racism by incorporating the Constitution's
criminal procedure guarantees against the states, for the Court to
have shown sympathy to the claim that a white man would not receive
a fair trial in Puerto Rico. The guarantee of constitutionally fair trials
in all jurisdictions had, in theory, eliminated the need for executive
discretion in rendition controversies implicating civil rights.393
Understanding the context of the Branstad decision illustrates its
inapplicability to the immigration rendition problem. Federal
compulsion as used in Branstad is grounded in the same principles
that allowed the use of federal compulsion to effectuate civil rights
decisions like Brown and Aaron and the use of federal compulsion to
effectuate minimum Due Process guarantees in criminal cases. The
federal compulsion sanctioned in Branstad is nothing more than the
compulsion necessary to coerce compliance with federal
constitutional guarantees.
Reading Branstad as authorizing federal compulsion beyond that
necessary to attain compliance with the Constitution would eliminate
a fertile source of political dialogue between the states and the
federal government. Branstad teaches that the Tenth Amendment
and the anti-commandeering doctrine can be dispensed with in
matters involving constitutional commands. But where the
Constitution does not compel a result, the Tenth Amendment anti-
commandeering principle allows for dialogue between the federal
government and the states as they allocate resources to express their
perhaps differing priorities.394 In this light, northern states can be seen
392. See Finkelman, supra note 310, at 95. Justice Marshall's opinion in Branstad at
most only alludes to the pro-slavery character of Justice Taney's Dennison opinion,
describing it as written in the context of a fracturing country when federal power was at its
"lowest ebb." Puerto Rico v. Branstad, 438 U.S. 219, 224-25 (1987).
393. Murphy, supra note 206, at 1076.
394. Ann Althouse, The Vigor of Anti-Commandeering Doctrine in Times of Terror, 69
BROOK. L. REV. 1231, 1250-61 (2004) (discussing local resistance to participating in the
federal government's anti-terrorism measures as an example of how the Tenth
Amendment can provide a mechanism for local expression of individual rights norms
greater than those guaranteed by federal law). This idea is akin to the idea that state
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to have expressed their opposition to slavery by not putting state
resources in the service of fugitive slave rendition. And Santa Clara
County has expressed its opposition to the federal government's
immigration rendition practices by withdrawing its resources from the
endeavor.
In the light of all of the history reviewed in Part II, then, Santa
Clara's decision is a justifiable exercise of Tenth Amendment
retained powers. Additionally, Santa Clara's decision belongs to a
historical tradition of states, in the absence of federal enforcement,
exercising discretion over rendition decisions in order to enforce civil
rights norms.
IV. ANALOGIZING IMMIGRATION RENDITION TO SLAVE
RENDITION AND CRIMINAL RENDITION DEEPENS OUR
UNDERSTANDING OF CURRENT IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT
PRACTICES
While history can serve as precedent, the review of history can
also illuminate underlying truths. If it is startling to encounter, in the
paragraphs of an article on immigration detainers in the twenty-first
century, references to fugitive slave-catchers and forcible abductions,
it is because discussing immigration rendition and slave rendition
together awakens a realization. The juxtaposition serves as a solemn
reminder of what violence it is to claim the body of a person, and how
contrary it is to everyday assumptions that this violence might be
accomplished with nothing more than a piece of paper.
A. The Common Experience Across Three Rendition Systems
The lived experience, of both the individuals and the
communities that have been targets of immigrant, slave, and criminal
rendition suggests the deep commonality shared by these three
rendition systems. Senator William Lewis Dayton from New Jersey,
in speaking against what would become the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850, described the following:
constitutions can provide more protection than the United States Constitution-an idea
repeatedly endorsed by Justice Marshall. E.g., Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 731 & n.4
(1979) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Oregon v. Hass, 420 U.S. 714, 728 (1975) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting); cf Robert M. Cover & Alexander Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas
Corpus and the Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035, 1036 (1977) (discussing federal habeas corpus
review of state court criminal judgments as a mechanism for constitutional dialogue
between state and federal courts).
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A black male or female lives in a free community, and has,
perhaps, for years; they are recognized as free by our laws, and
have children born there, (as was the case of the female carried
off by Prigg from Pennsylvania.) Upon some calm day a
stranger unknown to the community, presents himself there,
and, without process or evidence, simply says, that man, or that
woman is my slave! The black denies it: and yet he lays violent
hands upon that slave, and carries him or her off by force. That
community cannot follow to see how matters will terminate; yet
they know nothing of the man who presents himself, nor of his
right. They only know that the black has been there, perhaps
for years, and supposed to be free. Can it be matter of surprise
that, under such circumstances, there should be mobs, and riots,
and outrages? The case is calculated to create excitement, and
the feelings of all free communities revolt against it.395
That these words might well describe the immigrant rendition
experience today396 is illuminated by considering a similar report
concerning the effects of present-day immigration detainers
"disappearing" members of the community:
Parents get taken to Pima County Jail, there we have them on a
website, we know they are on an [immigration] hold, and then it
395. APPX. TO CONG. GLOBE, 31ST CONG., 1ST SESS., 438-39 (1850). Senator Dayton's
remarks were in favor of importing some measure of procedural due process to slave
recapture. Id.
396. I do not wish to be overly facile in drawing the connection between present-day
immigration rendition and antebellum fugitive slave rendition. Similarities between the
two issues, however, raise the question of the degree to which current practices represent
historic practices that have undergone "status regime . . . 'modernization.' " See Reva B.
Siegel, "The Rule of Love": Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2178-79 (1996) (describing how "civil rights reform does not simply abolish a status
regime" but instead "modernizes the rules and rhetoric" used to justify and enforce the
former status hierarchy-"status regime modernization" means "status relationships will
be translated from an older, socially contested idiom into a newer, more socially
acceptable idiom"); see also ALEXANDER, supra 208, at 14-15 (proposing to trace a line of
history from slavery to Jim Crow and then to mass incarceration "to illustrate the ways in
which systems of racialized social control have managed to morph, evolve, and adapt to
changes in the political, social and legal context over time"); Kevin R. Johnson, Protecting
National Security Through More Liberal Admission of Immigrants, 2007 U. CHi. LEGAL F.
157, 185 (2007) (describing America's undocumented immigrant population as
"harken[ing] back to the days of slavery and Jim Crow in the United States, with a racial
caste of workers subject to exploitation and abuse in the secondary labor market");
Johnson, supra note 10, at 604 (same). Status regime modernization is a larger question
left for another day; my modest goal is to use history to illuminate current practices. See
Karla Mari McKanders, Immigration Enforcement and the Fugitive Slave Acts: Exploring
Their Similarities, 61 CATH. U. L. REV. 921, 952 (2012) (noting that "similarities between
current immigration policies and the Fugitive Slave Acts provide insight into current
enforcement policies").
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seems like from one minute to the next they disappear. What I
mean by disappear is that they are no longer at the Pima
County Jail and we don't know where they went .... As you
know, INS facilities are not public, are not published, there's
not a web page that we can go to, to see if parents are there
397
A Jamaican immigrant in detention for a drug offense recently
drew the slavery parallel explicitly:
Being held in prison while awaiting your deportation hearing,
you are constantly reminded that you're not considered a
person. You have the feeling of being stripped of anything that
makes you feel human, taken away from your home, your
family, with a devastating effect on your children. It is the worst
punishment that any country or system can bestow upon
someone.
397. Sw. INST. FOR RESEARCH ON WOMEN & THE BACON IMMIGRATION LAW AND
POLICY PROGRAM, UNIV. OF ARIz., DISAPPEARING PARENTS: A REPORT ON
IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT AND THE CHILD WELFARE SYSTEM 11 (2011) (footnotes
omitted); id. at 13-17 (describing "climate of fear" created in the community); see also
HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED UP FAR AWAY: THE TRANSFER OF IMMIGRANTS TO
REMOTE DETENTION CENTERS IN THE UNITED STATES 1, 3,5 (Dec. 2009) (documenting
observations of federal immigration detainee transfer policy); INTER-AM. COMM'N ON
HUMAN RIGHTS, REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND
DUE PROCESS para. 394-401, at 137-40 (2010) (documenting observations of federal
immigration detainee transfer policy); Peter L. Markowitz, Barriers to Representation for
Detained Immigrants Facing Deportation: Varick Street Detention Facility, A Case Study,
78 FORDHAM L. REV. 541, 556-57 (2009) (noting "DHS regularly transfers detainees to
faraway remote detention facilities often making multiple transfers for a single detainee").
See generally IMMIGRANT FAMILY ADVOCATES, A PLEA FOR COMPASSION AND
COMMON SENSE: THE SENSELESS AND OPTIONAL DETENTION OF UNDOCUMENTED
IMMIGRANTS BY LOCAL LAW ENFORCEMENT IN DESCHUTES COUNTY, OREGON 2
(2010) (describing process by which members of the community are removed by
immigration detainers typically placed after minor traffic violations and similar offenses);
id. at 2 (reporting "terrible impacts" on the community when "[a] parent, often the family
breadwinner, is 'disappeared' without notification to family, friends or faith community").
ICE reported to Human Rights Watch in early 2010 that it was reviewing its detainee
transfer policy and "intend[ed] to minimize the number of detainee transfers to the
greatest extent possible." Letter from Phyllis Coven, Acting Dir., Office of Detention
Policy and Planning, U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, to Allison Parker,
Deputy Dir., U.S. Program, Human Rights Watch (Feb. 22, 2010), available at
http://www.hrw.org/node/89408. But see HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A COSTLY MOVE: FAR
AND FREQUENT TRANSFERS IMPEDE HEARINGS FOR IMMIGRANT DETAINEES IN THE
UNITED STATES 10-12 (2011) (reporting that while ICE did make available an online
detainee locator service, "no significant policy changes have been made" regarding
detainee transfer).
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Being shackled constantly for hours on end, dragged up and
down those hallways, you get the feeling of every person who
was in captivity and led into slavery.3 98
The lived experience of individuals detained because of
immigration rendition also bears an obvious and overwhelming
similarity to the lived experience of those who are detained because
of criminal rendition. Under both systems, a person who is locked up
stays locked up, when she would otherwise be released, and held for
rendition to some other government that claims the right to detain
her. Indeed, the experience of an immigrant detainee can be
indistinguishable from that of a criminal prisoner399-she is held in the
same local jail or prison as other criminal defendants awaiting trial or
serving sentences, 400 in the same general population,401 and under the
same conditions.402 The voice of one Iranian detainee tells of the
common experience:
398. Mark Reid, Op-Ed., Armed Forces Veteran Caught Up in Deportation Nightmare,
HARTFORD COURANT, Aug. 12, 2013, http://www.courant.come/news/opinion/editorials
/hc-op-america-deports-its-own-soldiers-instead-of--20130809,0,2569798.story.
399. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, LOCKED AWAY: IMMIGRATION DETAINEES IN JAILS
IN THE UNITED STATES, Ch. I: Summary and Recommendations (1998) [hereinafter
HRW Summary], available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-
02.htm#TopOfPage ("[S]ince the INS has decided to contract with local jails and has
refused to insist on separate, special treatment of immigration detainees who are held in
these jails, an INS detainee's experience in a local jail is no different from that of a local
inmate.").
400. Id. at Ch. IV: Findings ("Commingling INS Detainees with Local Jail
Populations"), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-05.htm#P742
138332.
401. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, ICE/DRO DETENTION
STANDARD: CLASSIFICATION SYSTEM (2008), available at http://www.ice.gov
/doclib/dro/detention-standards/pdf/classification-system.pdf (permitting immigration
detainees to be housed with the "general population" of local jails and prisons).
402. There have been widespread reports of abuses inflicted on immigration detainees,
including overcrowding, lack of access to legal resources or counsel, denial of medical and
mental health care, and physical abuse of detainees. See, e.g., U.S. Gov'T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-07-875, ALIEN DETENTION STANDARDS: TELEPHONE
ACCESS PROBLEMS WERE PERVASIVE AT DETENTION FACILITIES; OTHER
DEFICIENCIES DID NOT SHOW A PATTERN OF NONCOMPLIANCE 5 (2007) (detailing
systemic telephone access problems and varying compliance with other detention
standards); HRW Summary, supra note 399, at Ch. I: Summary and Recommendations
(finding immigration detainees "are sometimes subjected to physical mistreatment and
grossly inadequate conditions of confinement"); SEATTLE UNIV. SCH. OF LAW INT'L
HUMAN RIGHTS CLINIC & ONEAMERICA, VOICES FROM DETENTION: A REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS AT THE NORTHWEST DETENTION CENTER IN TACOMA,
WASHINGTON 62 (2008), available at http://www.weareoneamerica.org/sites/default/files
/OneAmericaDetentionReport.pdf (chronicling "mistreatment in areas of legal access,
family visitation, medical care, food, officer treatment and living conditions" at one
contract service facility).
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[I] have not committed any crime. I have never been in any
type of prison system but when I came here they locked me up
like I'm some kind of criminal ... they locked me up along with
inmates, people that have committed crimes ... that's why I
fear for my life ... 403
Juxtaposing current immigration detainer practices with slave
rendition and criminal rendition forces us to see what these systems
hold in common. Such accounts of the immigration rendition
experience, considered in the light of history, admonish us to treat
immigration detainers, and the legal issues surrounding them, with
gravity." Given the number of people affected by immigration
rendition,4 05 the question of the proper state and local role in
enforcing or resisting immigration detainers is of major importance.
B. Lessons for Immigrant Rendition from Criminal and Slave
Rendition: Procedural Reforms
Considering immigrant rendition together with criminal and
slave rendition is helpful not only because of the similarities among
these systems, but because their differences can indicate what
procedural reforms are needed in the immigration rendition
regime.406 A brief discussion of the pre- and post-seizure procedural
403. Letters from Detainees, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH (June 11, 1998),
http://www.hrw.org/legacy/reports/reports98/us-immig/Ins989-O1.htm (excerpting letter
from P.H., an Iranian detainee, to Human Rights Watch).
404. An empirical study of the criminal detainer system in the early 1970s found that
the problems caused by detainers were exacerbated because of "the discrepancy between
the casualness with which the detainers are filed and the seriousness with which they are
received." Edward Dauber, Reforming the Detainer System: A Case Study, 7 CRIM. L.
BULL. 669, 670-71 (1971). The author's recommendations for reducing the "casualness
with which the detainers are filed" included limiting the authorities responsible for filing
detainers and implementing guidelines for when detainers ought to be filed. Id. at 706-09.
Similar suggestions have been made with respect to immigration detainers. AM. CIVIL
LIBERTIES UNION ET AL., COMMENTS ON U.S. IMMIGRATION AND CUSTOMS
ENFORCEMENT DRAFT DETAINER POLICY 13-19 (2010), available at
http://www.legalactioncenter.org/sites/default/files/docs/lac/NGO-Detainer
CommentsFinal-10-1-2010.pdf (criticizing draft detainer policy for failing to provide
sufficient guidance and failing to hew to ICE's stated enforcement priorities). The
"seriousness with which [immigration detainers] are received" includes, apparently, a
nearly universal compliance by state officials with immigration detainers, as I documented
in an earlier article. See Lasch, supra note 329, at 173-74 (2008).
405. TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 21 (analyzing
data from 347,691 detainers issued over the course of 16 months); Foley, supra note 1.
406. Scholars have argued for increased procedural protections in immigration
proceedings. See, e.g., Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation and Justice: A Constitutional
Dialogue, 41 B.C. L. REV. 771, 778 (2000) (arguing that "courts should apply specific
constitutional protections to [deportation] cases, analogous to those granted to criminal
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protections (or lack thereof) will demonstrate the fecundity of this
soil.
The Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 were devoid of any
pre-seizure protections. Section 3 of the Act of 1793 permitted self-
help for the slave owner, who was "hereby empowered to seize or
arrest such fugitive from labor."407 This power was later approved as
constitutional in Prigg,408 and section 6 of the Act of 1850 similarly
authorized self-help.409
defendants"); Peter L. Markowitz, Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated
Approach to Understanding the Nature of Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 345-47 (2008) (arguing that immigrants in "expulsion"
proceedings, as contrasted with "exclusion" proceedings, should receive the entire panoply
of criminal procedural protections). Scholars have questioned the "civil" label given to
immigration proceedings, see, e.g., Kanstroom, supra, at 787 (rejecting a "formal
civil/criminal line" for determining appropriate procedural protections in deportation
proceedings, in favor of a "more flexible and functional idea of punishment"); have
documented the blurring of the civil-criminal divide with the rise of "crimmigration" (the
increasing intertwining of criminal law in immigration), see Juliet Stumpf, The
Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367,
376-79 (2006); and have disparaged the absence of the right to counsel and the reduced
presence in immigration proceedings of the exclusionary rule, see, e.g., Alice Clapman,
Petty Offenses, Drastic Consequences: Toward a Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel for
Noncitizen Defendants Facing Deportation, 33 CARDOzO L. REV. 585, 617-18 (2011)
(contending that the right to counsel should extend to individuals facing deportation); see
also Stella Burch Elias, "Good Reason to Believe": Widespread Constitutional Violations in
the Course of Immigration Enforcement and the Case for Revisiting Lopez-Mendoza, 2008
WIS. L. REV. 1109, 1155-57 (arguing that constitutional violations by immigration officers
and the fundamental changes in immigration law warrant a reconsideration of the position
that the exclusionary rule does not apply to immigration proceedings). But no one is yet
writing about the disparity in protection afforded in the criminal and immigration
rendition systems. Cf Molly F. Franck, Unlawful Arrests and Over-Detention of America's
Immigrants: What the Federal Government Can Do to Eliminate State and Local Abuse of
Immigration Detainers, 9 HASTINGS RACE & POVERTY L.J. 55, 57-58 (2012) (arguing that
greater federal oversight is needed to curb detainer abuses committed by state and local
law enforcement, but not addressing the lack of procedural protection in immigration
rendition).
407. Fugitive Slave Act of 1793, ch. 7, § 3, 1 Stat. 302, 302 (1793) (repealed 1864); see
also Basinger, supra note 139, at 314 (explaining that the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793
permitted slave owners, or their agents, to seize escaped slaves).
408. Prigg v. Pennsylvania, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 539, 613 (1842). Prigg dealt a formal blow
to those states which had attempted, through "personal liberty" or anti-kidnapping laws,
to impose by state law some pre-seizure procedural protections. Pennsylvania, for
example, required slave-catchers to obtain an arrest warrant for fugitive slaves, which
would be executed by state law enforcement officials. See Basinger, supra note 139, at
316-18.
409. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463-64 (1850) (repealed 1864);
see also Kaczorowski, supra note 175, at 1035-36 (highlighting that, in addition to
permitting self-help, the Act of 1850 called for citizens to assist slave owners in recapturing
escaped slaves).
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As for post-seizure procedural protections, both the Act of 1793
and the Act of 1850 included scant protection for the alleged fugitive
slave. The Act of 1793 required, after the seizure of an alleged
fugitive, that "proof" be presented to a federal or state judicial
authority, by either oral testimony or affidavit.410 Upon satisfactory
proof, a certificate would issue sufficient for removal of the fugitive
from the state. 41' The Act of 1850 closed the gaps in the Act of 1793,
which had afforded state courts opportunity to embellish the post-
procedural process due an alleged fugitive.412 The Act of 1850 put
post-seizure procedure exclusively in the hands of federal officials.4 13
Section 6 of the Act of 1850 expressly prohibited the alleged fugitive
from testifying in her own behalf.414 Most importantly, the Act
expressly declared the summary federal process for issuing a
certificate of removal conclusive and prohibited interference with the
rendition process by state habeas corpus or otherwise.415 "[P]rima
facie evidence would be sufficient to enslave an accused fugitive, who
would have no access to habeas corpus. "416
In stark contrast to fugitive slave rendition, criminal rendition
has become quite regularized in terms of procedure-the IAD and
UCEA contain important pre- and post-seizure procedural
protections for accused fugitives. First, the Fourth Amendment's
guarantee against unreasonable seizures417 is protected throughout
the rendition process. The IAD and UCEA require rendition
demands to be based on an underlying criminal complaint,
information, or indictment.418 Second, in criminal rendition
410. § 3, 1 Stat. at 302-04.
411. Id.
412. See supra Part II.A.4.
413. §§ 1, 5, 6, 9 Stat. at 462-64; see Kaczorowski, supra note 175, at 1035-36 ("The
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 represented an even more remarkable exercise of national
authority to enforce constitutional rights than its 1793 counterpart.").
414. § 6, 9 Stat. at 463.
415. Id.; see also COVER, supra note 85, at 175-77 (detailing early efforts to challenge
the Act in Massachusetts); Basinger, supra note 139, at 323-24 (discussing the Act's
creation of Fugitive Slave Commissioners and the expanded power of certificates of
removal); Kaczorowski, supra note 175, at 1036-37 (describing the effect of certificates of
removal on state process under the Act).
416. Basinger, supra note 139, at 324.
417. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
418. Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2012); UNIFORM
CRIMINAL EXTRADITION Acr § 3 (1936); see also United States v. Mauro, 436 U.S. 340,
352 n.19 (1978) (noting IAD may only be invoked by a jurisdiction in which the prisoner is
the subject of a pending "untried indictment, information, or complaint") (quoting 18
U.S.C. app. § 2 art. IV (1976)); UNIFORM EXTRADITION AND RENDITION Acr prefatory
note at 6-7 (1980) (discussing the requirement of proposed uniform legislation of a finding
of probable cause as a prerequisite to rendition).
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proceedings, the prisoner has the right to be notified of a detainer,419
can challenge the detainer through habeas corpus,420 and can demand
speedy processing of the detainer.421
None of these procedural protections apply to immigration
detainers. There is no requirement that a detainer be issued upon
probable cause 422-indeed, most immigration detainers have been
issued on no greater basis than that "investigation has been
initiated."4 23
And there are no procedural protections available once an
immigration detainer issues. Although the federal government
modified its detainer form in 2011 to include a checkbox that
indicates the local law enforcement authorities should notify the
immigrant prisoner of the detainer 424 nothing in the statute or
regulation requires notice.425 More importantly, even if the prisoner
does receive notice of the detainer, no mechanism for challenging a
detainer exists. Habeas corpus has generally been denied to those
challenging immigration detainers on the ground that the detainer
does not put the prisoner "in custody" for purposes of habeas
jurisdiction.426
419. 18 U.S.C. app. § 2 (2012); UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT § 10.
420. Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 US. 484, 500 (1973)
(allowing prisoner subject to criminal detainer to bring habeas corpus action to challenge
its validity); UNIFORM CRIMINAL EXTRADITION ACT § 10 (explicitly guaranteeing right
to challenge extradition through habeas corpus).
421. See Alabama v. Bozeman, 533 U.S. 146, 151 (2001) ("[T]he [IAD] basically (1)
gives a prisoner the right to demand a trial within 180 days; and (2) gives a State the right
to obtain a prisoner for purposes of trial, in which case the State (a) must try the prisoner
within 120 days of his arrival, and (b) must not return the prisoner to his 'original place of
imprisonment' prior to that trial.").
422. See 8 C.F.R. § 287.7 (2013).
423. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2011) (with a checkbox
indicating DHS has "[i]nitiated an investigation to determine whether this person is
subject to removal from the United States"); see also Lasch, supra note 329, at 173-82
(detailing common immigration detainer practices, including the seeming lack of
procedural protections afforded detained individuals). The most recently issued detainer
guidance and accompanying form suggest that detainers will be issued only where there is
"reason to believe" (a standard equating to probable cause) the targeted prisoner is an
immigration violator. See Lasch, Preempting Immigration Detainer Enforcement, supra
note 7, at 295-97. While this guidance may make up for the regulation's lack of any
evidentiary standard, it may also be transitory.
424. U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (June 2011).
425. INA § 278(d), 8 U.S.C. § 1357(d) (2012); 8 CFR § 287.7. The detainer form now
also includes on its back a single-paragraph "notice to the detainee," with a phone number
the immigrant prisoner can call with complaints. See DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM I-
247 (Dec. 2012).
426. Cases holding that an immigration detainer does not put a prisoner into
constructive custody of federal immigration authorities (as a criminal detainer puts a
2013] 223
224 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
One reason the immigrant rendition experience on the ground
has mirrored slave rendition more closely than criminal rendition has
been the near absolute lack of procedural protections for immigrants
in the rendition system. The closest historical analogy to today's
immigration rendition scheme is the slave rendition system
established by the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850-a system which
allowed seizure without warrant or process, and which prohibited any
procedure for questioning rendition orders issued on scant
evidence.42 7 Yet even the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 required some
evidence-whereas the prisoner who is the target of an immigration
detainer may be held based on nothing more than an unsworn
statement that investigation has been initiated into the individual's
immigration status.428
C. Lessons for Immigrant Rendition from Criminal and Slave
Rendition: Unmasking Legal Formalism
Analogizing immigration rendition to slave rendition and
criminal rendition also serves the important function of connecting
prisoner into the constructive custody of the jurisdiction filing the detainer) are based
upon the view that an immigration detainer is nothing more than a request for advance
notice of a prisoner's release. E.g., Zolicoffer v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 315 F.3d 538, 540
(5th Cir. 2003) ("Filing a detainer is an informal procedure in which the INS informs
prison officials that a person is subject to deportation and requests that officials give the
INS notice of the person's death, impending release, or transfer to another institution."
(quoting Giddings v. Chandler, 979 F.2d 1104, 1105 n.3 (5th Cir. 1992))); Orozco v. U.S.
Immigration and Naturalization Serv., 911 F.2d 539, 541 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1990) ("The filing
of a detainer is an informal process advising prison officials that a prisoner is wanted on
other pending charges and requesting notification prior to the prisoner's release." (citing
United States v. Shahryar, 719 F.2d 1522, 1524 n.3 (11th Cir. 1983))). Because these cases
hinge on a "notice only" view of immigration detainers, it seems doubtful they will
continue to have binding force in light of the detainer regulation's explicit command for
continued custody after the time the prisoner would otherwise be released. See, e.g.,
Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Kentucky, 410 U.S. 484, 498-99 (1973) (holding
prisoner is in constructive custody of an agency when future custody is certain); Vargas v.
Swan, 854 F.2d 1028, 1032-33 (7th Cir. 1988) (remanding for a determination whether an
INS detainer would be treated as a simple notice of INS interest in a prisoner or as a
"hold" on the inmate which would result in extended detention after his sentence until the
INS could take him into custody); Moreno v. Napolitano, No. 11 C 5452, 2012 WL
5995820, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 30, 2012) (holding that plaintiffs held pursuant to
immigration detainer suffered injury because under the "mandatory language [of the
detainer regulation], Plaintiffs faced an actual and imminent risk of injury because they
faced an imminent risk of future confinement pursuant to the 1-247 detainers beyond the
time that they would otherwise be released"); Rios-Quiroz v. Williamson Cnty., Tenn.,
No. 3-11-1168, 2012 WL 3945354, at *4 (M.D. Tenn. Sept. 10, 2012) (holding that use of
"shall" in 8 CFR § 287.7(d) renders the regulation mandatory upon state officials).
427. See Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 6, 9 Stat. 462, 463 (1850) (repealed 1864).
428. See U.S. DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., FORM 1-247 (Dec. 2011).
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existing critiques of immigration enforcement to critiques of slavery
and the criminal justice system and generating new critiques and
insights. While driven by formal legal categories, slavery and
criminality have been revealed as complex societal functions driven
by attitudes toward race, labor, and profit.
Recognizing immigration rendition as a legal system resembling
slave and criminal rendition raises questions as to whether
immigration rendition is similarly driven by race, labor, or profit
rather than by criminality, as the federal government claimed it would
be when it launched Secure Communities.429
As the documents revealed in April 2011 showed,430 there has
been a general failure of Secure Communities to hit its target-the
"Level-i" criminal immigrants thought to pose a serious risk to
national security and public safety.431 The documents indicated some
seventy-nine percent of immigrants deported through Secure
Communities had either no criminal conviction or only a lower level
criminal conviction.432 Twenty-eight percent of those turned over to
DHS through the program had no criminal conviction at all.433 A
study of detainers issued over a more recent sixteen-month period
found nearly half of those targeted by a detainer had no criminal
conviction at all.434
In many jurisdictions the government's failure to adhere to its
enforcement priorities was much more pronounced. In Maricopa
County, Arizona, for example-policed by the notoriously anti-
immigrant Sheriff Joe Arpaio435-some fifty-four percent of
429. See U.S. IMMIGRATION & CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT, STATE IDENTIFICATION
BUREAU DEPLOYMENT BRIEFING: NEW YORK STATE (2009), available at
http://ccrjustice.org/files/17.%20State%20Identification%20Bureau%20Deployment%20
Briefing.pdf (illustrating ICE advanced Secure Communities as a program aimed at
addressing crime).
430. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (discussing documents obtained
from DHS that raised questions about the effectiveness and voluntariness of Secure
Communities and prompted calls for an investigation into the program).
431. NAT'L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., supra note 35, at 1-2.
432. Id.
433. Id. at 2.
434. See TRANSACTIONAL RECORDS ACCESS CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 21
(finding 47.7% of those subjected to immigration detainers had no criminal conviction
whatsoever, and only 23% had "Level-i" convictions).
435. See Richard Delgado, Precious Knowledge: State Bans on Ethnic Studies, Book
Traffickers (Librotraficantes), and a New Type of Race Trial, 91 N.C. L. REV. 1513, 1515
(2013) (noting Sheriff Arpaio's "heavy-handed policing" of Latinos); Kevin R. Johnson &
Joanna E. Cuevas Ingram, Anatomy of a Modern-Day Lynching: The Relationship
Between Hate Crimes Against Latinalos and the Debate over Immigration Reform, 91 N.C.
L. REV. 1613, 1651 (2013) (noting the "well-publicized civil rights abuses by the Maricopa
2252013]
226 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 92
immigrants turned over to the federal government through Secure
Communities had no criminal conviction.436
The numbers demonstrate that criminality is not guiding
immigration rendition; reviewing our rendition history helps reveal
what other forces might be at work.
1. Rendition as a Mechanism for Enforcing Racial Boundaries
The most important and obvious aspect of the shared experience,
tying together those people and communities targeted by immigration
rendition, criminal rendition, and of course slave rendition, is race.
The entire history of slave rendition, and much of the history of
postbellum criminal rendition, was one of returning African
Americans to the south. Even now, beyond the days of convict leasing
and chain gang labor, the racial disparity endemic to our criminal
justice system437 means criminal rendition disproportionately affects
persons of color. Scholars have similarly documented the pervasive
racial aspect of American immigration enforcement,438 which means
County Sheriff's Office in Arizona, led by the controversial Sheriff Joe Arpaio" and the
subsequent Justice Department civil rights action against him).
436. NAT'L DAY LABORER ORG. NETWORK ET AL., supra note 35, at 4.
437. See generally ALEXANDER, supra note 208 (highlighting contemporary issues of
race in the criminal justice system); DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS
IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM (1999) (detailing racial disparities
throughout the United States criminal justice system); MARC MAUER, RACE TO
INCARCERATE (1999) (documenting the growth of the United States prison system);
ROBERT PERKINSON, TEXAS TOUGH: THE RISE OF AMERICA'S PRISON EMPIRE (2010)
(examining the influence of southern slavery practices on the evolution of the U.S. prison
system).
438. See, e.g., KEVIN R. JOHNSON, THE "HUDDLED MASSES" MYTH: IMMIGRATION
AND CIVIL RIGHTS 13-53 (2004) [hereinafter JOHNSON, "HUDDLED MASSES"]
(describing the relationship, throughout United States history, between immigration
enforcement and racial subordination); Kevin R. Johnson, The Intersection of Race and
Class in U.S. Immigration Law and Enforcement, 72 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Fall 2009,
at 1, 17-18 [hereinafter Johnson, Intersection] (highlighting the issues of racial profiling in
immigration enforcement and noting the distinction between enforcement at the United
States' borders with Mexico and Canada); Johnson, supra note 10, at 608-13 (describing
the impact of racism on immigration debate in the United States); see also Gabriel J. Chin,
Segregation's Last Stronghold: Race Discrimination and the Constitutional Law of
Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV. 1, 5-6 (1998) (describing the roots of immigration law's
plenary power doctrine, which permits racial discrimination, in the nineteenth century
race-based laws, and arguing that "[t]he Supreme Court's immigration jurisprudence
represents the last vestige of an antique period of American law"); C6sar Cuauhtdmoc
Garcia HernAndez, Criminal Defense after Padilla v. Kentucky, 26 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 475,
480-83 (2012) (tracing crimmigration's history to nineteenth century "racist displeasure
with Chinese immigrants"); Mary Romero, Racial Profiling and Immigration Law
Enforcement: Rounding Up of Usual Suspects in the Latino Community, 32 CRITICAL SOC.
447, 449 (2006) (concluding that "Latinos (particularly dark complected, poor, and
working class) are at risk before the law").
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the targets of immigration rendition are likewise disproportionately
people of color.
Putting immigration rendition next to slave and criminal
rendition raises the question whether immigration rendition is simply
yet another legal procedural mechanism to return people of color
back across borders. Given the history, it seems appropriate that
racial profiling was one of Santa Clara County's concerns when it
sought to withdraw from Secure Communities.43 9 And it is perhaps
not surprising that the numbers in Maricopa County do appear to
have been the product of racial profiling-in December 2011, the
Justice Department concluded a three-year investigation into Sheriff
Joe Arpaio's practices, finding the Maricopa County Sheriff's Office
"engages in racial profiling of Latinos; [and] unlawfully stops, detains,
and arrests Latinos."4o
2. Rendition as a Mechanism for Fulfilling Labor Demands
Considering slave and criminal rendition can remind us of the
extent to which immigration rendition is a labor-driven system.
Unauthorized immigrants, for the most part, migrate to the United
States to find employment-a 2006 report found that ninety-four
percent of unauthorized male immigrants and fifty-four percent of
unauthorized female immigrants participate in the labor force,"
comprising a significant percentage of the labor force in certain
industries.442
There is no question, then, that immigration rendition acts as a
mechanism for returning migrating laborers back across borders in
439. See supra notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
440. Letter from Thomas E. Perez, Assistant Attorney Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice Civil
Rights Div., to Bill Montgomery, Maricopa Cnty. Attorney, at 2 (Dec. 15, 2011),
http://www.justice.gov/crt/about/spl/documents/mcso-findletter12-15-11.pdf.
441. JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW RESEARCH CTR., SIZE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE
UNAUTHORIZED MIGRANT POPULATION IN THE U.S.: ESTIMATES BASED ON THE
MARCH 2005 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 9-10 (2006), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/reports/report.php?ReportlD=61.
442. See id. at ii-iii (reporting that unauthorized migrants account for nearly 5%--over
7.2 million workers-of the U.S. labor force, including making up "24% of all workers
employed in farming occupations, 17% in cleaning, 14% in construction and 12% in food
preparation industries," and in further breaking down those categories, unauthorized
workers make up "36% of all insulation workers, 29% of roofers and drywall installers,
[and] 27% of all butchers and other food processing workers"); see also Johnson, supra
note 10, at 585 (arguing that migration to the United States is "not all about drugs,
terrorism, leprosy, September 11, welfare, crime, [or] just about every other social
problem about which certain segments of the public, policy-makers, and pundits have
profound-and, at times, even legitimate-worries," but rather "is primarily about jobs
and economic opportunity").
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the same way slave rendition and criminal rendition returned people
across borders."3 This common thread suggests the relationship
between labor and rendition practices is essential to understanding
the driving forces behind immigration rendition.
There was a complicated relationship between abolitionism and
labor protectionism before the Civil War. Attitudes toward abolition
and the migration of African American workers may have varied
according to social class-with northern capitalists, for example,
favoring abolition because it would free a cheap labor force and
northern laborers opposing it for protectionist reasons.'" Fear of
freed African Americans competing for jobs with whites produced
anti-abolitionist sentiment throughout the antebellum period" and
caused riots in New York City in 1863.46
Criminality, like slavery, is a legal formalism toward which
attitudes might be adjusted according to labor market needs." Thus,
criminality was a sufficiently malleable concept to accommodate the
need for plantation labor in the postbellum south, establishing "a
fluid, flexible affair which alternated between free and forced labor in
time to the rhythm of the southern labor market.""8
Of course, in considering both slavery and criminality, labor
concerns have by no means been divorced from attitudes toward race.
Throughout the antebellum period, the presence of African
American workers was seen as degrading or contaminating the white
labor force,"9 and the "inherent inferiority of blacks" was assumed.450
443. See supra Part II.B.1.
444. Edna Bonacich, Abolition, the Extension of Slavery, and the Position of Free
Blacks: A Study of Split Labor Markets in the United States, 1830-1863, 81 AM. J. SOC. 601,
622 (1975).
445. Id. at 622-23; Williston H. Lofton, Abolition and Labor, 33 J. NEGRO HIST. 261,
272-74 (1948); c.f LEON F. LITWACK, NORTH OF SLAVERY: THE NEGRO IN THE FREE
STATES, 1790-1860, at 5-6 (1961) (discussing white laborers' distaste for competition that
slave labor created).
446. Albon P. Man, Jr., Labor Competition and the New York Draft Riots of 1863, 36 J.
NEGRO HIST. 375, 375 (1951).
447. See supra notes 209-11 and accompanying text.
448. Cohen, supra note 209, at 33.
449. Cheryl I. Harris, "Too Pure an Air." Somerset's Legacy from Anti-Slavery to
Colorblindness, 13 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 439, 450 (2007); see GEORGE M.
FREDRICKSON, THE BLACK IMAGE IN THE WHITE MIND: THE DEBATE ON AFRO-
AMERICAN CHARACTER AND DESTINY, 1817-1914, at 140 (1987) (recounting the
announcement of Representative David Wilmot of Pennsylvania that "he 'would preserve
to free white labor a fair country, a rich inheritance, where the sons of toil, of my own race
and own color, can live without the disgrace which association with negro slavery brings
upon free labor.' "); id. (describing how "the free-soil movement ... combined principled
opposition to slavery ... with a considerable amount of antipathy to the presence of
Negroes on any basis whatever"); LITWACK, supra note 445, at 269 (describing the
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This animosity toward laborers of color, and the belief that "Negroes
were unfit to associate with whites," caused even some who favored
abolition to support a plan of "Negro containment" in the south.451
This complex of socio-economic forces might explain what at first
blush seems like a critical difference between modern-day
immigration rendition and historical slave and criminal rendition.
Fugitive slave and Jim Crow era criminal rendition were tools used by
southern states to bring back a captive labor force, whereas current
immigration rendition is used by the federal government to send back
a free labor force.452 The rendition of African American laborers
should be understood not only as the return of a captive labor force
to the south but also as the expulsion from the north of laborers of
color, who would degrade, contaminate, and compete with free white
labor.453
Republican party's claim, in 1858, to be the "white man's party ... for free white men, and
for making white labor respectable and honorable, which it can never be when negro slave
labor is brought into competition with it").
450. Derrick A. Bell, Justice Accused: Anti-Slavery and the Judicial Process, 76 COLUM.
L. REV. 350, 356 & n.13 (1976) (book review) (citing, inter alia, WINTHROP D. JORDAN,
WHITE OVER BLACK: AMERICAN ATrITUDES TOWARD THE NEGRO, 1550-1812, at 429
(1968) and LITWACK, supra note 445, at viii ("[T]his was a white man's country in which
the Negro had no political voice and only a prescribed social and economic role.")).
Racism was rampant even among antislavery forces, and "opposition to slavery . . . could
be entirely consistent with a hatred of Blacks." Harris, supra note 449, at 450.
451. FREDRICKSON, supra note 449, at 144.
452. Another explanation, beyond the scope of this Article, may be that immigration
rendition today has taken on the form of sending back a free labor force because of
"preservation-through-transformation" or "status regime . . . 'modernization.' " See Siegel,
supra note 396, at 2178-79. Under this theory, the socio-economic forces relating to race
and labor that previously were satisfied by formal legal mechanisms (slave rendition and
criminal rendition) allowing for a recapture of unfree laborers of color are now satisfied by
formal legal mechanisms (immigration rendition) allowing for an expulsion of free
laborers of color. See id.
453. History might support, for example, the idea that that the fugitive slave provisions
in the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the Constitution served not only southern
interests in preserving a certain form of labor and race relations, but northern interests as
well, by furthering "Negro containment." FREDRICKSON, supra note 449, at 144. Seen in
this light, the abolition of slavery and fugitive slave provisions in the Northwest Ordinance
can be seen not as compromise but as consistency. See PETER S. ONUF, STATEHOOD AND
UNION: A HISTORY OF THE NORTHWEST ORDINANCE 58-64 (1987). The Northwest
Territories were not envisioned to be some Utopian society of free peoples of all races-
rather, it was intended that white New Englanders would settle there and replicate their
society in the territories. Id. at 58 (stating that the passage of the ordinance "was intended
to attract 'robust and industrious' settlers from New England"); Denis P. Duffey, The
Northwest Ordinance as a Constitutional Document, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 929, 938 (1995)
(explaining that the land from the Northwest Territory was marketed primarily to New
Englanders); id. at 956 (noting the expectation that the territories would be dominated by
the Saxon race, as evidenced by the provision in the Northwest Ordinance for "just and
lawful wars," which would allow white settlers to oust Indians standing in the way of
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3. Rendition as a Mechanism for Generating Profit
Formal rendition schemes not only satisfy socio-economic
demands concerning race and labor, they generate profit consistent
with those demands. At the micro level, slave catchers and bounty
hunters reaped occupational benefits from the slave and criminal
rendition systems.454 Federal magistrates were compensated five
dollars for hearing cases and received an additional five-dollar fee for
ordering the return of a fugitive slave under the Fugitive Slave Act of
1850.455 Federal officers were entitled to recover a fee and expenses
for executing process under the Act.456
State and local officials do not get reimbursed for holding
suspected immigration violators on immigration detainers. Indeed,
the absence of remuneration has fueled some of the local resistance
to immigration detainers-or at a minimum, lent strength to claims of
an unfunded federal mandate. In Cook County, where one local
official decried Secure Communities as a "$15 million unfunded
mandate,"457 the federal government reportedly has offered to pay the
costs of detention in an effort to persuade local officials to honor
immigration detainers.458 History's suggestion, that Cook County
territorial expansion); Peter S. Onuf, Liberty, Development, and Union: Visions of the West
in the 1780s, 43 WM. & MARY Q. 179, 196 (1986) (noting the view of Mannaseh Cutler,
founder of the Ohio Land Company, that "[u]ntil touched by the white man's
transforming hand, the western lands would remain 'barren wilds' and 'immense
deserts' "). "The master passion of the age was not with extending liberty to blacks but
with erecting republics for whites." William W. Freehling, The Founding Fathers and
Slavery, 77 AM. HIST. REV. 81, 83 (1972). A vision of the Northwest Territories free of
African Americans entirely was consistent with this prevailing sentiment, and furthered by
both the provision abolishing slavery in the territories and the provision providing for the
return of fugitive slaves. See AN ORDINANCE FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
TERRITORY OF THE UNITED STATES NORTHWEST OF THE RIVER OHIO of 1787, art. VI,
supra note 103, at 250.
454. The slave-catcher in the Jones v. Van Zandt case, for example, received $450 for
the return of eight people. Jules Lobel, Courts as Forums for Protest, 52 UCLA L. REV.
477, 497 (2004); see Jeffrey M. Schmitt, The Antislavery Judge Reconsidered, 29 LAW &
HIST. REV. 797, 815 (2011) (indicating northerners' view of slave-catchers as "morally
corrupt profiteers"). For a description of the role of the bounty hunter in the criminal
justice system, see generally Jonathan Drimmer, When Man Hunts Man: The Rights and
Duties of Bounty Hunters in the American Criminal Justice System, 33 HOUS. L. REV. 731
(1996).
455. Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, ch. 60, § 8, 9 Stat. 462, 464 (1850) (repealed 1864).
456. Kaczorowski, supra note 175, at 1037-38.
457. Press Release, Alvaro R. Obregon, Media Liaison - Gov't Office Manager, New
County Ordinance Ends Cooperation on Ice Detainer Requests (Sept. 7, 2011), available
at http://icirr.org/sites/default/files/ICEOrdPressReleaseFinal.pdf.
458. Antonio Olivo, Feds Seek Compromise on Cook County Immigration Ordinance:
Immigration and Customs Enforcement Director Offers to Pay for Detainer of Suspected
Illegal Immigrants Who've Posted Bail, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 29, 2012, http://articles
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would effectively be serving the role of slave-catchers or bounty
hunters in the immigration rendition system, puts the proposal in a
stark light.
At the macro level, rendition systems may serve perceived needs
regarding the labor supply and operate to feed society's engine for
profits. In the antebellum south, of course, rendition fueled the slave
economy. Slavery was intended to be profitable,459 and slave rendition
was aimed at recapturing slave labor and producing profits.460
Captive labor in the postbellum south also served to generate
profits for capitalists, and the criminal justice system has fueled some
part of the economy since. Douglas Blackmon describes chillingly the
intimate connection between postbellum convict leasing and
American industry.461 When convict leasing was abandoned, it was in
favor of state penitentiaries and chain gangs-prisoners were put in
service of the state economy.4 62 The connection between the criminal
.chicagotribune.com/2012-02-29/news/ct-met-cook-county-immigration-ordinance-0229-
20120229_1illegal-immigrants-ice-detainers-immigration-enforcement-agency. The
response to the federal government's offer revealed the Cook County ordinance was truly
an act of resistance: the Cook County Board president reportedly declared, "Equal justice
before the law is more important to me than the budgetary considerations." Hal Dardick,
Preckwinkle Ices ICE Proposal: Rejects Call For Working Group to Resolve Issues, CHI.
TRIB., April 10, 2012, http://articles.chicagotribune.com/2012-04-10/news/ct-met-toni-
preckwinkle-0411-20120411_1_preckwinkle-detainers-immigration-status.
459. There has been considerable debate over whether slavery was in fact profitable.
Compare Alfred H. Conrad & John R. Meyer, The Economics of Slavery in the Ante
Bellum South, 66 J. POL. ECON. 95, 96, 121 (1958) (concluding slavery was profitable), and
Richard K. Vedder & David C. Stockdale, The Profitability of Slavery Revisited: A
Different Approach, 49 AGRIC. HIST. 392, 404 (1975) (concluding slavery was profitable),
with Edward Saraydar, A Note on the Profitability of Ante Bellum Slavery, 30 S. ECON. J.
325, 331 (1964) (questioning Conrad and Meyer).
460. As is suggested above, see supra note 453, slave rendition may also have served
the function of promoting "Negro containment" in the south, and thereby promoted
different profit interests in the north. This may explain the role that commercial interests
played in brokering the "compromise" behind the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and its
inclusion not only of an anti-slavery provision but also of a fugitive slave provision. See
Duffey, supra note 453, at 959, 962 (asserting the Northwest Ordinance promoted
commercialism by "making the land in the Territory more salable," and describing the
Ordinance as "a machine for channeling the self-interest of settlers and commercial
interests and turning it into an increasing fund of liberty for the nation (and the world) as
a whole").
461. See generally DOUGLAS BLACKMON, SLAVERY BY ANOTHER NAME: THE RE-
ENSLAVEMENT OF BLACK PEOPLE IN AMERICA FROM THE CIVIL WAR TO WORLD WAR
11(2008).
462. Alex Lichtenstein, Good Roads and Chain Gangs in the Progressive South: "The
Negro Convict is a Slave", 59 J. S. HIST. 85-89 (1993) (describing how the "good roads
movement" in the south worked an extension of the south's economic reliance on captive
black labor through the abolition of convict leasing in favor of putting convicts to work on
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justice system and industry persists today, not only in the employment
of prisoners for paltry wages in prison industries,463 but also in the
employment of guards and construction companies to fuel our
massive for-profit "prison-industrial complex." 46
Immigrant detainees contribute to this growth industry,
comprising the fastest-growing segment of America's huge
incarcerated population.465 Supported by the broad power of
mandatory no-bond detention in immigration proceedings,466 this
profitable mass incarceration of immigrants of color is largely driven
by immigration detainers. 467 Putting immigration rendition side-by-
side against slave rendition and criminal rendition helps bring that
point into sharper focus.
CONCLUSION
A debate is currently raging over the proper relationship
between the federal government and the states regarding immigration
enforcement-some states and localities seek to "opt in" to
immigration enforcement while others like Santa Clara County have
chosen to "opt out." Insofar as it affects immigrant rendition, history
demonstrates the debate is not new. Through rendition controversies
over two centuries, states and localities moderated the formal legal
boundaries across which rendition purports to act. Northern states
altered the boundary of slavery through at times systematic resistance
state roads); see also OSHINSKY, supra note 209, at 135-56 (describing conditions at
Mississippi's state-run prison farm following the end of convict leasing).
463. See William P. Quigley, Prison Work, Wages, and Catholic Social Thought: Justice
Demands Decent Work for Decent Wages, Even for Prisoners, 44 SANTA CLARA L. REV.
1159, 1160, 1164 (2004).
464. See JOEL DYER, THE PERPETUAL PRISONER MACHINE: How AMERICA
PROFITS FROM CRIME 53 (2000); Michael Hallett, Commerce with Criminals: The New
Colonialism in Criminal Justice, 21 REV. POL'Y RES. 49, 49 (2004); Adam Gopnik, The
Caging of America, NEW YORKER, Jan. 30, 2012, http://www.newyorker.com
/arts/critics/atlarge/2012/01/30/120130crat-atlarge-gopnik. See generally DYER, supra
(discussing the prison industrial complex, its causes, characteristics, and possible
solutions); PERKINSON, supra note 437 (recounting evolution of U.S. prison system).
465. Robert Koulish, Blackwater and the Privatization of Immigration Control, 20 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 462, 477 (2008) (citation omitted) (noting the "close nexus ... between
immigrant detention policies and the new boom market in private detention").
466. See 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c) (2012) (mandating no-bond detention for, inter alia, any
person in immigration proceedings who has been convicted of any controlled substance
offense).
467. See Whitney Chelgren, Preventive Detention Distorted: Why It Is Unconstitutional
to Detain Immigrants Without Procedural Protections, 44 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1477, 1486-87
(2011) (noting that many of the facilities in which immigrant detainees are held are
private, for-profit prisons or jails).
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to fugitive slave rendition. Their voice in the dialogue was heard
through the accepted legal principle that the federal government
could not compel state officials to act-and then silenced by the
Fugitive Slave Act of 1850 and its consolidation of control over slave
rendition in the federal government. The states also expressed
themselves in matters of criminal rendition, both before and after the
Civil War, through the same Tenth Amendment anti-commandeering
principles.
Seen against this historical backdrop, resistance to federal
immigration detainers is not only legally justifiable, but belongs to a
tradition of expressed state resistance to rendition in the name of civil
rights. States may "opt out" of immigration detainer enforcement
because the federal compulsion that is currently a feature of the
immigration detainer regulation violates the Tenth Amendment. The
Tenth Amendment, put another way, permits states an active voice
whenever state officials are put in service of federal immigration
enforcement.
History allows us not only to understand the current resistance
but to understand how our immigration rendition system compares to
historical practice, in terms of procedural protections. The fact that
the closest historical analogue to our rendition system is the Fugitive
Slave Act of 1850 is deeply troubling and ought to inspire
consideration of both pre-seizure and post-seizure procedural
protections for our immigration rendition system.
Perhaps most importantly, history also teaches us that we must
transcend legal formalism in considering rendition regimes. The
formal legal boundaries across which bodies are delivered are nothing
more than the accumulation of social and economic attitudes and
define the roles people subject to those boundaries are expected to
play in our society and our economy. It is necessary to remove the
mask of legal formalism in order to understand what our rendition
systems actually accomplish.
The mistake in the past has been to explain away a clearly unjust
rendition system as ultimately grounded in some culpable act or
violation of formal law. For those looking back attempting to
decipher "all of the complexities of the process of complicity," 468 the
question to ask is "how was this permitted to happen?" Anti-slavery
judges, on one view, were able to put aside their morality and justify
enforcing the Fugitive Slave Acts of 1793 and 1850 by means of an
exaggerated "escalation of formal values and ... retreat to
468. Bell, supra note 450, at 356 (citing COVER, supra note 85, at xi).
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formalism." 469 Another explanation is that those, supposed anti-
slavery judges shared sufficient socio-economic interest with pro-
slavery forces to water down their anti-slavery views.470 The
importance of either account lies in exposing what lies beneath the
formal legal rules.
In the same way, for some time historians overlooked the
significance of convict leasing by relying on legal formalism.
"Sympathy for the victims, however brutally they had been abused,
was tempered because, after all, they were criminals."47' Reliance on
legal formalism obscured the fact that criminality in the Jim Crow
South was nothing more than a cover for a race-driven, labor-driven
system.
Seeing our current immigration rendition system as a system
driven by a complex of attitudes toward race, labor, and profit-as
opposed to a system driven by the culpable acts of those it affects, will
help us understand how a similar moral sleight of hand is necessary to
justify the system. We might hope to justify a race-driven, labor-
protective, profit-driven immigrant rendition system by reference to
some underlying illegality: "Those who are being deported have
committed crimes in our country." But the data reveal that the
federal government's promise to prioritize the deportation of so-
called "criminal aliens" has been largely myth, with the overwhelming
numbers of immigrants deported being those at the bottom of the
Secure Communities priority scale, many with no criminal convictions
whatsoever.
We might hope also to resort to the underlying illegality of
border crossing: "Those who are being deported came here illegally.
We have legal ways of entering the country, but they jumped the
queue." The question we must ask, then, is whether the border we
have constructed from our accumulated socio-economic fear and
desire can justify such formalism,4 72 any more than could the border
469. COVER, supra note 85, at 238; see id. at 229-38 (discussing judges' "elevation of
formal stakes").
470. Bell, supra note 450, at 356-57 ("It need not demean these judges to suggest that
little in their writings, judicial or personal, forecloses the possibility that (a) they shared
the prevailing view of their time regarding the natural superiority of whites and that (b)
the resulting perception of the blacks' lesser humanity helped tip the scales of justice
toward results deemed necessary to save the union."); see also Holden-Smith, supra note
146, at 1091 (finding that "[1]ike many privileged whites of his era, [Justice] Story was so
far removed from the plight of the black victims of slavery and racism that he was unable
to appreciate the harmfulness and depravity of the practices he sanctioned in Prigg").
471. BLACKMON, supra note 461, at 5.
472. See JOHNSON, "HUDDLED MASSES," supra note 438, at 152-63 (discussing the
social construction of "alien" and "illegal alien," and the use of this social construction as a
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between slavery and freedom in the antebellum period, or the border
between freedom and convict leasing, chain gangs, and lynching in the
postbellum period.
proxy to perpetuate racial subordination); Johnson, Intersection, supra note 438, at 2
("The laws are nothing less than a 'magic mirror' into the nation's collective consciousness
about its perceived national identity-an identity that marginalizes poor and working
immigrants of color and denies them full membership in American social life.").
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